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Abstract 
The thesis develops themes around eight published works and as such the thesis 
encompasses a coherent caucus of work within the petrochemicals industry in 
the UK. The thesis provides evidence which confirms the widespread use of a 
strategy of flexibility but challenges the conception of strategy as a deliberate 
formal plan, and the rational economism of Transaction Cost Economics. It also 
casts doubt on the existence of distinct strategic levels. The multinationals in 
the industry have been exposed as not using a sophisticated rationale to underpin 
their strategy, relying instead on institutional ideologies or mimetic 
isomorphism. The thesis also challenges exiting conceptions of the role of 
Human Resources in the pursuit of strategy by showing the importance of the 
generic HR function in line management as opposed to an HR department. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Introductory Remarks 
This chapter sets the scene for the research area and explains the thesis title 
"Strategy, flexibility and human resource management: 
a study of the outsourcing of maintenance in UKpetrochemicals"  
It represents the empirical investigation of flexibility within a given industry, 
that of petrochemicals 
The basis for the research is that the economic success of any business depends 
largely on the relative costs of production versus the revenues generated by 
sales. In the UK, former PM Tony Blair asserted at the CBI conference "The 
[UK] productivity gap has to close" (People Management 2001). One of the 
historical measures of productivity has been labour productivity: with increased 
competition, recent initiatives have resulted in a return to relating labour costs to 
output. 
Productivity - with so-called 'productivity deals' with trade unions - has been a 
key feature of manufacturing in the petrochemicals industry (Nightingale 1980) 
These created more flexible working patterns, predominantly in maintenance, 
but also in the interface with production. These were not applied to external 
supply chains, which involved the use of unreliable contractors in construction 
and maintenance (NEDO 1970). However, the petrochemical industry and its 
productivity has not been the subject of much further research. 
Meanwhile, the ideal of the 'flexible firm' (Atkinson 1984a) was developed as a 
strategy in firms with the principal aim of generating better returns by moving 
fixed costs to a more variable basis. This was by way of three types of 
flexibility: financial flexibility (such as performance related pay), numerical 
flexibility (often by outsourcing tasks to external agencies) and by functional 
flexibility, enhancing the internal 'core competence' of the firm (Prahalad and 
Hamel 1990). All three of these flexibilities could apply to the petrochemicals 
industry. This concentration on flexibility gave rise to 'the flexibility debate' 
(Wood 1988). Evidence accrued piecemeal showing that flexibility 
arrangements occurred in service industries (Hunter et al (1993) used 32 service 
organisations out of a sample of 47 cases) but also most notably in 
manufacturing (Delbridge and Lowe 1998). 
Human resource (HR) issues have not been followed up in the literature which 
debated higher level issues. Additionally, the flexible firm literature lacked a 
coherent theoretical underpinning and its claim to be strategic remained 
untested. As an indicator of the lack of progress, Peel and Boxall (2005) still 
asked: "when is contracting preferable to employment?" 
These three areas - strategy, FIR and theory are correlated and the major aim of 
the research illustrated in this thesis is their empirical investigation within 
petrochemicals. 
1.2 Conceptualisation of the research 
Smith (1989) in his criticism of the literature on flexibility suggests 
'a grounded theoretical approach... is required' 
Smith (1989:218) 
Procter et al (1994) also called for "in-depth research" in this area. 
The flexible firm model was criticised for a lack of theoretical rigour (e.g. Pollert 
1987, 1988a, b, 1991) but new approaches in institutional research had produced 
the new institutional economics - 'transaction cost economics' (Williamson 1975 
1981), which related to numerical flexibility. The development of linkages from 
external economic pressures to managerial actions would add to knowledge by 
grounding the research in a theoretical framework. There was therefore an 
opportunity to contribute to theoretical development in this broad area. 
The research proposed to investigate the strategic (or other) rationale for any 
changes found and to place HR issues within such a framework. Using in-depth 
fieldwork, it sought to gather evidence from an empirical case study to counter 
the problem posed by anonymous postal surveys. To limit extraneous variables 
such as technology and function, the area of research was limited to one 
function, maintenance, and one industry, the petrochemical industry, in one 
country, the UK. 
Strategic management research often did not acknowledge economics or HR 
theory: the state of theorising in strategic management is 'pre-paradigmatic' and 
composed of competing paradigms. Mintzberg et al (1998, 2001) for example 
claim that ten different schools of strategy exist. 
In the HR field, much research was criticised for its descriptive nature (Willman 
1986, Kelly, 1998) and use of anonymous postal survey methods such as in the 
case of WERS (the Workplace Employee Relations Survey): Ritson (1995, 
1998a 1999) details the major criticisms. They also lack rigour: consequently, in 
the HR field, theory is also weak. 
The research sought to answer questions about the implementation of the flexible 
firm model by empirical evidence in the petrochemical industry. Initial enquiries 
revealed a reluctance of firms to disclose those internal actions which were 
subsumed under the term 'functional flexibility' —i.e. maintenance craft work and 
trade union demarcations. However one firm, Mobil, at its Coryton Refinery, 
agreed to host research under 'numerical flexibility', based on the 
implementation of a new agreement for external contractors. 
In order to engage in the fieldwork, necessary to investigate the issue in the 
depth required, ESRC funding was sought. This was formulated with the aim of 
adding theory to the area, and understanding the implementation of a strategy 
which involved human resources - a new productivity deal disguised as a single 
union agreement. 
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The Research Proposal agreed by ESRC was entitled "Transaction costs and 
industrial relations strategy: evidence from Mobil's Coryton Agreement". The 
detailed rationale was: 
"A case study of the development of a single union agreement which links events 
to theories of transaction cost, strategic management and flexible firm literature 
and its implementation under Human Resource Management" 
A grant of £27,667 awarded in March 1995 under project number R-000-22-
1670 
The research scope was broad, encompassing economic theory corporate strategy 
organisational structure in the guise of the flexible firm model, and particularly 
the link to HR. These areas constituted the broad research questions which 
needed to be answered in the publications 
The structure of the thesis is as follows: in Chapter 2 the background literature is 
reviewed so as to complement the detail of works cited in the eight individual 
papers in Chapter 3 the basic methodology of case study and fieldwork is 
described. In Chapter 4 the results of the empirical work in the eight 
publications are related to the literature to demonstrate the contribution to 
knowledge of the thesis. In ChapterS the main elements of the thesis are 
summarised 
1.3 Summary 
This thesis seeks to examine the status of the flexible firm model in an industry 
with a history of sophisticated management and deep concerns about 
productivity. Empirical and theoretical development at the level of the firmlplant 
will develop knowledge of the theoretical rationale, and the role of HR factors in 
strategy. 
Accordingly, two broad questions have been posed: 
what is the process offormulation of a strategy offlexibility and 
how has any strategy been implemented in the UK petrochemicals industry. 
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Chapter 2 Background Literature 
2.1 Introductory Remarks 
This Chapter will be divided into the major areas of literature in terms of the 
research questions: what is the process offormulation of a strategy offlexibility 
and how has any strategy been implemented in the UK petrochemicals industry. 
The first question deals with the idea of flexibility with appropriate theoretical 
frameworks. It then links this to the history of the petrochemicals industry in its 
pursuit of that goal and to the possibility of a strategic intent. In answer to the 
second question, its use of human resources in its achievement is investigated. 
The literatures are detailed in the eight publications listed in the preface. The 
main background literatures below add to these and consolidate the area by 
outlining the issues relating to the two broad questions. 
2. 2 The research area: the UK petrochemicals industry 
A key feature of petrochemicals is the pursuit of economies due to its precarious 
financing. The oil industry has historic and current low returns on capital. 
Watson and Vandervell state since 1991, annual returns averaged only 3.6% in 
the UK and 5.6% in the USA as a result 
'this has focussed companies on making their refining and marketing operations 
as efficient as possible.' 
(Watson and Vandervell 2006:16) 
Because of the need to maximise returns, and pressure from owners, the industry 
has historically been in the vanguard of innovation in management such as in 
marketing (Ritson 1999a). 
This has especially been with regard to the flexibility of craft work (e.g. 
Wedderbum and Crompton 1972). Demarcation disputes had become a topic of 
media frenzy and subsequent discussion of 'half-time Britain' and 'the British 
Worker Question' (Nichols 1986) 
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The subsequent attempts at the removal of demarcations between trades resulted 
in flexibility and so more efficiency. These became famous as productivity 
agreements and were promoted by Flanders (1964), at Esso Fawley and by 
Oldfleld (1966) at Mobil Coryton, whose book he titled 'New Look Industrial 
Relations'. These deals focussed on the maintenance flinction because of 
evidence in the literature suggesting it was important. Ahlstrand (1990) showed 
the progressive moves by Esso Fawley managers over time to use de-recognition 
of different trade unions to promote internal functional flexibility by transfer of 
employees from annual to staff conditions of service where no artificial 
demarcations existed, these being based on skill alone. Young (1986) applauded 
the 'fully flexible craftsman' deal at Mobil Coryton, which was later reported in 
the HR press (OS 1992). According to Cibin and Grant (1996); there was a 
global strategy across the petrochemicals industry. This was in order to reduce 
the scope and breadth of product offerings and, simultaneously, move to internal 
dynamic efficiency as opposed to the previous static efficiency. BP not only 
outsourced its accounting function to contractors, but also its IT function (Cross 
1995). 
Recently, the industry entered a new phase of overcapacity and economic 
problems, creating a real problem of competition in the UK petrol market (Cohen 
1998, Ritson 1999a). Cutting costs was increasingly seen as necessary, and 
labour productivity became yet again a key driver of change. Recent evidence of 
productivity increases via cost-cutting led to safety issues within BP resulting in 
a large fatal accident at Texas City refinery killing 15 contractor personnel 
according to the US Chemical Safety and Hazard Board (www.csb.gov ). 
Garret and Silver concluded that in the USA 
'there is a growing trend to contract out custodial work specialising in the area 
of maintenance repairs'. 
Garret and Silver (1966: 468) 
A situation commented on in the UK by NIEDO (1970). Here there is risk and 
uncertainty: in maintenance work, schedule is far more important than the direct 
cost of the work. The clients' loss of production is vastly more excessive than 
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contractors' costs -some £20 million a day at pump prices for petrol (Cross 1989, 
1990). Thus, any delays (strikes, work-to-rule, and managerial disagreements) 
do not hurt the contractors as much as the client. Here, oddly, the supplier 
market may be small: in maintenance it is often unique to one local contractor. 
The contractor becomes a 'specific asset' by virtue of his trade (electrics, 
scaffolding etc) and effectively this becomes 'small numbers exchange' and 
subject to 'hold up' tactics (Clark and Ball 1991). 
Blyton and Turnbull (1995, 2004) regard the petrochemical industry as amongst 
the most innovative exemplars for UK firms especially in its flexible approach 
to labour. Its productivity deals for example set a standard for the rest of UK 
manufacturing and other industrial sectors (Nightingale (1980). Esso and Mobil 
were invited to present evidence to Government committees on industrial 
relations (Donovan 1968, House of Commons 1994), and were described as 
having a 'sophisticated modem' management style (Purcell and Sisson 1983). 
Dawson's (1995) study of I{RM in Mobil's Adelaide refinery regarded the 
benchmarking global survey of refinery performance by the 'Solomons' 
consultancy as an example of Mobil management's rational approach. 
Kelly (1998) highlighted trade union derecognitions at different petrochemical 
plants as evidence of a corporate strategy, relying on the evidence from the 
Transport and General Workers Union (in House of Commons 1994). His idea 
of strategy was not explained but in a similar vein, Tuckman (1998) surmised 
that the derecognition of craft trade unions within BP Chemicals by transferring 
craft workers to single status conditions was a mediating strategy as it promoted 
functional flexibility in that new terms and conditions of employment were 
designed to enable further subcontracting and release internal flexibilities. At the 
Norsk Hydro chemical plant, union derecognition has been seen to be a precursor 
to gaining corporate support for investment in competition with plants in other 
affiliates in other countries (Blyton and Turnbull 1995 2004). This was surely a 
strategic move on the part of managers, which was actually supported by the 
union, which feared closure. 
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The key issue for managers is that outsourcing maintenance is risky. This is 
because overruns on schedule or rework incur huge costs due to lost production 
and one significant maintenance failure can put the entire UK operation of the 
firm into deficit (Cross 1989, 1990). Baker (1990) commented that outsourcing 
of maintenance had led to annual costs due to waste and re-work approaching 
$17 billion in the US. Given the risks we would expect a method of controlling 
contractors' opportunism: such as a system of bonds for good behaviour, and/or 
a development of a set of local contractors to enable switching so avoiding small 
numbers exchange as happens in Japanese firms (Wickens 1987, Sako 1992). 
The risks can also be obviated to some extent by a managing contractor whose 
interests coincide with the client (Korczynski 1993), though Korczynski did not 
consider the interaction effect of the structural change from multi-contractor 
alliances with the onset of the NAECI - the National Agreement for Engineering 
Construction (Korczynski 1997). The idea of a managing contractor can be seen 
in some plants in the idea of management recipes (Ritson 1999b) as discussed in 
Chapter 4. 
This background again leads us to hypothesise that the petrochemical firms, as 
sophisticated major multinationals, might adopt a rational TCE type of process 
to developing strategy, show evidence of conceptual thinking based on a 
systematic appraisal of costs and benefits sophisticated cost-accounting and a 
definition of firm specific skills as specific assets. After all, the major oil 
companies were 
'among the closest real-world approximations to the 'managerial 
technostructures' of Galbraith 's (1967) new industrial state'. 
Cibin and Grant, (1996:283). 
Thus the pilot study at Mobil needed to determine, if outsourcing had increased, 
whether the managers assessed the various transaction costs of internal versus 
external supply. 
2.3 The Engineering Construction Industry 
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In numerical flexibility, where contractors have been prevalent, in what was to 
become the ECI - the 'engineering construction industry' (Garfit 1989)- there 
have been cultural and structural problems (NEDO 1970) and, as evidenced in 
The Lagger's Tale (Keenoy (1979), damaging disputes between competing 
internal and external groups of craft workers. 
However many studies paid little attention to the issue of outsourcing work to 
contractors, yet the Government 's 'Large Sites Report', (NEDO 1970) 
illustrated in the poor performance in terms of cost overruns and lack of delivery 
on time, as had Korczynski (1993). For example, there are only seven pages 
relating to contractors in Flanders, scattered though the book (Flanders 1964, pp. 
22, 29, 56, 60, 147-8, 193), only one page in Gallie (1978, p.  84), and eight in 
Ahlstrand (1990, pp.  172-9). Young's (1986) evaluation of flexibility and craft 
work at Mobil Coryton, mentions outsourcing only in passing. Claydon (1996) 
in contrast showed that managers used the threat and practice of work being 
transferred to contractors so as to provide an incentive to internal workers to 
agree to management's proposals. 
A National Agreement - the NAECI - the National Agreement for Engineering 
Construction - which NEDO had advocated, was only created in 1981 (Garfit 
1989). It covered only capital projects and some large maintenance turnarounds: 
most maintenance work was omitted and contractors worked on numerous site-
based agreements as maintenance project work shifted from one firm to another 
as they had always done (Korczynski 1997). 
This is what makes a study of this industry one where managerial perceptions of 
risk and institutional economic issues are vital to understanding the question of 
'numerical flexibility' fully. 
2.4 The formulation of a strategy offlexibility 
The original article on a flexible firm model (Atkinson 1984a) was entitled 
"Manpower Strategies for Flexible Organisations" (emphasis added) so the 
approach, as stated, was new, and strategic - and not 'just another productivity 
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deal' as had happened in the past. The model proposed a structural split between 
tasks for core workers with finn-specific skills, called 'functional flexibility' and 
tasks for peripheral workers with limited firm-specific skills: a process of 
'numerical flexibility' leading to the extemalisation or 'outsourcing' of tasks. 
The role of human factors was not pursued as will be argued later, despite one of 
the main 'mediating variables' in the model was seen as weak trade unions 
(Tuckman 1998). 
There was no strong evidence that this process was truly 'strategic', as much of 
the subsequent literature found the outsourcing only of ancillary activities 
(Strauss 1992). This was then debatable as an important strategic activity for a 
firm: however as we have seen in 2.2 above, there is an important UK industry in 
which major work has been outsourced: petrochemicals 
The related literature, such as the 'flexible specialisation' thesis of Piore and 
Sabel 1984) and work by Pollert (1991) tended to veer away from the level of the 
firm towards societal levels. Flexible specialisation was convincingly criticised 
by, among others, Smith (1989) and the lack of application to lower levels was 
then extensively criticised by Procter et al (1994). The literature has not added 
to the knowledge of whether the model is strategic, as 'constructed' by 
management, because it has not developed theory at the level of the firm, and so 
can be criticised as 'grand theory' (Wright Mills 1959: 26). 
The confusion of levels shows that in research we need to operationalise terms 
such as 'flexibility'. This concept of operationalisation is considered later, but 
we need here to emphasise the problems, because, for example, Sayer (1989) 
identified seven different types of flexibility. These were 'numerical flexibility 
in output and employment', 'functional flexibility', 'flexible labour markets', 
'flexible working practices', 'flexible machinery', 'flexibility in restructuring' 
and 'flexible organisational forms'. Watson (1995: 346-7) used the terms 
'flexibility for predictability' and 'flexibility for adaptability'. There is also the 
issue of 'lateral and horizontal flexibility' in terms of skill (Young 1992). One 
needs to agree with Pollert who stated: 
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'in reality the word flexible' is a mod(fler applied to virtually any action or 
structure' 
(Pollert 1991: 3). 
In addition the literature has lacked a theoretical framework to support 
Atkinson's model in terms of a rationale for a potential strategy. No theory had 
been used in subsequent articles in order to counter the claims of the critics (see 
for example Atkinson and Meager 1986a, b, Atkinson 1988). Yet to develop 
theory is a goal of social science, and appropriate theory underpins empirical 
work. Some research has commented on the underlying theoretical basis for 
flexibility and its critical effect on jobs via outsourcing. Cross' (1989, 1990) 
survey suggested that the cause of numerical flexibility was due to 'simple 
economics' where contractors were cheaper. This was because productivity was 
set as "output per employee" or where multinational enterprises' terms and 
conditions of employment created a large 'labour burden'. As with Pollert's 
(1991) assertions, Cross saw the end result only: was simply a continuation of 
labour market segmentation, and exemplified only one of a wide repertoire of 
management strategies, including lowering labour costs. Such an omission of a 
theoretical discussion was typical of many 'abstracted empirical' surveys - and 
so the management's rationale and its perceptions of contractors' better 
efficiency, were issues left for others to investigate. 
This is a prevalent problem, and even where theory is specifically introduced, 
such as in Ritson, (2007), the editors (Dainty et al 2007: 18) omit any reference 
to it, instead highlighting the descriptive content of the industrial relations issues. 
Of itself, this descriptive tendency was heavily criticised by Willman (1986) and 
Kelly (1998). 
2.5 Flexibility and Theory 
The question posed by the lack of theory of the flexibility literature is: what 
theory is appropriate? The use of market supply in numerical flexibility or 
outsourcing suggests economics as opposed to an institutional or sociological 
approach (Douma and Schreuder 1992), and so relates to the 'new institutional 
'U 
economics' often called Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) by Williamson 
(1975, 1981) 
TCE can be seen to provide a link to flexibility as the key differentiator as 
between tasks in the core and in the periphery was said to be 'firm-specific 
skills'. Atkinson stated: 
'The firm is seeking to separate [firm spec(fic skills] from a wider labour 
market'Atkinson (1984a: 29). 
But these remained undefined and occasionally other terms were used (Pollert 
1988b), yet the concept of 'firm specific skills' compares with TCE's concept of 
'asset specificity'. Thus where there is no external labour market, work cannot 
be outsourced. Cross (1989 1990) concluded that outsourcing was a simple 
economic event, but he did not investigate whether, and how far, this 
'economising' rationale had actually been applied in practice by managers, nor 
has it been investigated in the subsequent literature. 
TCE theory attempted to address some process issues in the institutional 
environment, including what were termed "Human Factors". These were the 
'bounded rationality' of the buyer (related to the lack of information) and the 
'opportunism' ('self interest seeking with guile') of the seller or contractor. 
These managerial conceptions were then set against "Environmental Factors": 
the uncertainty/complexity of the industry, the existence of small numbers 
exchange, and the extent of asset specificity. (Douma and Schreuder 1992:107 
fig 71; Ritson 1997, 2007). 
Pitelis (1994) and Rowlinson (1997) are among many who criticise TCE for its 
inability to consider internal managerial interests in any systematic way. In an 
empirical study mentioned earlier, Clark and Ball (1991) found that TCE failed 
to explain the managerial processes within bidding consortia in construction. 
Thus TCE is weak in this area and as the flexibility literature had also not 
addressed internal managerial processes, we must consider other theoretical 
approaches. The New Institutional Theory (NIT) is one such approach where 
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this issue has been taken up. Here Clegg (1990) and Whitley (1992a 1992b) 
stress the importance of opposing the 'undersocialised' view of economists and 
contingency theorists whereby contingent factors in the environment (e.g. 
transaction costs) determine structures and behaviour. Also rejected is an 
'oversocialised' perception of organisations which Meyer and Rowan (1977) 
term a 'cognitive cultural tradition' which emphasises the influence of 
psychological factors in decision-making (e.g. in the work of Bartlett and 
Ghoshal 1993, Barr, Stimpert and Huff 1992, Vinning and Globerman 
1999).This area developed as the 'new institutionalism' (Scott and Christensen 
1995) and this presents a kind of mid-range theory as illustrated by Wright Mills 
(1959). 
NIT determines that the success of organisations is not merely dependent on the 
economic efficiency of work processes (Granovetter 1985) and so 'organisations 
remain successful by social definition' (Meyer and Rowan 1977: 349). While 
organisational success is viewed as partly determined by the ability of 
organisations to adapt, this adaptation however is to institutionalised rules and 
procedures through which organisations gain legitimacy in the eyes of society, 
rather than economic factors per se. 
This has been conceptualised by Lant and Baum (1995) as an attempt to define 
the comparators which firms want to emulate, and thus the search for solutions is 
not exhaustive, unlike the idea of 'benchmarking' (DTI 1992). Benchmarking is 
seen as an objective, measurable process based on rational decision-making. 
However, as well as data being freely available for comparator firms, to be 
successftul a benchmarking exercise must show that some operations are more 
efficient in order for them to be copied as business or industry recipes (Grinyer 
and Spender 1979, Spender 1989). 
The procedures formally adopted for the purpose of gaining cultural support or 
legitimacy might even lead to a decrease in efficiency, or in the extreme case, to 
the sell-out of the organisation's own rational or strategic goals (Perrow, 1986). 
This means that even if the outsourcing process is not working well, it could 
continue simply because it had become the norm. Gibbs and Jenkins' (1991) 
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study of the chemical industry saw increased outsourcing despite the lack of 
flexible customer demand suggesting it was a recipe mis-applied. Ernst and 
Young (1996) in the UK North Sea oil production area, reported that while four 
out of five of the respondent firms had increased outsourcing, only one third 
suggested it had been successful. The practice seemed to ignore rational 
economic evidence. 
The new institutionalism literature revealed that in an attempt to decrease 
uncertainty and increase justification for their actions, firms use evidence from 
others to introduce change. This is operationalised as a processes termed 
'isomorphism' by DiMaggio and Powell (1991), who distinguished three types - 
these are: coercive, normative and mimetic, as described in Ritson (2007). 
Thus there may be an important institutional process underlying the strategic 
process of flexibility and outsourcing, but it may revolve round managerial 
uncertainty and basic norms and values, rather than a rational appraisal of 
economic measures of success as under TCE. The strategy process could include 
such strategic interventions as OD (Organisational Development) or scenario 
construction (Ritson 1997a, b, c) and so can be said to be 'emergent'. Young 
(1992) at Mobil Coryton and Ahlstrand (1990) at Esso Fawley found no specific 
rationale upon which managers based their strategy. We will see below why this 
might be so because of conceptions of strategy as a formal rather than as an 
emergent process. 
2.6 Strategy: the Process 
We saw that the initial work in this field was entitled 'Manpower Strategies for 
Flexible Organisations' (Atkinson 1984a) and that this was seen a significant by 
commentators such as Wood (1988): but what was meant by 'strategic'? This 
term is relatively recent, and refers to the Greek word strategos meaning 'the art 
of the general' (Legge 1995). The general chooses the place of attack, his battle 
formations and the make-up of his army, and as such has a plan which looks to 
the future and his potential enemies. But strategic management theory also 
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suggests a number of grand theory conceptions of strategy: Mintzberg eta! 
(1998), as mentioned earlier, suggest there are as many as ten types. 
In the strategy !iterature, and in the 'economising' framework of Wil!iamson 
under TCE, strategy is seen as a forward-!ooking and de!iberate, re!ative!y !ong-
term p!an, objective, even scientific and rationa!, and so justifiable and !egitimate 
(Quinn 1980:58). It is this deliberate, conscious version of strategy which is 
widely used, though often only imp!icitly. For examp!e, Hunter eta! (1993 :386) 
required 'a statement or expression of objectives' or some 'awareness' or 
'association' of HR issues in 'an holistic fashion' to provide evidence of a 
strategy. The idea of formal, deliberate p!anning was repeated by Legge in terms 
of HR strategy in her 1995 review and later by authors such as Deeks and 
Rasmussen (2002: 260-262). Thus Ma!!och (1991) found the actions of the 
petrochemica! company Tioxide, in its decision to subcontract, to be 
'opportunistic' and, as mentioned above, both Young (1992) at Mobi! Coryton 
and Ah!strand (1990) at Esso Faw!ey found no specific rationa!e upon which 
managers based their strategy, Young asserting management had no strategy at 
all. 
However, the test of strategy as being a forma!, written and deliberate p!an, is a 
harder test than necessary, given the turbulence of environments. This 
turbulence and uncertainty casts doubt on the breadth of the rationality of the 
industry's management in terms of its gathering of information and the 
rationa!ity of managers is 'bounded' (Simon 1957, Ritson 1997). If the flexib!e 
firm strategic model is about economising and is rational (as the strategic 
management theorists imply), outsourcing throws up curious inconsistencies, as 
mentioned ear!ier in the work of Ernst and Young (1996) and Baker (1990). 
The dimension missing is one of process - the intemal rationa!e within the firms 
- hence the referral to NIT ear!ier. Mintzberg and Waters (1985) suggest there 
is an alternative to deliberate fonnu!ation, an underpinning emergent strategy, 
based on a business ideology or be!ief in how things shou!d be done, which is 
not often forma!ised but is still rational in management's terms. This approach 
might well therefore fit the actions of the firms better than an economising, 
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deliberate planning framework - yet still be entirely consistent with the 
underpinning theory of strategy as holistic and forward looking 
Ackroyd and Procter (1998) consider the emergent in an explicit manner, and 
they look towards the definition of a new flexible firm model. Butler (1990) 
adds support by considering HR as having a dual role: in a deliberate strategy, as 
a tool in implementation, (a distinction which might make the HR literature 
above understandable) but equally important is its role of generating emergent 
strategies as new opportunities arise. Atkinson (1984a) had asserted that 
'There are both strong pressures to achieve a more flexible workforce and 
gyeater opportunity to do so now than in the past 
(Atkinson 1 984a: 28, emphasis added) 
The operation of an emerging 'opportunity' is a significant element, related to 
an emergent strategy. Butler's conception fits with the 'opportunistic' actions 
seen above by Malloch (1991) and was echoed by Claydon (1996) in his terms 
'reactive' as opposed to 'purposive' derecognition of trade unions. 
The process of strategy formulation, in this conception, therefore relates to the 
institutional environment of the firm, and thence to what Barney (1991) and 
Boxall and Purcell (2002) call a 'resource-based view' of the firm. Marchington 
and Wilkinson (2002:230) suggest that the resource-based view is limited to the 
organisational level and stress the need to reflect the 'institutional arrangements 
at national and industry level beyond the workplace' which brings in the New 
Institutional Theory, especially its conception of isomorphic processes. Oliver 
(1997: 701) suggested combining this resource-based view with the new 
institutionalism to cope with 'deeply embedded norms and traditions' in 
decision making - in particular he cites the work of Di Maggio and Powell 
(1983, 1991) which we have already considered above. 
2.7 Levels of Strategy 
Most commentators agree that there are three basic levels of strategy: corporate, 
business and lastly either functional or operational (Grant 2002, Marchington 
and Wilkinson 2002, Johnson and Scholes 2006, Campbell, Stonehouse and 
23 
Houston 2002). However, Purcell (1989) and Purcell and Ahlstrand (1994) 
suggest only two levels: 'upstream' representingfirst-order decisions; roughly 
equating to formulation/design and 'downstream' relating to second-order 
decisions at the level of action/implementation. 
Flexibility, as the 'dynamic efficiency' Cibin and Grant (1996) remains a key 
strategic issue because it is a corporate goal. But this could only be achieved at 
the level of the individual plants in the businesses, and, in terms of direct action, 
at the level of the functions within the plants. This has an important impact on 
the definition of strategic level, as will become apparent in the discussion below. 
The corporate level only deals with major questions: Daft (2002) suggests it is 
the 'raison d'être' - or the means the selection of businesses in which the 
company should compete, and with the development and coordination of that 
portfolio of businesses. At this corporate level from the 'macro' or 'far' 
environment, competitive forces (Porter 1985) form the 'micro' or 'near' 
environment act on the firm, and result in managerial reactions which include 
major mergers and acquisitions, and these have an impact on the share price. In 
this way, if there is a corporate level strategy, it must be seen to relate overall 
productivity goals to localised flexibility of the kind described earlier. 
The business level deals with aspects such as location, markets, and products. 
At this level, there have been major initiatives in the UK on labour productivity. 
The 'productivity gap' of the National Board for Prices and Incomes (1967) was 
addressed through productivity bargaining, and, in recent times, the introduction 
of essentially Japanese management practices. These comprise an attempt to 
transform the labour process in manufacturing and include initiatives such as 
TQM, JIT, supply-chain management, and Business Process Re-engineering 
(Wickens 1987, Oliver and Wilkinson 1988, 1992, Ackroyd et al 1998). These 
processes are primarily related not to HR issues as under the ambit of a Human 
Resources Department, but the new production methods aim to address 
productivity needs and are introduced by line managers (Womack Jones and 
Roos 1990). These include, for example, organising labour into multi-functional 
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teams, to match the new methods' demands: the 'functional flexibility' of 
Atkinson's model (Deibridge and Lowe 1998, McLoughlin 1999, Schonberger 
1982). These types of manufacturing initiative were not found in the 
petrochemical industry (Marchington and Parker 1988). 
The functional or operational level is the strategy of departments - marketing, 
accounting, finance, HR, manufacturing. Here we have a conceptual problem in 
that in Porter's (1985) terms, HR represents only an ancillary part of the 'value 
chain' of a business. This, as will be explained later, in 2.8, it is to confuse the 
departmental structure with the wider HR function which is within the ambit of 
line management. 
Strategic management research has concentrated on data based on the 
classification of strategy into the three levels described above. The strategies at 
each level are seen as essentially separate but in reality are logically connected 
up to the previous level, and affect the next level down. In petrochemicals t is 
suggested that the global strategy of dynamic efficiency should be translated 
locally in maintenance, the biggest cost area, as craft flexibility (functional and 
numerical). As petrochemicals is a manufacturing industry, the insertion of a 
business level does not seem logical in this case: what appears more logical is to 
use Purcell's split into an upstream (design and formulation) stage, evidenced 
perhaps by a deliberate global strategy (Cibin and Grant 1996), followed by a 
more emergent stage of detailed formulation and implementation. This in effect 
means that there needs to be a dynamic interchange between levels and 
functions, yet such an interchange has not been the subject of much research. 
As evidence for the applicability of this dynamic approach, in the 'core' CIPD 
text for Personnel Managers, Marchington and Wilkinson (2002) accepted 
Ritson's (1999d) suggestion that the dynamic between levels and functions had 
been underplayed: 
"Drawing on research in the oil and chemical industries, Ritson (1999:170) 
argues that .. strategy is more dynamic than the classic models suggest..." 
(Marchington and Wilkinson 2002:223) 
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So, concluding the above sections, there is evidence of a strategy in the 
sophisticated firms in the petrochemicals industry globally to introduce dynamic 
efficiency. This strategy has been implemented in the important maintenance 
function by way of derecognition of internal trade unions and by numerical 
flexibility - outsourcing to contractors. The strategy needs to be analysed in 
terms of its underpinning rationale: TCE and NIT are suggested as alternative 
frameworks. Wc next turn to the role of HR. 
2.8 Human Resources 
The flexible firm model had raised the role of manpower planning (sic) to a 
strategic level. The model also introduced the complex role of Industrial or 
Employee Relations: 
'The current state of the labour market and a weakened trade union movement in 
the UK will help [firms] secure these aims [offiexibility] 
(Atkinson 1984a: 28) 
In the literature, the HR aspects have largely been down-played: yet the methods 
used to implement the strategy of flexibility, seemingly involving HR issues, 
need to be investigated. Considering the central role of trade unions in the 
conception of why the flexible firm was emerging in the 1980s, suggesting that 
the ability of firms to engage in such flexibility was due to weak trade unions, it 
is odd that no link is made to a functional level of theory either in the industrial 
relations, nor the strategic literature. Only Tuckman, who used the term 
'meditating strategy' to describe the derecognition of craft maintenance unions in 
BP Chemicals, followed up this thread. Others had merely described the 
outcomes (e.g. Kelly 1998) or suggested new terms (Claydon 1993). 
These internal relationships of a strategy of flexibility were not taken up by 
research into any detailed linkages to strategic management nor to HRM. In 
Guest et al's (2000b: 5) paper, the figure for modelling the link between HRM 
and performance simply has one box entitled "Business Strategy" with an arrow 
to "HR Strategy". 
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Manpower planning, part of the title of Atkinson's 1984a paper, was not evident 
in the literature, yet studies relating FIR issues to the model would have added 
flesh to the bones of what was a very simplistic conception. This is because 
dynamic efficiency strategies, concentrated at the 'business level' are coincident 
with the flexible firm model and so with human resource issues: BP, for 
example, shed 25% of its head office staff (Cibin and Grant 1996). 
In looking at this HRM literature, some clear problems emerge which point to a 
re-design of the approach and the methodology. A key issue is the ability of 
researchers to negotiate access and so gamer the appropriate HR-based data. A 
recent large study for the Anglo-German Foundation (Muller-Camen, Tempel, 
Almond, Edwards, Fetter, and Wachter, 2004) produced a set of I{R variables 
based only on what the few firms in the sample would allow the researchers to 
study. 
There is also the problem of the operationalisation of terms: this surrounds the 
definition of the FIR function and the operationalisation of variables. 
The vague use of terms like 'personnel' is evident in the literature: for example 
Jenkins (1973) asked 'Is personnel still underpowered? 'and Purcell (1985) 
asked Is Anyone Listening To the Corporate Personnel Department? Purcell 
(1989) also concentrated on the "personnel department", and rejoiced when 
'Personnel Earns A Place on the Board' (Purcell 1994). 
Similarly, Gennard and Kelly (1994), concern themselves with the influence of 
PersonnelDirectors, and to the supposed unimportance of the labels 
appertaining to Human Resource Management (Gennard and Kelly 1997). 
Further, the Warwick company level survey used personnel issues (Legge, 
1995: 119), Hickson et al (1986:80) and Batstone et al (1986) used personnel 
managers, Hunt and Lees (1987) used both human assets and personnel 
managers, and Purcell and Ahlstrand (1994) refer to personnel specialists. This 
inconsistent terminology leads to problems of identif,ing variables accurately 
and to issues of their subsequent measurement and to distortions in the literature, 
especially as Professor Gennard has been for many years the CIPD Chief 
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Examiner for Relations and more recently editor of the journal Employee 
Relations 
There is also an a priori listing of potential variables which attempts to develop 
theory too early - often on the basis of poor empirical designs and poorly 
actioned methodology. Subsumed under the higher level terms above are 
different sets of HR 'practices'. Pfeffer (1998) included employee voice, 
employment security, sophisticated selection, extensive training, teamwork, high 
pay and status harmonisation in his list. Berg (1999) refers to high-
performance work practices, Applebaum et al (2000) to high performance work 
systems, Walton (1985) and Guest et al (2001) to high-commitment HRM, Wood 
1999 to high-involvement HR/ti'. .Marchington and Wilkinson (2002: 202) 
conclude that 'practices' are ill-defined and Guest et al (2000a) found no 
consistency in 'bundles' of HRM 'practices' in the Workplace Employee 
Relations Survey and resorted to counting the number of 'practices' individually 
to 'find' high commitment HRM. Additionally, most results are from self-
reports and cross-sectional studies which must, as Guest admits, be taken with 
caution (Guest et al 2000b). 
The problems within HR research lead to 'abstracted empiricism' (Wright Mills 
1959: 54-55) based on quantitative surveys rather than the exposition of the 
linkages and the posting of a more mid-range theoretical level, and authors in 
the HR literature are culpable of a lack of operational definitions: Purcell 
complained about macho management and the new-found management 
prerogative of line managers (Purcell 1982, 1991). Many authors are concerned 
not with personnel or HR as a concept or function across a business, but with a 
Department: this is not the same thing. It is therefore little wonder that many 
authors have commented on the lack of linkages between HR and strategy at 
whatever levels and any such links are not usually seen as important (e.g. 
Purcell 1995, Legge 1995). 
In this thesis, the 'HR function' refers not to a department, job title, or other 
defined internal structure, but to the generic fUnction of line management, 
augmented where necessary by HR departments, comprising data on practices 
which provide the evidence of HR activity in resourcing (manpower planning) 
and employee/industrial relations. These data are detailed in Chapter 4 
2.9 Summary 
We have constructed a rationale for the research questions under the appropriate 
literatures and questioned the problems in these. In particular, the issue of the 
conception and formulation of strategy is addressed. TCE is appropriate in its 
use of asset specificity, as well as other attributes: on the other hand, as an 
'undersocialised' approach, it does not deal with internal managerial processes, 
thus the New Institutional Theory can be used to address institutionally-based 
ideologies of the management cadre, and it avoids an 'oversocialised' approach 
base don individual decision-making psychology. 
For the issue of the conception and formulation of strategy, data from the 
petrochemical industry is key: it has a global strategy to counter the problems of 
low margins in its plants by way of a more flexible labour force and it has 
previous history of using contractors and by the reduction of the power of trade 
unions by derecognitions. 
These considerations gave rise to two broad research questions: 
what is the process offormula (ion of a strategy offlexibility? 
and 
how has any strategy been implemented in the UK petrochemicals industry. 
Chapter 3 Methodology 
3.1 Introductory Remarks 
The methodology follows the criticisms of the literature and of Wright Mills 
(1959) in that it attempts a mid-range approach. Mills (1959) suggested that the 
'sociological imagination' had been blunted by two extreme positions - 'grand 
theory' and 'abstracted empiricism'. This first he suggested was the association 
and dissociation of concepts (Wright Mills, 1959: 26), the second was research 
which was not based on substantive propositions or theory (Wright Mills 
1959:54-55). Between the extreme approaches of grand theory and abstracted 
empiricism criticised by C Wright Mills lies a mid-range area of theory. It was 
thus an objective to correlate and integrate these aspects in an holistic approach 
based on empirical findings. 
Methodology is in a dynamic interchange between the questions the research 
seeks to ask from the literature and the ability to obtain data sufficient to answer 
these questions. These questions were 
what is the process offormulation of a strategy and 
how has any strategy been implemented in the UK petrochemicals industry. 
The methodology to obtain that data to answer these questions takes two forms: 
the initial choice of an area to investigate the research questions (the sample), 
and the detailed conduct of the empirical work (the methods). This split is 
suggested by various authors such as Bryman (1989) and Gill and Johnson 
(1991). 
3.2 Access: the ability to obtain data 
To pose a mid-range question on flexibility would necessitate having the data to 
answer it. However the data required are sensitive - commercially or in terms of 
industrial relations - and, as explained earlier, internal access to organisations is 
very difficult for researchers to obtain. 
To answer the two research questions one requires sufficient reliable and 
relevant data. Secondary data to answer these fully is extremely rare in this area 
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of research: the Solomons Refinery Efficiency Survey mentioned by Dawson's 
(1995) in his paper on Mobil's Adelaide refinery is not published, though 
general industry statistics and individual company histories are available. More 
detailed data on the industry is held through oil industry analysts in financial 
institutions, but is too general except to provide background information. Access 
was obtained to a key respondent at the financial institution, Dresdner Kleinwort 
Benson, but the information on petrochemicals was generic and not useful to 
answer the questions except to confirm the global problems of the industry as 
Cibin and Grant had detailed. Other secondary data was obtained from other 
sources and published in Ritson (1999a) as a general survey of the problem of 
competition in the UK petrol market. Given access to internal information, data 
of a secondary nature can be obtained from analysing existing data such as from 
benchmarking (DTI 1992). 
Primary data is at which is gathered for the purposes of the research, and 
To answer the research questions therefore, primary data was necessary. The 
problem is the access to such data is difficult (see Horn 1996 for a discussion) 
and this problem was illustrated by the lack of investigation into the decisional 
processes of management in the pursuit of flexibility. Hence, a common 
methodology is to use surveys usually anonymous postal variety on which much 
research in the literature is based. Chapter 2 contains several examples, and this 
approach had been found lacking (e.g. Ritson 1995), particularly because the 
causal links within the firms from external events to internal organisational 
actions remain hidden. 
3.3 Fieldwork and the petrochemicals industry 
That petrochemicals industry could provide data was outlined in Chapters 1 and 
2. To answer the research questions therefore requires access to internal 
documents and staff who have specialist knowledge. Also access to figures to 
accommodate an economising cost/benefit rationale based on TCE would be 
necessary. In the case of Mobil we know (from Oldfield 1966 and Young 1986) 
that managers applied certain flexibility techniques to its craft maintenance 
labour force from the 1960s   onwards including externalising some trades to 
contractors. However much of the institutional data is sensitive given internal 
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craft union derecognitions (House of Commons 1994) and the external data on 
contractors is conunercially confidential. This research based its resultant papers 
on the ability of the researcher to gain considerable access to primary and 
confidential secondary data. 
The main investigation was to seek evidence for an internal rationale to frame 
the decisions of managers. This might consist of applying a model such as the 
'hierarchy versus market' approach of Transaction Cost Economics. Also, the 
concept of 'firm specific skills' could be defined further under the use of the 
term 'asset specificity' within TCE. This evidence could be found by 
investigating, through documents and interviews, whether management had used 
data so as to make a decision on the costs and benefits of internal versus external 
supply. Ideally evidence would comprise the setting up of a task, and its 
evaluation - from first costing internal supply and secondly by way of quotations 
from contractors to supply the work externally. 
The question of whether the actions in the industry were strategic required 
evidence for formulation of strategy involving the appropriate level of decision: 
corporate business or functional. Also, in this case, the involvement of FIR issues 
within such strategic formulation was a key area of investigation. These 
questions can be also be answered by gathering evidence via assessments of 
documents and the use of interviews, including trade unions respondents, and 
external bodies for the purposes of triangulation. 
As the research questions require evidence of decisional processes, i.e. primary 
data, and as the data was sensitive, this was unlikely to be forthcoming from a 
postal survey, particularly as the firms might not see any benefits by 
participating. Thus, the use of a 'fieldwork' approach was necessary. This had 
been specifically recommended by Lord McCarthy (1995) as 'a return of [the] 
pioneering spirit' of research. A significant problem with such a fieldwork 
approach is the cost - the time spent by the researcher in the field, and the travel 
and subsistence expenses incurred. This, as well as access difficulties, may be 
related to the rarity of this approach in the literature. The small number of cases 
is testament to the difficulty of acquiring in-depth access, and Gallie (1978), 
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even with the aid of research assistants, still took two years to gain access to BP 
- one firm 
The individual petrochemical plants' addresses were obtained from the Institute 
of Petroleum (Institute of Petroleum 1994, 1996a, b, 1999), now the Energy 
Institute, (www.energyinstitute.org ), and as the flexible firm model was 
effectively a type of HR intervention, letters were written to the FIR 
professionals in each plant. These letters described the research proposal, its 
design and methodology and included an ethical checklist based on Preedy and 
Riches (1985, and cited in Bell, 1995: 54-59). However, they frequently went 
unanswered and when a reply was received, it was to deny cooperation. Thus, 
access to a wider sample was not possible at this initial stage. The idea of a case 
study was therefore attractive. Such a case study was appropriate (see Yin 1994 
for a theoretical justification) and necessary given the problems of access 
described above. A case study was successfiflly used by Gallie (1978) in his 
study of BP, and by Ahlstrand (1990) in his study of Esso Fawley refinery. 
3.4 The Pilot Case: Mobil Coryton 
Industrial experience on the part of the researcher who had been employed at 
Mobil Coryton assisted in gaining access and Young (1986) had illustrated a 
change to flexible labour at Mobil Coryton resulting in a 'hilly flexible 
craftsman'. The HR Manager at Mobil's Coryton Refinery was contacted by 
telephone who granted an interview. However, Mobil craft trade unions had 
recently been derecognised, and, as this was still a sensitive area, access to 
internal employees to discuss inter-craft and craft-operator flexibility was 
denied. This is a key finding and links to the problems of developing theory 
referred to earlier. 
Fortunately, the issue of flexibility was currently pertinent as Mobil had just 
introduced a new Agreement for maintenance contractors, and access to 
contractors was agreed. This meant that the research had to be concerned with 
numerical flexibility - the peripheral workforce of contractors. This created a 
problem: whether the research questions could be answered by using an 
operational definition of a strategy of flexibility to incorporate only 'numerical 
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flexibility'. This, it was argued, was still strategic, involved HR and was risky, 
thus implying the potential use of a sophisticated, competent and rational 
approach. The data could be quantified by counting the numbers of employees 
and types of work outsourced to contractors, which made the research more 
objective. This data is simple, transparent and accurate, able to be verified. It is 
contrary to the complexity of vague terms like 'HR' issues or 'flexibility' as 
used by others and detailed in Chapter 2. The research proposal was submitted 
to ESRC and funding granted on the basis of the Mobil case study. 
A set of key respondents at Mobil was drawn up with the HR manager, who 
indicated which Mobil staff, and which contractors' managers, had been 
involved in the new contractors' Agreement. So as to remove bias and include a 
method of triangulation (Denzin 1970), the trade union officers at local and 
national level, and the Director of the National Joint Council of the ECI were 
included in the interview sample separately from the Mobil respondents. All of 
these respondents were telephoned to explain the research aims: none of the 
parties refused access and so formal access agreements (which included the 
ethical checklist so that they could be assured of confidentiality) were made with 
each party. . This list was added to as more details were revealed. A list of 
these respondents is detailed in Appendix 1. 
The initial fieldwork at Mobil comprised six one-day visits, with interviews 
arranged in advance, and, with follow-up interviews, lasted from mid-1995 to 
end-2001. The interviews were based on a semi-structured approach with 
contemporaneous notes taken and sent back for confirmation: this was to reduce 
interviewers' errors and possible bias. Bryman (1987) calls this 'respondent 
validity'. 
Documentary research provided basic new data and also triangulated 
respondents' oral evidence to reduce the possibility of reflexivity. This 
comprised access to extensive data sets within all of the files on the contractors 
(in maintenance and in capital projects) going back many years. These showed 
previous and current numbers of trades and employees within each category 
dates, contractors' names, in a time series based on records from annual trade 
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union negotiations. Detailed field notes were taken from these files and written 
up later, often providing thrther questions for respondents. 
Other documents, revealed the role of the HR function. A former HR manager 
produced documents from the US parent one of which gave a ten-page verbatim 
account of a speech given by the Refinery Director at a Mobil Corporation Inc. 
conference on manufacLuring strategy in the USA. The documents clearly stated 
the importance of HRM factors in strategic decision-making. Notably they did 
not single out the FIR Department but used the term 'HR fimction' as a generic 
duty of line management. 
The research was initially developed to ascertain whether there was a 
'transaction cost reduction' rationale, and in its relation to strategy and industrial 
relations using the flexibility issue as the core area for empirical data. The 
answer to the issue of a theoretical rationale emerged only after consultation of a 
large number of documents and interviews of current and former Mobil and 
other staff. This finding was in the negative (Ritson 1997) and so a return to a 
wider study was required. This was coincident with another practical issue: 
contact with Mobil managers was becoming difficult following the asset swap 
with BP, which resulted in Coryton Refinery changing hands in 1999. 
3.5 The Wider Study 
A Wider Study of these plants was also desirable in case Mobil was an isolated 
case. Fortunately back-up data from other plants had been identified in the 
proposal to ERSC and travel and subsistence already had been costed out and 
agreed. A set of respondents was developed based on the Mobil files instead of 
the previous attempt at a census of major petrochemicals plants from the 
Institute of Petroleum mentioned in 3.3. Eventually it involved over 100 semi 
structured interviews and triangulation with documents and different parties to 
answer the research questions. 
The data within the Mobil documents in the contractors' files revealed that 
Mobil managers had undertaken a survey of comparators firms and how they 
had handled the issue of contractors' work. These comparators included both oil 
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refineries, and chemical plants belonging to the multinationals, including 
processing plants in the 'upstream' or production part of the industry, and also 
Id, a purely chemical firm. These are detailed in Appendix 1. Following the 
access agreed by Mobil in the initial pilot study, these plants were approached 
for access. Specific named line managers responsible for maintenance andlor 
contracts or engineering (as appropriate) from these firms were contacted 
directly by telephone and the study was explained to them. The researcher's 
credibility was established based on the experience in the pilot case with Mobil, 
whose managers agreed to act as referees in the event that confirmation of that 
credibility was needed. Given the access provided by Mobil as a reference 
point, all except Elf and Total agreed to interviews. 
The study was then extended to their sister plants so as to try to encapsulate 
strategic plans at the level above the individual plant as discussed in Chapter 2: 
the corporate or business levels. This new set of respondents is detailed as 
Appendix 2. The subsequent interviews followed the practice of using an open 
question such as was used by Lawrence and Lorsch (1967), who asked 
'Would you list for me the major kinds ofproblems an organisation encounters 
competing in industry?' 
(Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967: n247). 
The question posed was 'how has maintenance changed over the past few yea rs? 
This key question was used to remove any suggestion of 'respondent reflexivity', 
in that contractors were not specifically mentioned so as not to prompt a 
response based on these. The managers emphasised labour relations in 
interviews and usually spontaneously used the link to contractors without any 
prompting. Subsequent 'prompt' questions were used to home in on the research 
questions only where necessary. As in the previous interviews, 
contemporaneous notes were taken, written up in Word documents, and returned 
to the respondents for checking. In some cases, these Were altered for accuracy 
by the respondents, re-written by the researcher and returned for final 
confirmation to the respondents, thus establishing respondent validity. 
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Triangulation was required to remove bias such as either exaggeration or 'sand-
bagging' by managers, and was achieved again by contacting the appropriate 
trade union officers, this time in the different regions the plants operated in. 
These officers (listed in Appendix 2) were interviewed in person or by telephone 
to establish their perspective of the facts. In nearly all of these cases, the dates, 
trades and numbers of employees were similar or identical to those given by the 
employers. Interestingly, there was a predominant opinion of the trade unionists 
that the changes were strategic, emanating from the multinational firms' 
headquarters. 
3.6 Summary 
The research design was created so as to overcome the methodological problems 
in the literature. The methods used were designed to answer research questions 
and required access to sensitive secondary and primary data. Data collection was 
by triangulated interview of key respondents and discovery of documents 
initially from a pilot study so as to test the validity and robustness of the method 
and its ability to answer the questions from the data which were able to be 
generated. The method of semi structured interviews and the written feedback 
limited errors by interviewer, as did triangulation with trade union and industry 
sources. The wider study used a similar methodology: the methods are sound 
enough to reliably investigate the contracting out of maintenance in UK 
petrochemicals plants and to answer the research questions, so as to add to 
empirical knowledge and theoretical development. 
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Chapter 4 Results 
4.1 Introductory Remarks 
This chapter sets out the eight publications related to the literature review 
arranged under the two processes in the methodology - the initial search for 
secondary data and the data within the Pilot and then within the substantive 
project described as the Wider Study. In the different papers the underlying 
themes (a strategic/theoretical rationale, FIR roles and evidential data) overlap as 
evidence was accrued. The papers were published as evidence accrued, often via 
initial conference papers. 
4.1. Secondary Data 
We saw in Chapter 3 that to answer the research questions by secondary data was 
difficult, and that it provided mainly a background picture. However, as the 
suggested global strategy of dynamic efficiency (Cibin and Grant 1996) required 
compliance, it may have differed as between countries or regions (such as the so-
called Pacific Rim). The UK situation was therefore investigated as a starting 
point to check out the return on investment seen by the firms. 
The relevant publication is: 
Ritson N H 1999a The real problem of competition in the UK petrol market: a 
reply to Cohen Strategic Change 1999 8, 4, pp  235-241 
Prior to the empirical research, secondary sources were used to set the UK 
context of the industry. The situation in the UK was highlighted by an article by 
a former marketing executive for Shell which suggested more service was 
necessary at the petrol pumps to attract customers and improve throughput and 
so profitability (Cohen 1998). However, this retail solution (a functional level, 
as a marketing strategy) suggested 'augmented features of petrol dispensing' and 
're-positioning of petrol' as a product (Cohen 1998: 203). This low-level 
response flew in the face of known facts in the wider industry, in that a higher, 
corporate strategy level was clearly being enacted. A response was written 
which described the petrochemicals' basic strategic problem in the UK. The 
article used a large number of secondary sources - some thirty-five references as 
against Cohen's ten, and traced the history of UK petrol retailing at the geo-
political level, concluding that 
"The oil companies are trapped. They need more volume but this leads to lower 
prices in a downward spiral" 
(Ritson 1999a: 238) 
This meant that they must re-position themselves as suppliers of energy - not as 
retailers. 
This was described in the publication 
Ritson N H 1999a The real problem of competition in the UK petrol market: a 
reply to Cohen Strategic Change 19998,4, pp  235-241 
This paper sets the scene for intense competition and low profitability in the UK 
and showed the low returns in the market place and the intense competition from 
non-refiners, the supermarkets, who bought petrol at spot rates on the Rotterdam 
market. The refineries were under intense pressure, as they were dragging down 
the petrochemicals finns' overall performance in the UK and they had to react: 
the business level of strategy is therefore clearly seen as it involves different 
functions, and contradicts Cohen's functional level of analysis. The link 
upwards to corporate level was not pursued but the profits of the corporate 
groups clearly suffered in that the UK was an important market. 
The obvious answer would have been to remove production capacity from the 
UK by shutting down plants, but the first firm to do so would instead give away 
market share and margin to competitors, as well as incurring large costs in the 
demolition and making safe the former plants. Rather than addressing the real 
problem, the finns made changes to relatively minor areas where they had 
control and where managers could demonstrate their expertise as Ahlstrand 
(1990) had determined at Esso Fawley. The rationale of managers from such 
secondary data was still not evident in the current climate however, and so the 
empirical research was used to provide answers. 
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4.3 Empirical Data I. The Pilot Study of Mobil Coryton 
The in-depth Pilot case study was used to frame the proposal was to ESRC so as 
to gather evidence to test for a ICE rationale involving a strategic conception of 
the role if HR. This was linked to finding data to test the research questions as 
submitted to ESRC, and to the specific literature relating to numerical flexibility 
or outsourcing. The use of ICE could add to the status of the flexibility thesis 
generally, so the title of the proposal to ESRC therefore linked TCE with 
industrial relations, and introduced ideas of strategy and human resource 
management as examples of how it might be rationalised and introduced. This 
encompassed the contracting atmosphere of uncertainty and informational 
asymmetry contributing to the bounded rationality of the Mobil managers. 
Asmentioned in Chapter 3, an approach was successful in gaining access: this 
encompassed access to interviews of maintenance contractors and other staff 
and documents related to the new for contractors. Thus the conceptual 
framework of TCE was used at Mobil Coryton to track any themes within the 
documents and follow these in the interviews, as explained in Chapter 3 
Three papers are relevant: 
Ritson N H 1997 Unbinding rationality: a single union agreement for 
contractors at a UK oil refinery Journal of Managerial Psychology 12, 3 pp  155-
176 
Ritson N H 1999c Manufacturing strategy in a UK process plant: the 
importance of human resource management Strategic Change 8, pp  349-357, 
Ritson N H 2007 The Quest for Productivity revisited - or just derecognition by 
the back door? In Dainty A, Bagilhole, B and Green S Eds. People and Culture 
in Construction: A Reader Taylor and Francis pp  260-279 
Mobil Coryton management had over the end of 1992 and beginning of 1993 
introduced a new Single Union Agreement for contractors. This was a good fit 
I,] 
with the theory of transaction costs as described in Chapter 2 as the transaction 
costs of monitoring were presumably reduced through the single-union 
agreement which Mobil instigated. Though the changes were costed in a 
"Value-for-Money" analysis, the savings for the single union deal amounted to 
only £lmilion per year and there were no data on contractors' performance. 
While the files included various costings of contractors' work such as 
employees rates of pay, there were no appropriate figures found for the 
measurement of work in tow: it was discovered that, due to the complexity of 
maintenance operations, only about 20% of work could be measured accurately 
enough to use as a bonus scheme (and initially as a costing for contract bidding 
by the contractor finns), and most work was done on a 'time and materials' 
basis. Thus there was no evidence for the economising of TCE in comparing 
costs of supply: no cost-benefit analysis of the extension of work contractors, 
even on a basic costing level as Cross (1989, 1990) had surmised. 
Nor was any evidence found in these data that indicated that Mobil had used any 
TCE concepts, even implicitly. One premise derived from the model was that 
its firm specific skills could be placed in a theoretical setting within TCE's 
conception of asset specificity. However, there was no formal evaluation of 
firm spec(flc skills which was important to any rationale as these were 
supposedly the determining factor as to which tasks were subject to numerical or 
functional flexibility, and had thus far not been measured in any way. Managers 
did not spend time gathering comparative information on contractors, as TCE 
predicted, managers took the risk, of opportunism - a jump into the dark, into the 
arms of the six contractors and so did not avoid small numbers exchange. 
Indeed a single union agreement was itself an example of such a paradox, Mobil 
had opted for the very small numbers exchange that TCE stressed risked 
opportunistic behaviour by the single trade union. 
There was however clear evidence that Mobil's actions could be seen as 
adhering to a subset of TCE under human factors - the bounded rationality 
taken from Herbert Simon's early work. The firm had made a significant set of 
changes: it became a leader to a follower; it used a type of agreement from 
another industry; and it imposed it, not on its own workforce but on its 
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contractors. All of these were a break with its previous traditional way of 
working. The result was written up as 
Ritson N H 1997 Unbinding rationality: a single union agreement for 
contractors at a UK oil refinery Journal of Managerial Psychology 12,3 pp  155-
176 
Thus there was no other evidence of TCE and the answer to the question 'what is 
the process offormulation of a strategy offlexibility' was delayed until the later 
publication (Ritson 2007). In this much later paper, the details of the objectives 
and the method of handling the change became clear. Mobil Coryton had a clear 
deliberate strategy of attracting inward investment from its parent Mobil 
Corporation in much the same way as had Norsk Hydro (reported by Blyton and 
Turnbull 1995). The way to achieved it was the subject of an extensive 
consultation and communications exercise. 
This was published as 
Ritson N H 2007 The Quest for Productivity revisited - or just derecognition by 
the back door? In Dainty A, Bagilhole, B and Green S Eds. People and Culture 
in Construction: A Reader Taylor and Francis pp  260-279 
Respondents in interviews did not hide the fact that they had not used any 
measurements or detailed planning. The results were isomorphic with two types 
of agreement being used to control the contractors: three plants used the single 
union deal, while the remainder used the National Agreement as amended by the 
Supplementary Agreement (NAECI-SA). 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, DiMaggio and Powell (1991) distinguished three 
'isomorphic' processes: but which ones applied? Coercive isomorphism is not 
applicable. Di Maggio and Powell suggest the use of contract and power is 
within buyer-supplier and other inter-institutional relationships, as seen by Clark 
and Ball (1991). Even thought the imposition of the solutions on the contractors 
is coercive, the isomorphism is between the multinational finns not between 
these entities and the contractors. Further, Shell and BP affiliates produced 
42 
different local solutions to the contractor issue. So, even within the same 
company, where hierarchy could coerce lower level managers, this did not 
happen. In Shell UK Oil, the Essex plant Shellhaven used a single union 
agreement while its Shell UK Oil Cheshire facility at Stanlow used the NAECI-
SA. BP Chemicals at Hull used contractors' own agreements while BP 
Chemicals Grangemouth used the NAECI-SA. There are no other organisations 
or societal rules, laws or sanctions to coerce these firms. 
Normative isomorphism also is not applicable, as there are no extant professional 
bodies or employers' or trade associations from which to obtain the recipe. ICI 
had to engage the NJC for the ECI in lengthy negotiations to change the NAECI 
to create the option of the Supplementary Agreement, and a 'norm' was set only 
after ICI and then Shell implemented the new Agreement in 1994. Similarly 
there was no norm or standard for the Single Union Agreement introduced by 
Mobil, as it was copied from automotive and Japanese firms' UK manufacturing 
and was introduced uniquely to petrochemicals. 
Ritson (2007) argued that mimetic isomorphism was applicable, as it takes place 
through the adoption of similar practices by organisations within the same field. 
These may be deliberate and objective - by use of benchmarking exercises for 
example - or they may be intuitive and taken-for granted. In the case of these 
firms, there was an initial survey or benchmarking exercise undertaken by Mobil 
in 1991, and one of the comparators was ICI. Given the enquiry from Mobil, it 
can be assumed that this awoke a latent interest in ICI as it was some four years 
after that exercise following lengthy discussions with the NJC that ICI eventually 
persuaded the NJC to agree to the new Agreement. Indeed it may well have 
stimulated the other firms to take some action. This suggests that the original 
intent was deliberate - to increase contractors' performance, but as there were no 
comparators who had done this already, managements had to discover an 
emergent strategy to deal with it. Evidence from Mobil showed that the 
managers had considered a variety of avenues, and involved a number of 
different participants in their 'away-days' to formulate a contractor strategy. 
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DiMaggio and Powell state that more often than not such copying needs to have 
legitimacy through 'culturally supported norms of behaviour'. This was evident 
in the public's support for the stance of the Conservative Government on 
industrial relations including its legislative programme over three elective terms 
and, by implication, its clear stance on enabling managerial prerogative: 'macho 
management' as Purcell had suggested. In other industries the wave of 
derecognitions (seen by Clayton in 1989) as well as the rise of the single union 
deals in Japanese transplants in the electronic and automotive sectors all added to 
the legitimacy felt by the managers of the firms. Given the poor state of finances 
due to supermarket competition (Ritson 1999a) and the cyclical nature of 
chemicals (Ritson 1999d) there was thus 'a window of opportunity', to enable 
the enaction of an underlying ideology which depended on location and 
technology and so included a variety of similar but distinct strategic activities 
which were revealed as firms took advantage of the opportunity across the 
industry. 
Further evidence was meanwhile accruing, with interviews of staff and 
discovery of documents. Access to documents showed that the strategy within 
the refinery was deliberate: formal, written and openly discussed and linked to 
human resource issues. In terms of process, the literature indicated that some 
authors unearthed no evidence of a deliberate strategy, almost inevitably 
concluding that one did not exist (Young 1992) or that managerial action was 
'opportunistic' (Malloch 1991). These studies lacked any theoretical analysis of 
the possibility of an emergent approach, and also specific evidence. Young did 
not have access to the later documentation at the Mobil refinery which clearly 
showed management's intention to encourage inward investment from the US 
parent. (Ritson 1999b, 2007). Had he had access to the current data, his 
analysis must have been different. This evidence was published as 
Ritson N H 1 999c Manufacturing strategy in a UK process plant: the 
importance of human resource management Strategic Change 8, pp  349-357, 
The key was an industrial relations strategy which addressed the problems of 
maintenance flexibility (including production operators doing conditional 
maintenance) and contractors' contribution and also more general issue such as 
Health and Safety (which had seemed to be 'owned ' by the unions) and the lack 
of teamwork generally. This evidence was forthcoming from a formal paper 
presented by the then Refinery Director to an international conference of Mobil 
managers. The strategy was labelled as at the manufacturing level, but the clear 
direction was from the corporate level. 
This paper showed the details of a 'downstream' strategy as Purcell (1989) and 
Purcell and Ahistrand (1994) had espoused: the emphasis of the paper was not on 
some distant global corporate level goal but on specific economic returns to 
manufacturing, and the role of teamwork in particular was highlighted as an 
essential precursor to any typically technical manufacturing initiatives such as 
TQM, as seen in the wider manufacturing industry. The clear intention of the 
changes in Mobil was seen as strategic, i.e. long term, whatever the level which 
can be applied: corporate funding was vital to retain competitive performance. 
From these two papers there was also evidence under the second research 
question, related to how strategy had been implemented. Mobil had followed a 
mediating strategy (Tuckman 1998) with its derecognition of the internal craft 
trade unions and the outsourcing of the more basic trades in 1992. This created 
functional flexibility. It then addressed numerical flexibility and the outsourced 
work it had created by challenging the contractors' inefficiency: this was done 
not by a contractual or managerial structure but by a change to working practices 
over the heads of the contractor employers. In 1993 it had introduced a single 
union agreement with the AEEU to replace the old multi-union Site Agreement 
which had been based on the NAECI. In the process it also derecognised the 
contractors' unions not party to the single union deal. 
These HR changes were noted as dangerous in the comment 'this carries an JR 
warning' in one of the presentations to management made by the HR team 
tasked with the process of establishing the single union deal. Various efficiency 
elements were incorporated such as the harmonisation of start and finish times as 
between the contractors and the Mobil workforce, refreshment units and toilet 
and washing facilities placed around the large refinery site. This was to avoid 
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unnecessary travel during meal or comfort breaks. The set morning tea break 
was also abolished to be replaced by a break where work had stopped naturally. 
On the plus side Mobil introduced a skills 'passport' to enable contractors' 
employees to move from site to site and to other plants by way of an accredited 
record of tasks and skills acquired. 
There was much evidence of the role of The HR department in the detail of the 
strategy, which implies, as the literature indicated, a second or third order 
implementation role - though this was extended to provide option to senior 
management rather than just following a given brief. More mundane were the 
HR based tactics used to persuade the internal blue collar maintenance craftsmen 
to change to staff status. These included an advert for a fully flexible craftsman 
in the local press, and the offer of a 17% salary increase with additional 'merit' 
payments to follow the move to staff status. The HR Department organised 
"Question and Answer" sessions and a ballot: in the end the craftsmen voted to 
accept the deal despite the resistance of their own FTOs. 
Such detail tends to site the role of HR in two distinct levels: at the corporate 
level the issue of poor UK industrial relations impeded the inward investment 
needed, and the flexibility required of a dynamic efficiency strategy as indicated 
by Cibin and Grant. On the other hand the Department of HR tended to be 
involved in options for change but was more concerned with the detailed change 
management process than a high level role. This placed much of the HR activity, 
but not all, in the area of a functional level of strategy. 
This question of levels corresponds to the discussion in Chapter 2, in 
determining whether two or three levels of strategy exist, and illustrates the need 
for a more dynamic approach as Marchington and Wilkinson (2002) recognised. 
4.4 Empirical Data II: The Wider Study 
In one area, the Mobil case pointed a way to answer the first question "what is 
the process offormulation of a strategy offlexibility" because, although it did 
not use any TCE rationale, it had used a benchmarking exercise to identify best 
practice amongst a varied collection of firms, similar to Lant and Baum's (1995) 
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contention that firms choose their own set of comparators. This process led to 
the consideration of the NIT as an underlying rationale for strategy formulation. 
Gradually the importance of these internal institutional factors emerged, 
resulting in a revisiting of the Pilot study material in Ritson (2007) as reported 
in the previous section. 
The second question "how has any strategy been implemented in the UK 
petrochemicals industry" only partially emerged from the details of the Pilot, 
but one case was an insufficient sample - though Tuckman (1998) had only used 
BP to justify his article which purported to be about 'the chemical industry' as a 
whole. 
The answers to both questions arose simultaneously as evidence accrued across 
the industry of similar practices, and interviews had not revealed a detailed 
rationale to develop strategy except for managements in Mobil and ICI, who 
developed the Single Union Agreement and the NAECI-SA respectively. 
The ESRC grant had included strategy and human resources as part of the 
proposal, and the theoretical underpinning of the strategy was developed in 
stages. Other evidence arose concerning the role of HR factors in the 
development of a strategy of dynamic efficiency which included the outsourcing 
of maintenance to contractors. However, there was doubt as to whether this was 
opportunistic (Malloch 1991) or strategic: Young (1992) saw no strategy at 
Mobil Coryton. We saw in the previous section that his was not in fact the case 
at Mobil, but was there evidence elsewhere? 
The wider study engendered four relevant papers: 
Ritson N H 1 999d Corporate strategy and the role of HRM: critical cases in oil 
and chemicals" Employee Relations 21,2 pp  159-175 
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Ritson N H 1999b "Management recipes: an alternative to thinking?" 
Management Accounting 1999 77, 3 pp  46-48 
(International Federation of Accountants' Award of Merit article) 
Korczynski M D and Ritson N H 2000 Derecognition of trade unions and the 
dualistic behaviour of oil and chemicals firms Work, Employment and Society 
14,3, pp  419-437 
Ritson N H 2001 Close-coupled disasters: how oil majors are de-integrating 
and then managing contractors in Mars G and Weir D H T (Eds.) 2001 Risk 
Management Volume II Management and Control Aldershot, Dartmouth! 
Ashgate, pp  105-113 
4.4.1 Implementation: HR 
The wider study initially began with two cases in the sample, ICI and BP, both of 
whom had corporate headquarters in the UK, as critical tests of the corporate 
level role of strategy. Both ICI and BP had concluded deals with their internal 
workforces to enable ifinctional flexibility and then, to ensure numerical 
flexibility, had outsourced trades, transferring staff to contractors finns and 
guaranteeing them work for a period of five years. Here it was clear that ICI 
depended on the results of a human resources audit to decide on whether it could 
use 'differentiation' or 'cost leadership', (Porter's 1985 two 'generic' strategy 
forms) - or even achieve as sale of the plants. In a dynamic interchange between 
levels that is not evident with the strategic management literature, corporate 
strategy in these two firms could not even be formulated before the FIR aspects 
had been assessed, and then changes made to accommodate the corporate level 
strategy. This influence of HR factors was related to skill and flexibility, and 
was considered at the corporate level. 
In BP, the corporate decision was to implement an asset-based strategy, so that 
results would be more transparent across the different assets of the Group. This 
meant that scale economies had decreased and were supplanted by extensive 
inter-trade flexibility achieved by craft union derecognition and transfer to staff 
nE' 
status and the transfer of less-used trades (note: not lower-level trades) and the 
use of specialist contractors 
The published paper showed that the changes were part of a corporate level 
approach as both firms' Corporate Headquarters were in the UK, and that the 
changes applied to all of their different manufacturing plants, so that overall 
performance was enhanced: this gave rise in BP at least to an increase in its share 
price. 
This was published as 
Ritson N H 1999d Corporate strategy and the role of HRM: critical cases in oil 
and chemicals" Employee Relations 21,2 pp  159-175 
Human Resources 
Marchington and Wilkinson, as mentioned in Chapter 2, endorsed this more 
complex view of strategy formulation: 
Ritson (1999:170) argues that the relationship between HRM [human resource 
management] and strategy is more dynamic than the classic models suggest" 
(Marchington and Wilkinson 2002:223) 
The paper was also important as it explains how, in corporate level decision 
making, the role of HR management is not peripheral but central. Continuing 
the citation of the above paper, Marchington and Wilkinson state clearly that it 
is wrong to suppose 
"that HRM is owned by and undertaken in specialist departments rather than 
being integrated into the line management of the organisation, and thus 
inseparable from all other managerial functions and activities 
Marchington and Wilkinson (2002:223). 
This accepted the problem of the relationship of an FIRM Department to 
strategy. This paper confirmed the suggestion, as explained in Chapter 2, of that 
HR is a variable concept and is very often misconstrued. The result is that the 
role of human resources in corporate level strategy has been shown here, in fact, 
to be a key determinant 
We should not be surprised at this central HR role as industrial relations has 
taken up the time and effort of so many governments: it was the major plank of 
the Conservative Party's 1979 manifesto - a 'strike free Britain' as noted by 
Bassett (1989) in the title of his book Strike Free, and its encouragement of 
Japanese inward investment (Blyton and Turnbull 1995, 2005). That a whole 
series of HR researchers had missed this relationship (as evidenced in Chapter 
2) is related to the fact that they had not perceived or in the case of Gennard and 
Kelly (1997)- disregarded - the difference between HR departments and their 
roles, which are specific, and the HR function, which is generic. The question 
of access (as discussed in Chapter 3) has also hindered posting the correct 
question to answer the theory. 
Significantly, recent events have shown this analysis of the central role of HR to 
be correct. Both BP and ICI have sold the plants in the study based initially on 
the improved profitability which came from the HR changes described in the 
paper. BP sold Grangemouth to INTEOS in 2005 and ICI sold its Runcorn plant 
to INEOS-Chlor in 2003 and its Wilton plant to Huntsman in 2004. Without the 
changes to the HR function - in BP derecognition and in ICI outsourcing - these 
sales would not have been possible as the changes resulted in productivity gains 
which were accounted for and which were auditable by buyers. 
Thus we saw the emergence of a strategy around HR issues which interacted 
with the global strategy of dynamic efficiency, but which was interpreted 
differently by these two UK based firms. As such, it can be categorised as a 
corporate initiative, and actions taken affected all of the UK plants belonging to 
both BP and ICI petrochemicals divisions. 
This answers the first research question by showing that formulation of strategy 
is concerned with the resource based view around HR factors, and the levels are 
not static but dynamic. These papers not only put HR at the heart of strategy - 
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in terms of de-recognising trade unions to remove demarcations and outsourcing 
trades to increase quality and timely interventions - but also to attract billion-
dollar investment 
4.4.2 Implementation: complexity 
As the research progressed, more evidence was accumulated from the other 
plants and revealed a coherent set of changes where outsourcing became the 
norm - the average reduction of the internal workforce was 50% but some plants 
had gone much further. The results were first published in the industry journal 
Petroleum Review as 'Maintaining production in the new millennium' (Ritson 
1998b). 
These results were then progressed in draft during 1998 and were published as 
Ritson 1999b "Management recipes: an alternative to thinking?" in 
Management Accounting 77, 3 pp  46-48 
Evidence was presented in the tabulated results (Table 1, p  47). Four plants did 
not give numbers due to confidentiality: as highlighted in Chapter 3, we knew 
this would be a problem. However, 12 plants did indeed provide numbers, 
types, and further details of organisational arrangements. 
These showed: 
1. A range of outsourcing - from plant number 9, Esso Fawley who reduced 
numbers from 550 to 120- a 78% drop - to plant number 1, BP Grangemouth 
who reduced staffing from 212 to 185 - only a 12% drop. The average was 40% 
2. The retention of high skilled trades such as instrument mechanics and stream 
analysers, who, as the literature reported in Chapter 2 (e.g. Kelly 1998), had 
generally been transferred to staff status after the derecognition of their trade 
unions. 
3. Different bases for organising the new arrangements - there was no 'best 
way'. Plants 7 and 11 used a trade or functional basis, plants numbered 8, 13 
and 15 used an area or divisional basis while, counter to TCE's insisting on the 
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dangers of small numbers exchange, most plants had severely reduced the 
numbers of contractors, and three plants 4, 10 and 12, used what were termed 
'single source vendors' or 'managing contractors' referred to by Korczynski 
(1993). This use of different bases was true even of plants in the same company 
who seemed not to coordinate efforts between each other, nor as Ritson (2001) 
reports, with contractors in any meaningful sense. 
4. Contingent changes included moving turnarounds out to longer intervals 
(periodicity) seen in the table and shorter schedules for these at plants 2 and 7. 
These changes were said by managers to be the result of changing mind-sets and 
resulted in the saving of millions of pounds per annum. 
This paper used a more academic framework, related to the notion of 'recipes' 
derived from the Grinyer and Spender (1979) and Spender (1989) work noted in 
Chapter 2. The discovery of extensive copying, as opposed to a detailed 
formulation of policy and strategy, was becoming clearer in the empirical 
evidence. 
The second question "how has any strategy been implemented in the UK 
petrochemicals industry" was further amplified in the accruing evidence. The 
evidence partially answered both of the major research questions, and began the 
process of using NIT as a framework partly by way of the apparent 
legitimisation of strategy in the 1990s due to Government actions, mentioned 
earlier. 
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This evidence however also pointed to the piecemeal implementation of a 
corporate/industry level strategy and the question was whether these big firms 
were 'sophisticated modem ' (as in Purcell and Sisson's 1983 terms, described 
in Chapter 2), or just 'big'. Meyer and Rowan (1977) had developed the notion 
that even if a strategy it is not successful, if it assumes the role of a norm, it 
becomes embedded in an industry's field of firms - as we saw in the evidence in 
Chapter 2 from Ernst and Young (1996). Such a conception was further 
developed in Ritson (2001). 
4.4.3 Implementation: Dualism 
Marchington and Wilkinson 2002 had suggested 
"Problems also arise[d?fferent factors external to the organ isation suggest the 
adoption of d?fferent  types of HR strategy, orfd4fferent parts of the business 
operate in d/J'erent market circumstances" 
(Marchington and Wilkinson 2002:223) 
The changes to industrial relations processes had been seen to enact a 
flexible/dynamic efficiency outcome using a 'mediating strategy' (Tuckman 
1998) of derecognition of internal craft trade unions (Claydon 1989, 1993). 
However there was no literature to suggest the opposite was also happening: i.e. 
that the power and status of contractors' trade unions was being enhanced. 
The wider study confirmed that some 20 plants derecognised their internal craft 
trade unions by transferring employees to staff status. Yet the opposite was true 
for most contractors where the role of trade unions in the external crafts 
workforce was enhanced by introducing the National Agreement for 
construction (the NAECI) instead of a local site agreement which had increased 
their status. Although some external craft trade unions were derecognised by 
the three plants which used a single union arrangement, the single union left had 
"small numbers exchange" as its basis and so, as TCE had warned, also an 
enhanced the status of the unions not least in terms of opportunism. 
The paper was published as 
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Korczynski M D and Ritson N H 2000 Derecognition of trade unions and the 
dualistic behaviour of oil and chemicals firms Work, Employment and Society 
14, 3, pp  419-437 
The results were incorporated into a discussion of two apparently conflicting HR 
strategies, so the paper developed more of an industrial relations theme, 
comparing the treatment of internal versus external workers in terms of their 
union representation. The description of this process, which was termed 
'dualistic', espoused an efficiency motive, but the tabulated results showed that 
a 'recipe' was emerging - the contractors were subsumed under either a single 
union deal as in three sites or under the National Agreement (NAECI) in the 
remainder. The paper ended in a brief discussion (Korczynski and Ritson 2000: 
433) of the similarity of actions taken across the industry using the Di Maggio 
and Powell (1991) notion of 'mimetic isomorphism'. This theoretical area 
related to the overall strategy of the Mobil managers, and to the establishment of 
the semi-rational basis of their moves to change the maintenance 'atmosphere'. 
[Note: This was referred to earlier. Ritson (2007), on further consideration of 
the data from the wider study and the pilot, suggested that the most appropriate 
model should be NIT) 
The use of institutional theory arose directly from the results: from the 
desperation of managers which led to the copying seen throughout the industry. 
Interviews with managers confirmed the desperate situation and the 
appropriateness of the NIT approach. The manager at Shellhaven stated that: 
"We were in trouble .The plant looked like it was going to close so we had to be 
seen to be doing something. Anything would have done but next door [i.e. a 
nearby plant] had derecognised the crafts and gone for a single-union dealfor 
contractors'crafts. It took them ages but we hadn 't the time and did it all at 
one fell swoop. We had to show we were in control of the plant or it would have 
shut 
(Korczynski and Ritson 2000:433 emphasis added) 
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The paper was used in large part to document the changes in the UK 
petrochemicals industry within an official Sectoral Working Paper for the 
International Labour Organisation, contributed by Forde et al (2005) and was 
extensively cited therein. 
Again, the paper was prophetic in that BP acquired Coryton in a Europe-wide 
assets swap with Mobil in 2000 clearly at the corporate level and of world-wide 
significance for both firms. Later in 2005 BP shut down the ageing Coryton 
lubricant operation as part of a global analysis after acquiring Castrol lubricants 
business, and as it was retreating from refining in the UK in 2007 BP sold the 
entire Coryton plant to Petroplus. 
4.4.4 Implementation: Disasters 
The rationale of the managers was discussed in Ritson (2007) evidencing and 
underlying the ideology of unitarism. Evidence of this piecemeal approach to 
implementation of the strategy (Ritson 1999b) in particular its applicability to 
only one part of maintenance, provided evidence of maintenance 'disasters'. 
This was published as 
Ritson N H 2001 Close-coupled disasters: how oil majors are de-integrating and 
then managing contractors in Mars G and Weir D H T (Eds.) 2001 Risk 
Management Volume II Management and Control Aldershot, Dartmouth! 
Ashgate, pp  105-113 
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These 'disasters' happened despite the fact that maintenance failures, as 
discussed in Chapter 2, can ruin the profitability of an entire affiliate company, 
not just the plant concerned, due to the permanent loss of production and the 
subsequent possible switching of customer loyalty. Here, in this paper, several 
examples of maintenance disasters were blamed on the 'close coupled' refinery 
processes coming into contact with the 'loosely-coupled' maintenance activity 
especially that of contractors in panned maintenance shutdowns. These terms 
were based on Perrow's (1986) book NormalAccidents. 
The strategy of dynamic efficiency was ineffectual in nature as not only had it 
been piecemeal as between plants within the same firm - but also it had not been 
applied to all areas of contractor maintenance. It had been applied to remedial 
maintenance but not to planned maintenance during turnaround/shutdown 
projects. 
This was evidence that the structures for control of the work - not only the new 
Agreements (NAECI or Single Union Agreement) but the way they were 
implemented by managers - were not adequate. While BP Grangemouth had 
created a kind of network or "alliance" with local contractors and introduced 
them in some detail to the site, this was not introduced elsewhere in BP, or in 
other maintenance functions and areas of the Grangemouth site, despite the 
training of contractor personnel having contributed to a record time for the 
Cracker unit's turnaround 
The 'disasters' involved on the whole poor planning, resulting in industrial 
action - strikes - (Ritson 2001 :108) which seriously delayed the re-
commissioning of vital units of plant operation. These were Esso Fawley, 
Conoco Humber (which considered recognising unions for the first time) and 
Exxon Chemicals Fife. 
The conclusion was that the management of the process (a caveat which 
Atkinson, 1984a, had specifically mentioned) was therefore flawed: 
managements were pragmatic and sought the most efficient solution whether 
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from dc-recognition or re-recognition, depending on the particular micro 
environment where the craft unions operated. 
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Chapter 5 Discussion and Conclusions 
5.1 Discussion 
The research presents extremely sensitive data, gained from exclusive access to 
major petrochemical plants, their contractors, trade union officers and other key 
respondents, which raises several questions in an overview such as this thesis 
Firstly, a major issue has been the conceptions in the literature relating to core 
terms such as strategy (and its levels), FIR and flexibility. These have been 
clarified in the research presented here, but a further problem remains: what 
constitutes maintenance work The research area was defined by managers as 
craft work, comprising remedial repairs. However, Moubray (1991) explained 
that there are three different maintenance functions: planned, remedial and 
conditional. 
While plant managements had consistently increased outsourcing of craft 
maintenance work to contractors, we saw the plants had not adequately 
considered planned maintenance work, variously termed 'turnarounds' or 
'shutdowns' (Ritson 2001). Thus they had only included only the remedial 
variety of maintenance and so access was limited to this area and within it to the 
numerical flexibility of contractors rather than the functional flexibility of the 
internal workforces. 
This issue concurs with Buckley and Chapman's (1997) anthropological idea of 
the 'native categories' of respondents in management research: in this case, it 
concerns the incorrect naming of these roles by management: an historical 
accident, confusing a Department with a Function. 
This also seems to apply to the researchers, whose terms were individually 
arrived at and inconsistently applied as explained in Chapter 2. The issue of a 
lack of definition of maintenance also is evident in the academic work of, for 
example, Lee Cooke (2003). 
This is an important omission given the initial need to test for TCE rationale 
under the ESRC proposal. The notion of 'firm-specific skills' in the flexibility 
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literature was found not to be present in results within the research area as a 
managerial rationale for outsourcing. However access was not provided to 
investigate conditional work carried out by so-called process operators, the 
flexible firm model's "firm specific skills" criterion would apply, given nature of 
the tasks of the process operators. This is because these tasks and the respective 
skills were very site-specific, involving detailed monitoring of the conditions of 
the different production units from computer-operated control rooms sited at 
various places, and the conducting of ad hoc and regular surveys of the external 
conditions. Strange noises for example would be investigated, these being 
identified only from long experience on the particular unit. 
These maintenance personnel were not outsourced - were not subject to 
'numerical flexibility' - nor were their unions derecognised, though changes to 
collective bargaining were made. Unfortunately, they were not subject to the 
research as access was denied to internal employees. 
Secondly, the theoretical development progressed throughout the different 
papers, beginning with TCE and ending with NIT. The pilot study did not accept 
that the TCE concepts were used even implicitly by managements, but the wider 
study however did suggest an economising framework based on skill in that 40% 
on average of the lower level trades were outsourced. This is a weak suggestion, 
however, as it was clear no calculations were made but an underlying ideology 
drove the process. While there was evidence for strategic intent 'upstream' this 
was not implemented 'downstream' in any objective, scientific manner and 
managers relied on being isomorphic with their competitors to maintain 
legitimacy with their firms and with the wider society, as per Meyer and Rowan 
(1977). 
A criticism of the isomorphic approach is that it tended to suggest that copying is 
an end in itself: this may be true, but also the decision may be based on a 
successful 'recipe' which should be transferred across the economy as suggested 
in Donaldson's (1996) use of contingency theory. In this case, however, 
evidence showed there were some disasters due to the weak nature of the 
linkages as between the loosely coupled contractors' maintenance activity and 
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the closely coupled process units of the refinery and chemical plants. These two 
sets of activity, maintenance and production were uneasy bedfellows when 
contained within the same plant; when one was outsourced to contractors the 
situation often became uncontrollably chaotic - a system failure. 
What is not clear is what theory can explain the initiative of Mobil and ICI - 
perhaps the new institutionalism, given a lack of comparators to copy, reverts to 
a more rational basis, with the cultures of the two companies coming into play. 
The single union deal was risky, especially as it involved the derecognition of the 
other unions, but this corresponded to Mobil's culture as the 'maverick' of the 
seven sisters (Sampson 1975). The Economist (1996) described 'Lucio Noto, 
head ofAmerica 's Mobil, 'as 'The oil buccaneer'. On the other hand ICI had not 
derecognised its crafts and had decided on the NAECI, reflecting its more 
conservative bureaucratic culture (Gill 1978). Under NIT this could be used to 
show that at some point instead of mimetics some firm has to break with 
tradition, and the history of Mobil would have indicated it was the prime suspect, 
given its 'maverick' reputation. 
Allied to this was a confusion over the nature and level of strategic formulation 
in the evidence presented. The nature of strategy as a 'deliberate' plan, as 
generally conceptualised in the literature, has been shown to be far more 
'emergent' and dynamic and the existence of three levels is questioned. 
Moreover the literature's conception of these firms as 'sophisticated modem' or 
'sophisticated consulting' style suggested by Purcell and Sisson is challenged by 
their lack of success in several areas of implementation, and by a confrontational 
style based on a unitarist ideology. 
5.2 Conclusions 
The thesis addressed the ESRC proposal "A case study of the development of a 
single union agreement which links events to theories of transaction cost, 
strategic management andflexible firm literature and its implementation under 
Human Resource Management" 
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This was condensed into two basic research questions: what is the process of 
formulation of a strategy offlexibility and how has any strategy been 
implemented in the UK petrochemicals industty. Below the answers are 
summarised, beginning with a reflection on the methodology. 
5.2.1 Methodology 
The case study was needed no secondary data was available except at higher 
level than necessary to answer the research questions. The primary data showed 
that problems of access limited and framed the questions that could be asked. 
The restriction on access meant that there could not be any detailed description 
of how the firms managed internal functional flexibility. In the past, as seen by 
Oldfield at Coryton in the 1960s, the firms managed this in a bureaucratic way, 
with numerous inter-craft 'task sheets' detailing all the agreed inter-craft 
flexibilities. 
Thus the research area was limited to access to numerical flexibility and so to 
contractor relations, although some knowledge about internal issues was 
forthcoming in a piecemeal fashion through interviews. 
Further, there was the problem of framing the major terms. This was discussed 
in Chapter 2 and the above discussion of the definition and framing of what 
maintenance work comprises demonstrates this issue yet again. 
Nevertheless, access to sensitive data from a wide study the industry was a 
major feature, and allowed the advancement of theory. These data were 
confirmed through triangulation and by respondent validity as being reliable and 
accurate. 
5.2.2 Formulation of Strategy 
We have seen that the strategies of the firms were initially deliberate, corporate 
and often global, based on dynamic efficiency, in order to address the changing 
global economics of the industry. This dynamic was transferred to the plants 
but the role of theory - of TCE factors - was not evident in formulating the 
strategy of dynamism. Managers did not use an economising framework but 
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rather an intuitive ideological stance to stem immediate economic concerns. 
This ideological approach was legitimised by then-current norms and this 
corresponded to the theory of NIT, under which the behaviour of firms which 
responded to the action of others, particularly Mobil and ICI, was seen as 
mimetic isomorphism, i.e. copying. 
Evidence from BP and Id, confirmed the HR aspects as central to corporate 
strategy. Much additional information about how the role of HR in strategy 
cannot be over-simplified as a Department: it is generic, located in line 
management. This deeper knowledge was gained from the access gained to 
formulate the interview programme described in Chapter 3. This was because 
empirical evidence from the Wider Study showed an entirely different, indeed 
opposite, approach for contractors whose unions were re-recognised under 
NAECI though the three SUAs did de-recognise some unions at the expanse of 
recognising and consolidating the role of the single union. The results 
confirmed and extended the evidence in the literature (such as Claydon, 1996 
House of Commons, 1994 and Kelly, 1998) which showed that several of the 
firms had de-recognised their internal craft trade unions, and placed the craft 
workforce under a staff contract. This corresponded to Tuckinan's (1998) view 
that derecognition was a 'mediating strategy' to create functional flexibility. 
The new flexibility could be seen to be at the corporate level in terms of 
formulation but at the business level in terms of strategy implementation as the 
firms' business is manufacturing and so is dependent on return from the plants 
via good maintenance performance. Alternatively it can be seen as a functional, 
manufacturing strategy - this term was used in one publication because the 
issues it raised were concentrated within the management caucus of the plant 
and was used to facilitate change. These alternative explanations point to 
evidence of a more towards a dynamic interchange between levels than usually 
found in the literature. 
5.2.3 Implementation of Strategy 
Strategies of implementation emerged as piecemeal and poorly-devised resulting 
in disastrous problems with schedule on planned maintenance leading to high 
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costs, while remedial maintenance was said to have improved significantly. 
These differences are in line with Butler's 1990 thesis which allows an emergent 
role of HR to suit particular local requirements. The results confirmed strong 
evidence for flexibility of the numerical kind in a 40% average rate of 
outsourcing over nearly all of the plants in the sample. The lack of a rationale in 
implementation can be seen to support the problems of formulation and the 
conclusion is that these firms have not behaved in a sophisticated manner, 
against predictions from the literature. 
5.3 Summary 
The thesis points to difficulties in the literature regarding the adequacy of 
analysis within strategic management in terms of levels and the role of human 
resource factors in addressing productivity through flexibility. It refines a role 
of transaction cost economics to explain the results, thus adding to the evidence 
of the appropriateness of the new institutional theory. Finally, it strongly 
suggests a requirement for a more definitive approach to concepts and a return 
to a methodology which adds to or tests out results from a survey methodology. 
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Appendix 1 
A list of respondents at the Mobil pilot case study 
l3interviewees - 5 HR, 8 Maintenance/Engineering 
Coryton 
Mobil 
Refinery 
Jeremy Valiance former ER Adviser 
Paul Lowndes Employee Relations Manager 
Jeff House Senior ER Adviser 
Jim Corlett Production Manager 
David Technical Manager 
Chamberlin 
Jeff Jones former Refinery TGWU Chairman 
Mick Martin Solomons Survey co-ordinator 
Mobil Europe 
Ltd 
David Kershaw former Refinery ER Manager 
Kelvin Young former Refinery ER Superintendent 
Volker Meyweg former Refinery Director 
Reinhardt Getz former Refinery Maintenance Mgr 
Contractors 
Janus Engineering 	 David Pendrey Coryton Contractors Panel Chair 
CIIVIMS Ltd 	 Tony Cooper Coryton Contractors Panel Secretary 
Respondents from Trade Unions - 12 interviewees 
AEEU 
	 Geoff Garbutt 
	 National Officer 
MSF 
	
Keith Sneddon 	 National Officer 
AEEU 
	
Gavin Laird 
	 National Officer 
AEEU Construction 	 Tom McLean 
	 National Officer - 
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0MB 
AEEU (EETPU 
T+G Essex 
GMB Essex 
MSF Essex 
AEEU (EETPU) Essex 
AEEU (Construction) 
Thamesside Construction 
Committee 
Dave Hewitt 
Ken Biggs 
Brian Theobald 
Terry Stevens 
Martin Gould 
John Ardron 
Derek Wheaton 
Paul Street 
National Officer 
National Organiser 
FTO 
FTO 
FTO 
FTO 
London Div Organiser 
Local Organ iser 
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Appendix 2 Respondents from the Wider Study 
2.1 Respondents from Mobil's 12 Comparators 
(10); 16 interviewees, 4 HR 12 Maintenance/Engineering 
Respondent Name 	 Interviewees 
BP Grangemouth Chris Hutchinson Maintenance Managers 
Jim Preston 
Bill Long Contracts Manager 
BP Chemicals Hull Dave Champion Maintenance Manager 
Conoco Humber Ren Reed Employee Relations 
Manager 
Esso Fawley Sandie Batho, Paul Employee Relations 
Adams Managers 
Elf Milford Haven* did not respond 
Gulf Oil GB Milford Bob Symonds, Ron Maintenance Managers 
Haven Nash 
ICI Teesside Steve Waugh Engineering Manager 
Lindsey Oil Refinery Ian Fowler Maintenance Manager 
Shell Expro Bryan Cooper Maintenance Manager 
Shell Stanlow Les Ball Maintenance 
Superintendent 
Fiona Walsh ER Adviser 
Texaco Pembroke Nigel Denton Maintenance Manager 
Total St Fergus* did not respond 
Others 
Esso UK Petroleum: Peter Lewis, Corporate Strategy Adviser 
Shell International: Piet De Vlemings Corporate Strategy Manager 
Shell UK Oil: John Dean, Corporate Strategy Manager - 
PSI 
2.2 Respondents from the wider industry 
6 Maintenance/Engineering and one HR interviewee 
Respondent Name 	 Interviewee 
BP Chemicals Baglan Bay 
	 Ron Fairfax Engineering Manager 
Steve Kerkhofs Maintenance 
Manager 
BP Chemicals Grangemouth 
Exxon Chemicals Ltd Fawley 
Exxon Chemicals Ltd 
Fife Ethylene Plant 
PIP North Tees 
Cohn Bell Employee Relations 
Manager 
Ken Francey Maintenance Manager 
John Tyree Engineering Manager 
Shell Chemicals Carrington 	 John Wilkinson Maintenance 
Manager 
S he llhav en 	 Nick Blamphin Maintenance 
Manager 
Full Time Trade Union Officers 
Name Interviewee Plants covered 
GMB Hull Steve Featherstone Hull 
GMB South Jon Parker Lindsey, Conoco 
Humberside 
AEEU Greg Douglas ICI and PIP Teesside 
Sheffield Tom Hardacre 
AEEU 
Southampton Mick Benfield Esso Exxon Fawley 
AEEU 
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Swansea 	 Dave Bennett 	 Milford Haven, Baglan Bay 
AEEU = Amalgamated Engineering and Electrical Union 
GMB - = General Municipal and Boilermakers union 
Others 
Paul Corbett: AEBU National Officer for Construction 
Fred Higgs: T+G National Officer Oil and Chemicals 
EIiJ 
6 Respondents from Industry Bodies 
( 
Name Interviewee 
DTI Stephen Weatherly Director ofACTIVE 
Arthur McQuillan Secret my of CRINE 
Engineering Construction Jeremy (3oodchild Western Area Secretary 
Industry Association 
European Construction Ivor Williams Director 
Institute 
National Joint Council for Lewis Sampson Director 
the Engineering Construction 
Industry 
Petroleum Employers Roger Colomb Director 
Council 
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Part 2 The Publications 
Unbinding 
rationality Unbinding rationality: a 
single-union agreement for 
contractors at a UK oil 
refinery 
Neil Ritson 
University of Northumbria at Newcastle, Carlisle, UK 
Background 
The process industry 
There have been several major studies of employment practices in process 
manufacturing - Woodward's (1958) comparison with craft and mass 
production, Flanders' (1964) study of Esso's Fawley refinery, Olduield's iporting 
of the Mobil Coryton agreements (1966), Goldthorpe and Lockwood's (1969) 
search for the affluent worker in Laporte, Gallie's (1978) testing of Blauner's 
theory of automation and integration in EP, Ahlstrand's (1990) quest for 
productivity in Fawley after Flanders, and Young's (1986: 1992) evaluation of 
flexibility and craft work at Coryton. None of these refers to management 
decision making and the studies have tried generally to understand the outcomes 
for employees arising from the nature of automated process plant technology. 
Furthermore, little attention has been paid to the important issue of semi-
permanent contractors in any of these sources: there is only one page in Gallie 
(1978, p.84), none in Goldthorpe and Lockwood (1969), eight in Ahlstrand (1990, 
pp. 172-9), seven in Flanders (1964, pp.  22, 29, 56, 60, 147-8, 193). Despite its age, 
The Large Sites Report (National Economic Development Office, 1970) still 
comprises the most detailed description of capital expense projects in oil and 
chemicals in the UK. It criticized the large number of different agreements and 
advocated a National Agreement, which was created in 1981, for capital 
projects and large turnarounds. 
The most recent research Is Young's (1992) description of one refinery's 
internal agreement which ran in 1974 to 78 pages of detailed inter-craft 
flexibilitles, or where later (Young, 1986) full flexibility was acquired internally 
by refineries based on a trend begun with Esso, Fawley as far back as the late 
1950s (Flanders, 1964). A survey of maintenance subcontracting in UK industry 
demonstrated that, in oil and chemicals, in parallel to seeking internal 
flexibility, process plants were increasingly almost together as an industry, 
using the flexibility of outside contracting, which increased by 40 per cent from 
1981 to1988 (Cross, 1990). These moves were arguably down to simple 
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Journal of economics where productivity was set as "outpUt per employee" or where multi- 
Managerial national enterprises' terms and conditions of employment created a large labour 
Psicho1oov burden per se and so contractors were cheaper. The basis of management 
123 perceptions of contractors' better efficiency was not investigated, as the survey was large (more than 200 cases). 
The literature on single-union agreements per se tends to concentrate on the 
156 power relations and the no-strike clauses (for example Bassett, 1986; Grant, 
1993; Wickens, 1987) or on the industrial spread and employee coverage of the 
agreements (for example Beaumont 1990; Garraghan,1986; Garraghan and 
Stewart, 1992). There is little evidence of how they arose or the philosophy of 
the main trade unions involved or management requirements for their efficiency 
as modes of legitimate authority within the plants. This data has, therefore, 
been of little use in analysing the reasons for choosing the single-union, new- 
style agreement In the present case. 	 - 
Bounded rationality 
While economists have always made extraordinary assumptions about 
"rational" or "economic" man (sic), the calculatedness of human social activity 
seemed to occupy much space from Machiavelli through to Crozier (1964, p. 194) 
who described "the active tendency jof man] to take advantage of all available 
means to further his own privileges", and it is this conception of "management" 
which fires the labour process research of Burawoy (1979) and others - a kind 
of conspiracy theory based on management rationality, within which 
exploitation of employees is seen as a conscious act (Harris, 1988). 
In the study of human decision making, theories of supposedly riskless 
choice are used by psychologists. Even "risky" decisions only "attempt to 
maximise expected utility" (Edwards, 1954). Even then, Edwards agrees that, 
when we try to specify what to maximize, we might be wrong and, furthermore, 
there might be two opposing parts of the concept of rationality: there might be 
costly effort (and therefore negative utility) to maintain a weakly ordered 
preference field as required under a maximization principle. "Under such 
circumstances", he continues, "would it be 'rational' to have such a field?" 
(Edwards, 1954. p.  383). 
Simon (1972) expressed the view that "economics has to export ... a very 
particular and special form of [rationality] - that of the utility maximiser". Even 
in psychology the ideas of decision making were imported from the economic 
studies of "rational choice" rather than a cognitive version which would have 
been more in keeping with the subject (see Edwards and Tversky 1967 for 
example). Hence the importance of the stance of the "Carnegie school", of which 
Chandler, March and Simon were a part, which developed essentially new ideas 
about the impossibility of the rational models which economists had developed 
to explain real-life decisions. Even the Theory of Games and its elegant 
experiments (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1953) cannot replicate the tense 
and risky atmosphere of management work, and so its conclusions can be taken 
only so far and no further. It was the Carnegie school mainly which developed 
a theory of organizational behaviour which promulgated the notion that 
rationality was not perfect or limitless but rather was bounded by Individual 
experience. Simon coined the term "bounded rationality" which he defined 
rather loosely as behaviour which was "intendedly rational but only limitedly 
so" (Simon, 1957a, p. xxiv, original italics). Bounded rationality for Simon 
existed because "the capacity of the human mind for formulating and solving 
complex problems is very small compared with the size of problems whose 
solution is required for objectively rational behaviour in the real world (Simon, 
1957a, p.  198). He described organizations as important because "Individual 
human beings are limited in knowledge, foresight, skill and time that 
organisations are useful instruments for the achievement of human purpose" 
(Simon, 1957a, p.  199). 
The bounded rationality model also suggested sequential consideration of 
alternatives (motivated, simple-minded and ego-based according to Cyert and 
March, 1963, pp.  120-2), using heuristics or rules rather more complex than rule-
of-thumb and sat isficing - choosing the first acceptable solution. In these terms 
there is also the "implicit favourite" model whereby much of the foregoing 
description of a bounded rationality could be subsumed under such an 
approach which would bind the scope of the search, the treatment of 
alternatives and the criteria for selecting them and, of course, the weight 
attached to different solutions. 
Though he refers to "capacity", what Simon surely means is more akin to a 
perceptual set, a predisposition to see things in a certain way and importantly 
to look for evidence and solutions in a similar direction[i]. The role of 
management was not considered very much by the authors cited in the studies 
at the oil refineries and chemical plants above, nor were the management 
decision-making processes investigated by them. Rather, the role of employees 
and their jobs was the subject of enquiry, and how far these became more 
productive or efficient and under what rules, regulations or circumstances such 
increases could be achieved. Their perspective was more sociological than 
psychological, though Ahlstrand (1990) may be said to have crossed the barrier 
between the two disciplines in his conclusion that semiotics (and from that, 
bounded rationality in careerist terms) was the ultimate driver for the quest for 
productivity improvements. 
The current case offered a unique chance to fill the gap in management 
decision-making knowledge by an investigation of why the company had failed 
to follow the lead of others, as it had previously, why it then failed to involve 
employees but chose an adversarial tack, why It took an unusual type of union 
agreement to vet the terms of conditions for employment on its site and, finally, 
why it chose to impose those terms on its suppliers' (contractors') employees. It 
seemed as if, to an outsider, the scales had fallen suddenly from the eyes of 
management or, more probably a priori, that a strong individual held sway and 
by fiat rather than logic transformed the relationship with the contractors and 
their labour forces. The change was too quick, too drastic and too risky to be 
otherwise. 
Unbinding 
rationality 
157 
Journal of In searching for theoretical models of explanations for the phenomena. 
Managerial modern economists use of psychology in their attempts to explain economizing 
Psvcho1ov structures and processes is impressive. Williamson (1996, pp.  42-3) descrIbes 
123 just that contracting-out situation as exists in the refinery, where managements 
"attempting 	 "all (intentionally rational agents") are 	 to cope effectively" but, as 
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complex contracts are unavoidably incomplete", then bounded rationality must 
"economising exist. Paradoxically, things get worse with the 	 on bounded 
rationality" which, Williamson says, is "a leading purpose of organisation". By 
this he means that client refinery managers rationally try to make contracts 
more complete, but the mass of paperwork and controls that have to be set up 
create yet more uncertainty and opportunity for misunderstandings, so, all 
other things being equal, a short contract is best: hence the "economy" on 
bounded rationality. We would expect, a priori, that a multinational oil major 
would behave bureaucratically and rationally. The process in question, 
however, involved a non-programmable decision, but with aspects of rational 
approach. This is discussed below. The new role for bounded rationality found 
indirectly within Williamson's work makes a snapshot of a complex contracting 
situation a test of its currency[21. 
Previously, Archer (1980) and Blal (1986) determined rational decision 
making in stages, the latter author as a two-part approach involving four stages 
in each part The first stage is problem identification and involves: monitoring 
the decision environment, defining the problem, specifying decision 
alternatives and diagnosing the problem. The second stage, the problem 
solution, is achieved via: developing alternatives, evaluating alternatives, 
choosing the best alternative and implementing the chosen alternative. This is 
familiar stuff, but it was actually this process which the refinery management 
embarked on, but, under the bounded rationality perspective, other features 
were incorporated which they were unaware of, because under ambiguous or 
new situations, such as, in this case, decision making happens under extreme 
uncertainty. Janis (1989) included not only bounded rationality (defined as 
limited time, information and resources) but also social constraints (such as the 
need for acceptance, social support, a shared perspective on what happens, and 
acceptance and agreement beyond the initial decision-making team to cope 
with existing culture and values clashing), and personal constraints (including 
the desire for prestige, maintenance of self-concept, coping with pressure and 
emotional needs including career advancement). This latter is a risky strategy 
for individuals - worthwhile if carried off successfully but disastrous if not. 
Cyert and March (1963) suggested a slightly different angle in the notion of 
"problemistic" search, where, as the rationality is bounded, only the immediate 
task environment exerts sufficient pressure to influence alternative searches, 
while decisions are made to optimize consensus rather than objective criteria. 
Consequently, managers often settle for considerably less than they would like 
to have and, anyway, the ideal decision would strain resources and time in the 
search. 
Oil refining 	 Unbinding 
Oil refining has numerous, specialist, industry-wide bodies such as the 	 rationality 
Petroleum Employers' Council, the Institute of Petroleum, the National Joint 
Council for the Engineering Construction Industry, various regional clients 
groups and strong contractor associations such as the Electrical Contractors' 
Association, the Thermal Insulation Contractors' Association, professional 
engineering institutes and so on. In contrast to factory production, refining 159 
creates profit only by scale economies gained by continuous 24-hour, 365-day 
production on truly massive sites several square miles in area. Each refinery 
has a requirement for critical specialist maintenance needing skills and 
equipment not found in the general market. Because of this, since their 
inception, all refineries have had their own direct crafts workforce, 
complemented by semipermanent engineering and civil contractors for new 
capital expense work or for other new work of a maintenance and repair nature 
which is not continuous. Refineries, therefore, depend heavily on contractors. In 
factories, maintenance can be done during annual works' holidays but in 
refineries the cost of an annual shutdown would be astronomic and the cleaning 
and repair of major production units is done on a rotating basis because the 
plant has to be shut down and production goes off-stream. These episodes are 
called "shutdowns' or "turnarounds". To "turnaround' a major unit may often 
require a three-week period and 200,000 man-hours plus materials - into the 
£10 million bracket. If there are delays and product cannot be stored, loss of 
production and sales revenue amounts to a further paper loss of millions of 
pounds per day. Unlike factory production, of course, this loss cannot be made 
up by overtime or otherwise as plant is run at capacity continuously. One 
company recently extended the period between major shutdowns and so It 
retained a very large amount of cash which positively affected its rating by 
merchant bank analysts in the City of London, such is the scale of operation[3]. 
The vast scale, short length and thus the intensity of turnarounds, and the 
impact on profits and share price, therefore, are in stark contrast to the more 
modest needs of manufacturing and help to set it apart from the rest of the 
engineering industry. 
Refinery management 
Part of unbounding rationality is the openness to differing views and this can 
be achieved by ,rotation of managers, for example by surveys and 
benchmarking techniques and soon. Though this happens in the oil industry, it 
is generally only within that industry and, in refining, managers are generally 
grown from within, usually from chemical or mechanical engineering 
backgrounds[4]. 
In the terms of modern economists (Williamson, 1996), there isa great deal of 
human "asset-specificity" or firm-specific skills. This contributes to bounded 
rationality; though objectively, very few positions actually require firm-specific 
skills, this is ignored. Perhaps those relating to networks built up with 
government, local enforcement agencies (such as the Health and Safety 
Journal of Executive), or requiring a historical perspective, would be required from within, 
Managerial but accepted practice and culture prove otherwise. Ironically, though 
Psvcholocni serendipitously, one of the roles where this could be said to be essential, but was 
123 not available to the refinery, is the record of dealing with trade unions in 
"hold engineering construction. The intimate knowledge of techniques such as 
up"[5] by contractors or their trade unions, the knowledge of previous disputes 
160 and personalities in the industry are all vital bargaining tools in that they 
establish credibility for staff engaged in direct negotiations and indeed, more 
generally, about the company's competence. 	 - 
Limited views from the environment 
Similarly, the standard environment scanning by surveys is parochial, with 
Conoco in the UK conducting an annual survey of refining terms and conditions 
of employment and Solomons producing a worldwide refinery efficiency survey. 
There is generally no mechanism for formally accessing the wider horizons of 
manufacturing industry, though this has, in the UK, seen such wide-ranging 
changes (such as reported in Bassett, 1986; and Blyton and Turnbull, 1995). 
There are internal corporate comparisons, illustrated in part by the external 
Solomons whose survey showed up the weaknesses and so appropriate 
benchmarks had not therefore been sought outside the industry. Instead, 
attention focused on the fact that, since the 1973 and subsequent oil price 
instability, many refineries had been forced to make better returns in an era of 
over-capacity. Further, demand changes, such as diesel and unleaded fuels and 
gas for the new breed of small power stations, required more capital investment 
at a time when refineries are already losing money on sales and sales volume is 
down, much product being bought on the "spot" market in Rotterdam at less 
than refineries in the UK can make It. Manpower has been cut in slices since the 
profit drive of 1989/90, maintenance workforce being a prime target, reducing 
from 300 posts in the 1970s to some 95 today on staff conditions, and production 
operators moving to a 12-hour shift from eight hours, thus reducing the number 
of posts there, too, by two-thirds[6]. 
Since 1973, in the UK, Esso closed its Milford Haven refinery in the mid 1970s 
and in 1984 BP closed its Kent refinery and part of its Llandarcy refinery. 
However, until 1996, there were no other casualties in the UK refining 
(Elf/Murco have announced a merger with Gulf at Milford Haven, which will 
close, while BP has taken over Mobil's Coryton refinery) [7]. Attention spans, 
therefore, were understandably limited among the oil company managers, as 
Cyert and March (1963) suggest, determined on the immediate problem they 
understood. 
This pressure on performance meant that companies were looking at various 
means of cutting all discretionary costs, a truly problemistic search. In the 
wider industry, one company outsourced its drivers and was followed by many; 
another outsourced its IT and accounts; and every company seemed to be 
outsourcing its refinery maintenance. Table I illustrates this in part by the 
concentration of derecognition of crafts trade unions and the hidden corollary - 
the expansion of recognized contractors' unions replacing the direct labour Unbinding 
forces in doing the same jobs. Maintenance is arguably a more risky area close rationality 
to the very core of the manufacturing base and bottom-line profit performance. 
The pressures of the hostile environment had resulted, as Cross (1990) reported, 
in using more outsourcing across the entire industry, though this brought with 
it a lack of control, risk and uncertainty 
- suddenly, the activities considered 
outside the organizations, i.e. contracting generally, were beginning to become 161 
part and parcel of operating. However, in this case, though not in any other 
refinery at the time, the pressure inadvertently paved the way to unbinding 
existing rationality. 
The possibility that refining could be just a branch of manufacturing had not 
been discussed, nor had techniques like total quality management been 
introduced with conviction anywhere in the industry except by Texaco (Grant, 
1995), while no evidence for world class manufacturing was found in 
companies. Employee relations' records showed a coherence of derecognition 
strategies. This is evidenced by the submission to the House of Commons Select 
Committee on Employment (1993) by the Transport and General Workers' 
Union (T&GWU) based on trade union information, though uncorroborated by 
the employers, and illustrates just how bounded their rationality had become. 
Operator 	 Location 	 Description of employees 
BP Chemicals 	 Bagian Bay 	 Process operators and craft 
BP Oil 	 Llandarcy 	 Process operators and craft 
Esso 	 Fawley 	 Process operators and craft 
Esso 	 Distribution 	 Drivers 
Mobil 	 Coryton 	 Administrative and craft 
Mobil 	 Birkenhead 	 Administrative and craft 
Shell UK 	 Shellhaven 	 Process operators and craft Table I. Shell UK 	 Staniow 	 Administrative and craft Derecognition in Shell 	 Distribution 	 Drivers major oil companies 
Source: House of Commons (1993) In the UK to 1993 
Rationality bounded by institutional agreement 
A major problem in maintenance is the complexity of the work and the trade 
union demarcations and agreements. Thus, there is a rationality for 
derecognizing the crafts trade unions, as seen in Table I, and transferring the 
employees to more flexible staff conditions of service. As for outsourcing of work 
to contractors, this is far more difficult as the employees belong to refinery 
suppliers not to the refining company. In addition, there are national agreements 
- for example the Electrical Contractors' Association, the Thermal Insulation 
Contractors Association and the National Agreement for the Engineering 
Construction Industry (NAECI) - as well as local site agreements which are 
typical construction agreements. These cover various ways of working often for 
Journal of different trades, and are complex and long - the NAECI is over 120 pages. This 
Managerial is because it has to deal with a number of circumstances which, in the past, 
Psvcholov uniquely affected construction sites. Commonly, the need for contractors to be 
123 brought in from their "home" bases means that travelling time and allowances and/or accommodation arrangements have been included, resulting in various 
radius allowances, and complicated by absences, holiday and shiftworking 
162 arrangements. Furthermore, the special nature of the sites has allowed the 
development of a series of other allowances called "conditions money" 
(referring to height and confined spaces) and welders' allowances for difficult 
materials such as stainless steel or alloys[8]. Basic pay is complicated by the 
transfer of employees between different jobs with different allowances and by 
the different skills payments, or by temporary chargehand status. Added to 
these are the call-out, shift and overtime payments. Most sites also operate a 
bonus or incentive scheme of some sort for work which Is able to be measured, 
while for other work there might be a "second tier" or general site bonus, 
backed by a guaranteed working week of, say, 40 hours, the last two hours 
being at overtime rates. 
Also, because of the distances travelled to and from the site, and indeed 
within a large site, changing and washing up time at the beginning and end of 
the day was allowed, tea-breaks for the entire workforce meant winding up and 
winding down before and after them, while most employees had to travel to 
central catering areas, even for morning tea breaks. In refineries this was 
exacerbated by non-smoking outside of defined areas and employees needed to 
travel for a morning smoke. Employers then had to arrange the bussing of 
employees around the site; arrangements of first and second sittings for lunch; 
provide lockers, toilets and washrooms; and prefabricated cabins had to be 
erected on site for shelter from inclement weather. In manufacturing, as well as 
having a stable workforce with set pay rates and stable job regimes, with 
virtually no need for shiftwork or conditions pay, the payment-by-results or 
piecework (now much replaced by measured day work) has traditionally been 
"owned" by the employer with piecemeal negotiations on "poor" jobs. However, 
in construction, the scheme is generally the subject of intense pre-contract 
negotiations with the trade unions (see the reference to "hold-up" earlier) as the 
contracts are short and earnings have to be seen to reflect this insecurity. In 
manufacturing the utilization of working hours, even with set meal breaks, Is 
vastly superior to that in construction, where the National Economic 
Development Office (1970) suggested "only 40 per cent of hours were fully- 
utilised" and "apathy was rife". 
Times are changing, however, and the large-scale expansions of the past era 
of high product demand are changing towards more maintenance and repair 
work, while simultaneously plant is getting older and more liable to breakdown 
or need thorough attention, particularly where safety, risks and environmental 
pollution are possible outcomes of plant breakdown. Thus, many more contract 
hours are "local" and the need for travelling and overnight stays becomes less 
Unbinding 
rationality 
and less important. This situation helped put more pressure on the institutional 
framework and in the end led to the significant changes described below. 
Bounded rationality in action: the case study 
Methodology 
The initial research question area was how manufacturing firms' managements 
are coping with increased levels of subcontracting identified by Cross (1990). A 
telephone survey of organizations which depend on contractors (oil refineries 
and chemical plants) revealed various changes to internal employee relations 
but that only one refinery had specifically and explicitly addressed the issue of 
institutionalizing a better contractor performance, which created a need to 
change the industrial relations agreement. Access was gained at this company, 
and as it was a "critical", that is a sole case, the study designed itself (as had the 
study by Gallie, 1978, p.  40). This design, therefore, and the qualitative nature of 
the data, meant that triangulation was necessary to reduce error from primary 
sources by checking against other primary sources and against the secondary 
(archival) sources provided by the company. Initially, notes were made from 
document files covering the entire period of the run-up to the changes, written 
up and chronology established, with themes and queries arising being noted 
separately to form prompts during the interviews. 
Thereafter, a representative sample of over 20 people was identified and 
comprised officers at various levels from relevant trade unions, company 
managers from different departments, contractors, industry body officials and 
industry analysts. They were all interviewed and presented with the summary 
of the archival data for comment. These interviews were structured open 
response. Interviews were recorded in note form at the time, typed up later and 
sent back to the interviewees for verification/validation. Alterations were made 
if necessary and new points which were raised were noted for further 
investigation. Second and third interviews were arranged to develop themes 
raised during the initial interview. 
Fin clings 
The investigation revealed that the case study refinery had opened in 1953 and, 
like many others in the UK, had been developed progressively as the market 
demand for petroleum products increased in the post-war boom. Initially 
processing 50,000 barrels a day of crude oil, it now processes 190,000 barrels - 
this is 7 per cent of UK demand. Though the refinery had lost a new venture to 
affiliate companies and was losing money (not meeting its production budget) 
in 1990/1991, the attitude of employees, including many managers, was based 
on the history of many of them working since their teens or early 20s at the 
refinery, sometimes with brief spells abroad or in the UK headquarters, 
sometimes not. That there were only some 900 employees on site, with 90-odd 
on shift meant that the population knew each other very well and most lived 
locally. Contractors had been used for maintenance and construction work as 
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Managerial contractors was established early on. 
Psvcholoav The ways of working in a tight labour market post-war were highly 
1 92 "Water regulated by agreements such as the 	 Tube" and the Outside Steelwork 
1,2 Erection" agreements where an employers' association negotiated with a trade 
union confederation through two local panels of negotiators[9]. In the 1950s this 
164 refinery, like some others, had broken away from these national arrangements 
and established its own agreement for its refinery site to cover construction and 
maintenance. The former was replaced in 1981 by the NAECI, but the latter 
remained in place, despite Its terms and conditions being based on the earlier 
national agreements and it never having incorporated the productivity 
arrangements which the refinery had negotiated internally for its own crafts. 
The panel of employers remained in place, creating cost problems for the 
refinery managers who, in the end, had to foot the bill for any concessions made 
during the negotiations with the trade unionsilO]. 
Even at the level of corporate strategy this was also happening in that all the 
oil majors use all the markets at their disposal and all are vertically integrated; 
unlike other industries, the market is not segmented such as into fuels and 
lubricants, though BP and Mobil are in 1996 attempting this, at least in Europe, 
by swapping markets (Cibin and Grant, 1996). Oil refining was still complacent 
and conservative - perhaps because of the.costs of downtime on a refinery and 
the inability of management to assess the strength of union resistance without 
the possibility of incurring these huge costs[1 11. Inward investment companies, 
mainly Japanese, had shifted the goalposts far enough away from traditional 
ways of working in other sectors of the UK economy by virtue of the different 
production methods, as well as their inherent "foreignness" which enabled this 
to happen in manufacturing The new ways of working in engineering allowed 
change to happen in a quasi-legitimate fashion and the trade union recognition, 
often with employee participation, single status terms and conditions of 
employment, as well as flexibility and no-strike clauses (Bassett, 1986 Wickens 
1987). Unlike the economic problems of the British car industry, which paved 
the way for a new approach in engineering, this challenge to tradition was 
absent from oil refining and the stringency of the economic downturn had not, 
at that time, closed a refinery. Thus, the existing traditional rationality was 
established more firmly in refining than in other areas of the economy, making 
any change exceptional. 
Beginning to establish a new rationality 
Change agents 
The refinery had been planning for a ten-year programme of development worth 
a billion pounds. A new refinery manager was assigned from an affiliate 
company as the last major venture or expansion at the refinery had suffered a 13-
week strike by contractors' employees and was an economic disaster. (At the 
time (1989-91) it had been the largest construction project in Europe[121.) He had 
seen a number of other operating practices throughout the global refining 
industry and his appreciation of the UK situation was from an outsider's 	 Unbinding 
viewpoint - a different rationality from the insider's. His main preoccupation was 	 rationality 
the underlying culture. His reaction on arrival was that the refinery was "owned" 
by the blue-collar employees who lived locally and had been there up to 40 years. 
Managers and supervisors were either on rotation and career-minded or were 
from the ranks of the local area and sympathetic to the status quo ante. In the 
first case, there was no "ownership", and in the latter the managers and 165 
supervisors had the same attitudes as their subordinates. Changing the culture 
depended on management taking control - or at least the initiative[13]. 
A group of employee relations staff, several of whom were specialists in the 
engineering construction industry, were also appointed. This group was 
headhunted from outside the company as there were no available people within 
the company still with the relevant experience. These new people had their own 
bounded rationality, of course, but it was not clouded by memories of the 
company, unlike the new refinery director's, nor, in concert with him, was it 
affected by the present site or its culture. The new venture employee relations 
(ER) manager was formerly with oil and contractor companies and more 
recently British Airways. He complained about the isolation of the oil industry 
from engineering - it had its own industry bodies as described earlier and its 
managerial inadequacies were clearer to an outsider. The new venture ER 
manager also recruited internal employee relations staff with broad experience 
of managing change in other industry sectors. His team included the internal 
refinery employee relations manager who came from the nuclear industry, more 
allied to mechanical engineering than oil, and he had been exposed to the 
changes within the UK engineering sector, such as cellular manufacture, team 
working, etc. 
The existing Chair of the Contractors' Panel and its Secretary were contractors 
themselves and were soon replaced by more external, seasoned professionals, 
rather than the previous practice of simply drawing such important positions 
from among the ranks of the existing contractors. The Secretary was experienced 
in contract audit work (some of which had taken place at the case study refinery) 
and the Chair had experienced similar change management as an industrial 
relations officer, then as a self-employed contractor at another refinery which had 
sought to change its contractors in a different way[ 14]. 
This group of managers, in the absence of the complete billion-pound 
venture programme, had good reason to show what they could achieve, if only 
for career reasons. Ahlstrand (1990, pp. 222-9) also mentions the need for senior 
managers in Esso to have concluded a major productivity deal at Fawley to 
progress their careers. Anyway, It created a pool of new ideas and a power elite 
prepared to chance its arm. The danger, of course, is that there is a large element 
of risk inherent in allowing such change agents loose: one is reminded of Janis' 
(1989) example of groupthink possibly occurring within the new, tightly-knit 
expert team. This may have been the reason why the exercise actually 
conducted attempted to be so methodical and objective, at least as far as It went, 
in order for these forces to be harnessed and controlled by the refinery. 
Journal of Creating a new rationality 
Managerial A cross-functional task force was set up to identify the dimensions of the 
Psvcholocn, problem, mirroring the managing change/just-in-time programmes of world- 
192 class manufacturing, though the mention of world-class manufacturing as a set 
of goals and accompanying techniques was mainly because of the worldwide 
experience and vision of the new refinery director. This task force consisted 
166 mainly of mechanical and chemical engineers who used the contractors and 
was chaired initially by the refinery director, latterly by the new venture ER 
manager under his new title of Manager, Contract Services Employee Relations, 
noting the loss of the venture and the new role he had created as servicing the 
contractors. Internal benchmarks obtained by the task force of the company 
against its own refineries were telling - the return on capital employed figures 
of the Far East were ten times higher than Western Europe, with the UK and 
Australia being among the poorest performers worldwide. Hence, it mirrored 
the situation described by a BP manager to Gallie (1978, p.  310), "fit takesi six 
weeks to complete a crude unit shutdown here but three weeks in France'. The 
task force then identified process, quality and safety improvements as key 
attributes in changing the environment for contractors to enable efficiency 
gains to be made. What was the reality which was to be changed in the refinery 
to achieve these goals? 
First, the process of contractor work was exposed. It had not improved since 
the 1970s and, despite a 1990 NAECI agreement to introduce bell-to-bell 
working, this had not been forced through by employers. Demarcations 
between trades and between subcontractors were prevalent, bureaucracy 
stifling, and the organization was based on conservatism Oust-in-case) not 
radical efficiency Oust-in-time).  The site agreement was based in the NAECI 
with most of its bureaucracy and also had a complex bonus scheme for 
measured work, though much work was so sporadic that decent "runs' at 
making bonus were infrequent and measurement was difficult. 
Second, the refinery had followed industry practice only by progressive 
derecognition of its internal labour force (Table I). The recent derecognition of 
the craftsmen in house meant that the changes needed to the contractors' 
agreement would be a sensitive area because of the local inter-relationship of 
craft trade unions with members employed both in refining and in contracting 
belonging to the same branch. As such, it carried a high risk for management 
and the refinery Contractors' Panel therefore carefully benchmarked its own 
area of negotiation in a survey of other refineries in 1991/92 (see Table II). The 
key methodology, in hoping for a lead to follow, was "had the problem been 
addressed before?" and, If so, "had it been successful?" Note that bringing back 
maintenance work into the refinery's own workshops was not considered; 
bounded rationality extended that far to limit the possibilities and only 
solutions to the identified problem were of course sought. 
This benchmarking survey showed no lead standard, or indeed any standard 
agreement for maintenance and repair work, and no new forms of agreement 
which could be adopted to improve productivity. Most refineries seemed to rely 
Unbinding Owner and location 	 Major project 	 Minor project Repair and maintenance 
rationality 
Gulf Milford Haven 	 Projected ISOM 3 	 NACEI nn No fixed approach 
NAECI no 
Total St Fergus 	 NAECI Nom 	 No official policy In house agreement 
Shell Mossmorran 	 NAECI Nom 	 In house agreement In house agreement 
Lindsey Killlngholme 	 NAECI Nom 	 NAECI nn Local agreement— 167 
contractors own  
Conoco Killingholm 	 NAECI no 	 NAECI no Local agreement - 
contractors own 
ICI Teesside 	 NAECI Nom 	 NAECI nn ICI personnel 
BP Hull 	 NAECI Nom 	 NAECI Nom BP agreement 
£6.50 per hour 
BP Grangemouth 	 NAECI Nom 	 NAECI Nom B? agreement 
£6.50 per hour 
Shell Stanlow 	 NAECI Nom 	 NAECI Nom Site agreement 
ESSO Fawley 	 Fawley site 	 Fawley site Fawley site 
agreement 	 agreement agreement 
Texaco Milford Haven 	 NAECI Nom 	 NAECI nn £1.07 NAECI no Table Ii 
Elf Milford Haven 	 a 	 NAECI no £1.07 Whatever is cheapest Case study task 
Notes: This Is a representative sample of some 20 sites force survey. 
Nom = nominated by the client as following the terms and conditions under the NAECI construction, 
nn = non-nominated under NAECI; using its substantive conditions such as rates of pay but a turnaround 
shorter procedure with fewer parties involved and maintenance 
ISOM = isomerization plant, creating unleaded fuel arrangements in 
a Unknown due to either the plant not having had a project of this type or the intereviewee was oil and chemical 
not aware of the way the project had been handled plants 1991 
on the NAECI for construction projects and a wide variety of different 
maintenance and repair arrangements[15]. 
This was not good news, either rationally from the point of view of content or 
from the point of view of an emotional "comfort factor'. Rationally, the refinery 
management knew that the NAECI was cumbersome and using it meant an 
inefficient way of working. The NAECJ and all the local site agreements (in 
house or local or contractors' own) for the different plants still enshrined the 
demarcations of earlier ages and none had created inter-craft flexibility for 
contractors' work. Contractors from outside the region let it be known that the 
case study refinery site agreement was tight enough to make It more difficult 
for them to make money on It. Thus, the refinery was actually ahead of the 
competition, making benchmarking useless and further gains even more 
difficult, as they would have to come from a higher base point. Hence, it might 
have to break with its long-established tradition of "following the leader" when 
it came to contractors. 
The refinery Contractors' Panel therefore had a problem - their economic 
situation demanded change but no model agreements were readily available 
from within their own industry, unlike the trendsetting, new-style labour 
agreements in manufacturing, famous in the press for their "no-strike" clauses 
Journal of (Bassett, 1986). International benchmarking had been possible in a multi- 
Managerial national enterprise and showed what was possible elsewhere, while UK 
Psvcholociv J 0.1 benchmarking in the industry revealed no better practices - what could they 
IL,,) 
do? 
The task force progressively came up with a list of changes which needed to 
be implemented to increase contractor efficiency, which in effect added to these 
168 problems but increased by this means the pressure to break from the existing 
mould. Their final report highlighted the saving of a good deal of money and 
would alleviate the refinery's economic situation, but it meant that contractors 
had to go further than any other of the process plant contractors included in the 
survey. One phrase frequently encountered in the documents was "fullest 
utilization of working hours" and the need to "make the construction site more 
like a factory". This constitutes a breakthrough in the boundedness of the 
previous rationality of viewing the oil refining business as totally different. The 
new rationality, if adopted, meant smoothing process work flow, preventing 
delays such as the washing and changing times and the tea break, planning 
jobs better, more flexibility of labour, providing better transport or 
relocation/duplication of facilities and so on. It clearly implied rejecting the 
demarcation and the procedural limitations of the NAECI on which 
maintenance and repair agreements were often based, and which their own site 
agreement piggy-backed or copied . It was also clear that the current set of 
trade unions officials would not go along with this; they had their own bounded 
rationality which consisted largely of assertions that big international oil 
companies could always pay up and the quest for productivity was a charade. 
(Support for this view would have come partially from Ahlstrand (1990) whose 
study of Esso showed few improvements despite years of productivity 
bargaining at Fawley) They were approaching unknown territory Risky as it 
would have been, continuing within the framework of the present agreement 
was one thing; risk turned to uncertainty as new agreements outside of it were 
considered, none of which were able to be pre-tested. 
However, the stakes were high: the changes could allow investment from the 
parent as against other divisions internationally A similar case - that of Norsk- 
Hydro, a fertilizer plant 
- bears a remarkable resemblance but was no earlier 
than the present case and so could not have been a model (Blyton and Turnbull, 
1992). 
Discussion 	 - 
Why a new agreement? 
What has a new labour agreement got to do with contractor efficiency? Could 
not the refinery just renegotiate the contracts, or renew them with better or 
cheaper contractors? In the time-span the management felt they had available, 
changing one thing at a time - sequential decision making - saved on bounded 
rationality, in the psychological sense, and also staff resources and enabled 
focus on goals. The recent successful derecognition of the refinery crafts had 
given the managers some hope of change being able to be achieved and in the 
Unbinding 
rationality 
poor economic climate there was a perception that employees would vote for 
more job security than complain strongly about their union agreement being 
changed; particularly if it could be concealed within better earnings 
opportunities. The agreement was important in more direct ways, too; it formed 
the basis of how work was to be done on site - how many men of what trades 
were needed, how much they cost, what quality standards could be worked to 
and so on. Much of the work is labour-intensive and the costing of contracts and 
their viability for contractors depends heavily on accurate estimates of time and 
labour costs as well as materials. Profit was made legitimately on how 
effectively the labour force was used to complete jobs ahead of schedule and 
thus make more money each week as jobs turned over more frequently[16}. 
What were the alternatives? 
In order to establish legitimacy, negotiations within the present site agreement 
were begun so that change could come from below and by established means in 
an established forum. It was soon evident to the rather impatient refinery 
managers, and to the panel, that these were proving fruitless, mainly because of 
the recent derecognition of refinery crafts unions by the refinery client and the 
consequent hostility of the local full-time officers (FTOs). These FTOs saw, in 
the T&GWU data in Table I, a conspiracy within the oil industry to collude In 
taking on the unions[17}. 
The National Joint Council of the Engineering Construction industry was 
also approached about the prospect of using the NAECI instead of the site 
agreement for maintenance and repair - this would have added a certain 
legitimacy to the application of the National Agreement. This was rejected 
eventually on grounds of excessive bureaucracy and the amount of additional 
trade union representation required (the same FTOs would also be present) 
despite reassurances from the National Joint Council (NJC).  From the data in 
Table II, it would anyway have been an unusual step for maintenance and 
repair work and, of course, a solution was being sought which had legitimacy 
from elsewhere. 
Benchmarking was a method of obtaining this legitimacy and originally 
foundered on a lack of external competitor practices over a period of many 
years. The process of looking elsewhere had begun, however, and, though no 
obvious solutions were found, in the background may have been the "preferred 
solution" of complete derecognition of all the unions, which had happened 
within refineries and the larger ambit of UK engineering So the boundaries of 
tradition had to be breached. Without benchmarks, various options were open. 
Deunionization of contractors' employees was considered as well as 
derecognition of certain unions whose officials seemed the most opposed to the 
changes required. Simultaneously, informal benchmarking in engineering 
revealed the possibility of so-called new-style industrial relations, and visits 
were made to Rover and other companies. Of the internal documents studied, 
there were copious articles on single-union agreements revealing a desk-based 
programme of research into such alternatives. Books such as The Road to 
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Journal of Nissan and Strike Free had been read by the ER team in the past and there was 
Managerial an awareness of the role in such deals of the Electrical, Electronic, 
Psvcholoav Telecommunications and Plumbing Union (EETPU) and the Amalgamated 
123 Union of Engineering Workers (AUEW), both of which were signatory to refinery, contractor and national agreements. 
In its search for some kind of alternative, the task force had struck up on 
170 engineering more generally and could justify its new deal for productivity gains 
from the contractors as applying the same paradigm as in the rest of British 
industry Most people had heard of single-union deals through the publicity 
attached to Nissan and many thought they were "a good thing". The EETPU 
seemed to think so, AEUW was also committed and deals of the type seen at 
NorskHydro with the T&GWU indicated that, despite official repugnance from 
headquarters, many unions at local level were becoming realistic about their 
lack of power. 
The refinery's Contractors' Panel, after much internal discussion, then gave 
the site agreement trade union signatories three months' notice of termination 
of the agreement. This was, they emphasized, strictly within the procedural 
agreement, and current bounded rationality. It was, however, softened by 
asking for proposals for a new agreement which met the needs Identified by the 
contractors with the client. This again seemed to be a benchmarked solution - 
the famed "beauty contest" (famed because of the loss of the proposed new Ford 
plant in Scotland where the unions refused to be involved in a competition for 
who got the single recognition: Ford cancelled the investment). However, this 
was outwith current oil industry practice and no proposals were forthcoming 
over the period. After informal discussions a new single-union deal was agreed 
with the national executives of one of the three unions. Site meetings explained 
the new terms to the contractors' workforce who accepted them in spirit, asking 
for various items to be clarified. There was no industrial action, despite the 
determined opposition of the officials[18], suggesting an instrumental 
orientation to trade unionism as evidenced by Coldthorpe and Lockwood 
(1969). 
Rebinding rationality - a single-union agreement 
The process led to an agreement which looks more like a manufacturing-style 
agreement than a construction agreement, though It still includes travelling 
time, radius allowances, etc. The entire agreement was only 12 pages long, with 
another ten pages of appendices, contrasting with the previous site agreement 
and the 120-page NAECI, and more like those in manufacturing. The various 
allowances, the contractors said, were to be replaced by basic rate increases in 
future negotiations, reflecting the anticipated decrease in capital expense 
projects in favour of more minor maintenance and repair jobs, and the 
consequent need to use local labour which was not eligible for the terms and 
conditions which applied to "travelling men". It required the "fullest utilisation 
of working hours", a phrase stolen from the National Agreement, and so 
employees came prepared for work, clocking on after changing into overalls 
and clocking off before changing back into ordinary clothes. The morning mass 	 Unbinding 
tea break was abolished and "natural breaks in the flow of work" were used on 	 rationality 
individual jobs at the various places in the refinery where people were working 
This was seen by many employees as "sensible". Harmonization with client 
refinery maintenance work hours was included to enable better team working - 
again copied from manufacturing and total quality management approaches, 
familiar to the union officials if not the employees, and adding to the legitImacy 171 
of the agreement. Toilets and canteen facilities were duplicated around the site 
and buses for transport improved - a cost item which showed management 
intentions were not all about "labour intensification". 
Table III shows that the typical items identified by Bassett (1986) for "new-
style" agreements in manufacturing were not applied; though It is a single-
union agreement with full flexibility of labour, these are the only clauses 
retained in the new contractors' agreement. Thus, the refinery Contractors' 
Panel was again not following slavishly but has inserted key clauses to create 
the shortest time-span for efficiency improvements. Less important issues, 
though still outside the new rationality, have been left for later discussion. The 
new agreement on turnarounds was established and used later, and the various 
allowances are still being discussed, with a view to removing them. It may also 
become possible in the future to create more single-status terms and 
participation. 
In typical single-union agreements, the main instigator, the EETPU, had had 
a policy of working with employers and their early single-union agreements 
enshrined a constant procedural structure of a board which made weekly 
decisions about working arrangements and about labour issues, including 
annual pay. This concept was not unlike many of the practices in Europe such 
as Works Councils. Its constitution placed it between an executive committee 
and a consultative committee with no negotiation as such but discussion 
Old site agreement 	 New contractors agreement 
Bonus scheme 
Demarcatlons 
Multi-union representation 
Multi-union recognition 
Multi-union membership 
Separate working hours 
Sunday overtime rates 
Wash and change times 
Set tea break 
Allowances for conditions 
No skill standards 
No training scheme 
Long grievance procedure 
Turnaround arrangements 
Travel allowances 
Retained 
Out 
Out - single union 
Out - single union 
Retained for individuals 
Aligned with client 
Decreased 
Out 
Out 
Retained temporarily 
New passport for accreditation 
Comprehensive scheme 
Short 
New addendum 
Retained temporarily 
Table III, 
Contractors bounded 
rationality: the main 
clauses of the old 
and new agreements 
corn pared 
Journal of around a table. Some of these were successful others not (see Bassett, 1986 and 
Managerial Grant, 1993 for discussion). The AEEU, however, though incorporating the 
Psvcholoav EETPU and its single-union approach, had no policy on employee involvement 
123 and participation, nor was staff status (a feature of some agreement with Japanese manufacturers) included, nor was there a no-strike clause or 
pendulumlbinding arbitration - instead, a three-stage final offer procedure. 
172 Flexible working, and a commitment by client, contractor and employee to 
further training to allow this to happen, was inserted into the agreement, and 
seen by managers as an important statement of principle - the agreement was 
not "anti-union" but "pro-changed. A new training centre was set up (copying 
the Rover Learning Business idea) to achieve this training under the auspices of 
the National Skills Development Scheme for the Engineering Construction 
Industry, which conferred legitimacy Rates of pay were increased, the bonus 
scheme was kept intact, but overtime rates for weekends were lowered. Hence, 
a definitive move had been made to convert the reality from construction 
practices at least towards those of world-class manufacturing by way of a 
methodology of rules and regulations in a collective agreement, a document 
which enshrined the rituals of the past and still maintained a union presence 
and the power of the strike weapon if needed. 
All craftsmen have a basic training certificate, though attempts to include 
scaffolding training have failed for various reasons, including the resistance 
from refinery engineers and arguments over safety. However, the main progress 
was felt to be the change from a negative to a positive trade union response and, 
as evidence of this, the Contractors' Panel is looking to improve the benefits 
package for contractors towards that of the client refinery's own workforce. A 
recent example of success is the conclusion of a turnaround addendum to the 
agreement This provides for the special circumstances of a turnaround, which 
can be so large as to need the rules and regulations of the NAECI in other 
refineries. 
Outcomes 
There has been continued resistance from the derecognized unions which 
referred the matter to the TUC and still operate a local pressure group. The 
agreement costs 10 per cent more than the NAECI hourly rate, but the company 
argues that it gets more for its hour. The turnaround addendum and the 
flexibility in the original agreement allowed the extensive use of team working 
on the last cracking turnaround (using team-building ideas benchmarked from 
a shoe manufacturer!) which resulted in it halving the cost of previous 
turnarounds on that unit and lasting more than half the time taken by a 
competitor to turn round its similar unit some weeks later. 
The softer aspects referred to by Janis (1989), such as coalition building and 
support from the corporation, were never formally or even informally 
considered according to documents and interviews, yet they were followed 
implicitly. Agreement was sought from the European manufacturing director 
who met the top union officials and the corporate labour relations adviser, while 
Unbinding 
rationality 
meetings were held with groups of internal staff to reassure them. These tactics 
were all "taken-for granted" rules of thumb as the usual style and role of 
management within the company. 
As highlighted throughout this article, the quest for standard solutions to 
problems continued after the implementation of the new agreement. Shortly 
afterwards, one refinery derecognized all of its internal unions and 
subcontracted out all of the maintenance work to a joint venture company, 
creating a copy-cat single-union agreement for the contractors. Two other 
plants also created site agreements with single-union representation and the 
NJC itself reoriented Its approach to produce "NAECI supplementary 
agreements" for maintenance and repair work. These retained the recognition 
of all of the unions which were signatories to the National Agreement which, 
above all else, was the contentious issue of the single-union agreements, but 
allowed flexibilities within the local site arrangements. 
Conclusion 
Employee relations seems to be an area where newness is not highly-prized, 
where legitimacy of management actions seems to rely on tried and tested 
methods, national agreements, industry-wide practice and so on. Despite what 
is said in academic studies, the press or Parliament, the management in this 
case was not abusing its power: rather it was aware of its objective position 
below break-even and the probability of going out of business if improvements 
were not made. This was no empty threat: 150 refinery employees had been 
made redundant in 1990 and the £10 billion venture had been cancelled. From 
the data from interviews it is impossible to tell whether an implicit favourite 
solution was underlying the case, or indeed whose favourite would be adopted 
implicitly. There is far more straightforward evidence for bounded rationality, 
though one must bear in mind the strong views of the union full-time officers 
who insisted the solution was a charade and had been decided in advance. 
Using the lowest level of interpretation, we can conclude only that the mangers 
were acting in an "intendedly rational" fashion. 
More than the derecognition and negotiation of staff status for the crafts and 
derecogniton of the process workers' union, which followed industry practice, 
the single-union agreement signalled both a move outside of the company's 
previous decision-making paradigm and the use of one directly (if only 
partially) borrowed from manufacturing Subsequently, other refineries have 
also moved to the use of single-union agreements and forced the National Joint 
Council to review its National Agreement to allow extensive use of 
supplementary agreements to suit individual clients. 
The evidence from this critical case is that established rationality within the 
oil refining and engineering construction industry generally is itself beginning 
to become unbounded. 
Notes 
1. De Bonos lateral thinking was an attempt to break out of habitual thought patterns, as 
was the ancient art of Zen Buddhism in its use of non-rational koans such as the sound of 
173 
Journal of one hand clapping to free the mind of past preconceptions and allow in the light of satori- 
Managerial enlightenment. Though this anti-rational agenda seems now to have a continuous thread by 	 labour throughout history, the views of Simon and others are still not accepted 	 many 
Psychology process theorists or, on the opposite bank, by formal economists. 
123 	 2. There is insufficient space to detail the wide use to which Williamson puts the concept and 
reading of his work Is recommended, for example "The modern corporation". in Ash and 
Bowman (1990). 
174 	 3. Interview with Klelnwort-Benson oil analyst. 1995. 
4.  interview with venture ER manager. 1994. 
5.  "Hold-up" is a term used by economists to describe the pre-arrangement negotiation 
situation where a key though small manufacturer with asset specificity" can hold up the 
start of the project by insisting on inequitable distribution of profits. Trade unions also 
have used this ability to "up the ante", i.e. to bid up wages. 
6.  Internal documents and interviews with line managers. 
7.  Interviews with staff from the Institute of Petroleum. 
8.  These latter are usually paid on the successful passing of on-site welding tests, welding 
being a safety-critical operation in the process Industry with large volumes of high- 
pressure, high-temperature ilqulds and gases being transported by pipework at high 
speed. 	 - 
9.  Interview with former construction Engineering Union officer (now the AEEIM, December 
1995. 
10.  Internal documents listed scores of concessionary changes to the unions over many years. 
II. Opinion of several managers Interviewed, 
12.  Revealed In a company engineering publication designed to highlight successful projects. 
According to interviewees, the article did not goon to admit that the design was also 
flawed and caused production difficulties later. It served, however, as a "monolith" for the 
rest of the corporation and prevented further investment in the refinery for ten years 
afterwards. 
13.  Taken from note of a confidential speech to corporate annual conference on 
manufacturing. Chicago. IL, 1993. 
14.  Interviewwlthventure ER manager. July 1994. 
15.  Task force details were taken from copious documents and supported by various 
interviews. 
16.  Interviewees' opinions. 
17.  Trade union views on oil industry collusion, their ability to pay and the unions' own 
hostility were taken from Interviews with full-time national and local officers, April 1995, 
December 1995 and 1996, 
18.  Data taken from internal company reports, memos, letters and faxes to and from trade 
unions. 
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The real problem 
of competition in 
the UK petrol 
market: a reply 
to Cohen 
• This artide is a response to an article 
by Marcel Cohen, published in 
the June-July 1998 (Vol 7, No 6) 
issue. 
• A reply by Cohen will be published in 
issue no.5. 
The article by Cohen (Cohen Marcel, The 
problem of competition in the UK petrol 
market, Strategic Change, Vo17, pp. 203-
212) is interesting as far as it goes, relying on 
well-tried theoretical positions on the market-
ing of consumer goods (Hay and Morris, 1991; 
Kotler, 1997). However, Cohen does not seem 
to have the problems of the industry fully 
under his belt and has tended to apply a set of 
marketing formulae to petrol, ignoring the 
wider picture of geo-polltical factors and the 
internal 'bounded rationality' (Simon, 1957; 
Ritson, 1997; Marchinton and Parker, 1995) of 
its managerial cadre, which is responsible for 
much of the refusal to look the retailing 
problems squarely in the face. To limit his 
analysis to the physical environment of petrol 
retailing entirely misses the strategic point; it 
is just one of the 'four Ps' 1 of marketing 
theory—that of place. Even his discussion on 
product ignores the profit contribution of 
other products and indeed the internal com- 
'Product, price, promotion, place. 
petition against petrol retailing divisions for 
internal investment. 
Methodologically, the exposition is weak, 
deriving from only seven articles or newspaper 
stories, some of which are not even about the 
UK. The assertion that ergonomic factors 
related to petrol dispensing would increase 
competitive advantage is highly questionable, 
and needs to be accompanied by empirical 
research on consumer choke and the reasons 
for switching from one product delivery mode 
such as hypermarkets (who could anyway 
quickly copy the new technology) to another: 
i.e. to the local service station. As it stands, this 
remains an untested hypothesis. 
In this reply, I would like to widen the issue 
of strategic change in retailing to take into 
account the work of Robert Grant (Grant, 
1993, 1994, 1995; Cibin and Grant, 1997) on 
oil company strategies at the global level, 
which are, 1 will argue, the direct cause of 
the UK problem. This level of analysis is 
supported, even if implicitl% by Cohen as he 
agrees that there is also a deeper problem of 
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petrol retailing. In France where 'the majority 
of petrol [is] sold through ... non-traditional 
outlets' (Cohen, 1998, p.  204) he admits that 
the problem is not at all limited to the UK and 
therefore the minutiae of pump and forecourt 
design (Cohen, 1998, p. 208) is hardly applic-
able as a solution to a global problem. 
Cohen sees the recent attempts to re-
invigorate petrol branding as a one-off reaction 
rather than part of a continuous process, and 
even considers that 'petroleum has been 
marketed for over sixty years' (p.  208) instead 
of almost one hundred years - it was in fact 
first marketed as a lighting fuel (Yergin, 1991). 
The use of augmented benefits (Kotler, 1997) 
to sell petrol, which Cohen regards as recent, 
has always in fact been a feature of petrol 
retailing. Whereas Cohen states that promo-
tions were introduced in the UK 'since 
February 1984 when Shell launched its pro-
motion 'Make Money with Shell" (p.  206), it 
does not accord with the facts. This aberration 
may be forgiven in a non-academic paper, as 
Cohen was responsible for Shell's marketing, 2 
but not in Strategic Change; the Cohen 
analysis turns on the fact that there has been 
a sudden reaction to retailing problems, too 
early for some or too late for others, so timing is 
seen as a distinct issue. However, Mobil 
introduced Green Shield Stamps (GSS) from 
the US in the 1960s,   which involved consider-
able administration and a strategic alliance 
between both companies, coinciding with 
GSS's foray into other areas of UK retailing. 
However, no other oil companies at the time 
took up a similar venture as there were no 
other partners except GSS, tied to Mobil, and 
no 'smart-card' technology for the oil compa-
nies to 'go it alone'. Furthermore, Mobil also 
added to the industry and its own product 
reputation by the Mobil Economy Run until 
1972. This car rally was widely reported in the 
popular press as it took over a week of 
motoring to achieve unbelievable (but accu-
rate) fuel consumption figures for ordinary cars 
driven on Mobil petrol (some cars according 
to Nash and Keegan, 1985, achieved over 
2According to the autobiographical note at the end of 
the article. 
70 mpg). In a classic case of serendipity, Total 
Oil bought the marketing product from Mobil 
just before the 1973 oil crisis; the name 'Total 
Economy Run' at this time was supremely 
attractive but the firm failed to capitalize on the 
idea of the attraction of 'total economy' and the 
run disappeared into obscurity. 
Other US companies as well as Mobil appre-
ciated the precise point raised by Cohen's 
article: that petrol is a 'distress purchase' and 
Petrol is a 'distress purchase' 
has to be sold on the basis of a competitive 
advantage based on augmented features such 
as location and service, not mainly on core 
features or product features (as Cohen does 
note) or even benefits like economy. If 
consumers are rational they would all buy 
cars with diesel engines which run for hun-
dreds of thousands of miles at, nowadays, a 
70 mpg average, If Governments were rational 
they would encourage this cheap fuel which 
needs no huge refining capital investment. But 
they don't. 
In the 1950s and 1960s, ganges mainly sold 
petrol in the UK but their marketing was 
insufficiently professional for US companies 
who wanted to apply the slick selling methods 
that they used along the US state highways to 
the UK. Many garages became converted to 
gaudy 'service stations' and hundreds of new 
service stations, without the encumbrance of 
repair shops, were built as the market a-
panded dramatically post-war. Whereas the 
companies did indeed advertise travel, it was 
not for reasons of defeating the competition in 
the expanding market, where there seemed 
room for everyone. To increase consumption 
was the goal, accepting that advertising might 
just about contribute to single competitive 
advantage. However, the advertisements were 
general enough to apply across the board to 
other makes of petrol, which were not 
differentiated by the oil companies by product 
features, as Cohen claims. It is certainly true 
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that consumers thought that the brands were 
different right up until 1973 when Mobil 
Consumers thought that 
the brands were different 
until 1973 
supplied cheap petrol to ASDA in the wake of 
an oil crisis and the exchange system used by 
petrol companies began to be exposed in the 
subsequent row which was fuelled by the 
press. It can hardly be said nowadays with 
current traffic levels that car travel is pleasur-
able, especially in the UK, and so retailing had 
changed, but (as Cohen says) not by enough, 
and mainly by hypermarkets. Yet here again 
there is evidence that the oil companies—or 
some of them—realized the future of retailing 
some time ago. In the early 1970s Mobil was 
introducing its mini-markets concept as con-
venience stores to augment the service 
stations's appeal to the driver, as well as 
introducing traditional car-orientated pro-
ducts - discounted garage items like tyres, 
batteries and accessories—to broaden the 
appeal of the local garage. However, sales 
figures were disappointing and later market 
research revealed that people did not want to 
hang around at petrol stations shopping, and so 
these méves were abandoned. Today, Evans 
(1995) reports, Shell estimate that cigarettes 
are the main augmented purchase at their 
stations in the UK at 40%, followed by Mars 
Bars, Kit Kat, Coke and crisps. In the US, 
tobacco (28%) is followed by beer (1390, fast 
food, soft drinks, milk products and sweets. 
But these are not often attractions except to 
motorists on longer journeys, perhaps with 
children in the back. 
Hypermarket petrol retailing, paradoxically, 
relies on the fuelling of cars after shopping not 
before it: Mobil's research revealed the smell 
of petrol was not conducive to promoting 
the need for extensive food shopping in their 
mini-marts. The existing huge hypermarket car 
parks ensure few delays, unlike the smaller 
service stations which are often crowded at  
weekends, especially with power-washing and 
valeting services designed to attract customers. 
As Cohen rightly points out, the frequency of 
purchase and convenience of having both 
petrol and extensive stocks of food and 
groceries make hypermarkets more attractive 
than mini-markets could ever have been. At a 
more strategic level, which is the basis of this 
article, these chains do not have refineries or a 
distribution system to support, or wells to drill, 
and they can use the low-margin petrol retail-
ing as a loss-leader or break-even activity to 
attract customers to high-margin food pro-
ducts. That fuel is a marginal, distress purchase, 
is being recognized by the hypermarkets and is 
the essential trap of petrol retailing for oil 
companies, which I will argue has no longer a 
place in the oil companies' portfolio. 
The oil industry and its problems 
The strategic position of the oil companies is 
significantly different from that of hypermar- 
The strategic position of the 
oil companies is different 
from bypermarkets 
kets for historical and geo-political reasons. 
These are important to understand in attempt-
ing to assess the 'boundedness' of the oil 
companies' managerial rationality. According 
to Yergin (1991) the 'major' oil companies 
were formed in the late nineteenth century as 
the nascent industry grappled with the 
problem of a vastly fluctuating price of oil-
a problem which still pervades the industry to 
a lesser but important extent today. Fluctua-
tions occurred because the US law on 
property and mineral rights effectively encour-
aged the immediate and over-production of 
wells and these gluts decreased the price by 
many hundreds of percent. (For this reason, 
Rockefeller concentrated on the more stable 
businesses of refining and transportation 
of oil.) Later, changes were made to the 
- 
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legislation which encouraged slower exploita-
tion which stabilized the prices somewhat and 
Rockefeller moved into production with his 
vertically-integrated Standard Oil. In Europe 
oil was discovered in the colonies of the 
imperial powers, hence the rise of Anglo-
Iranian oil company (BP), and the Royal-Dutch 
company in the East Indies which merged 
with the UK transport company, Shell. In the 
early years of the industry there were very few 
US Independents to rise against Standard Oil 
because of the risks of obtaining supply and 
the need for vertical integration to avoid being 
exploited by Rockefeller with his strategic 
holdings in refining and transportation. Gulf 
and Texaco were formed in the teeth of 
competition, but in the state of Texas, which 
was more protective of its own wells. In 1911 
Standard Oil was ordered by the US Supreme 
court to break up, but the rise of other 
independents for the same reason of the need 
for extensive initial capital investment has 
been very slow, and often sponsored by 
governments. Even so, politics affected many 
oil companies' production functions: the Gulf 
nations invited in US firms to compete with 
the British for the rights to drill wells, in order 
to bring about some commercial competition 
and consequently a driving up of prices by the 
auction of concessions for drilling rights. First 
to be hit by nationalization of these conces-
sions was Shell in Mexico, then Libya and the 
Gulf nations followed and most producers 
were affected. Collusion by the companies in 
secret meetings (such as the one held in 
Scotland in the 1930s) to join together to 
defeat the producing states' national interests 
was fraught by the classic 'prisoner's dilemma' 
decision the companies had of 'cooperate or 
compete'. Libya relied on Occidental's need 
for crude (it had no other interests abroad) to 
break the will of the majors and later OPEC at 
Geneva gave the companies the ultimatum in 
1973 which trebled oil prices. 
Despite these problems, the value of a world-
wide oil supply was polltically strategic. On an 
economic level, vertical integration secured 
supplies, enabled efficient crude runs through-
out refineries, allowed cross-subsidization on 
production drilling from profits in other areas,  
and, crucially, it enabled the companies to 
develop their transfer-pricing between àffill-
ates in different countries. Companies were 
therefore not very interested simply in retailing 
profits until the 1973 price hike cut the 
'offshore' profitability. Previously the compa-
nies were able to use transfer pricing to offset 
any local profits, say in the UK, by setting a very 
high internal transfer price for crude oil 
supplied from their own wells in, say, Saudi 
Arabia, and the profit made was declared in the 
country such as Liberia or Panama where the 
shipping company was registered, and taxed at 
1% or so, thus creating 'offshore profits'. 
Nationalization and the revitalized OPEC 
changed the economics of vertical integration 
for the oil companies and showed up their 
inflexibility. Inefficiencies in each part of the 
value-chain became visible directly as profits 
and losses, which then became local issues for 
an affiliate, and were not hidden by corporate 
tax-reporting. Shell was the first to break with 
tradition in 1984. Rather than buy crude from 
the firm's own upstream operation, the Rotter-
dam 'spot market was used. This was because 
despite deals with Saudi Arabia to ensure crude 
supply in the wake of the 1973 oil shock, the 
price paid internally for this crude was greater 
than that on the spot market, which was now 
being supplied by Iran, Iraq and others in 
excess of their OPEC quotas. 
It is this production overcapacity (after the 
years of economies being made by consumers 
due to the high price of oil) which has re-
introduced instability into supply and prices. 
The oil companies had geared-up to create 
massive static efficiencies (Cibin and Grant, 
1996) through large .production facilities, very 
large crude carriers, huge refineries and a huge 
distribution system. As Cohen says, this is to 
increase volume, as the 'margin-times-volume 
equals profit' formula requires yet more 
volume as margin (offshore profit) declines. 
Thus the oil companies are trapped. They need 
more volume but this leads to lower prices in a 
downward spiral. Evans (1995) reports that the 
biggest suppliers to the spot market are 
probably Gulf and Texaco who effectively 
supply their competitors: the hypermarkets 
and the independents. There is no escape from 
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this scenario unless the initial economics or the 
politics change, and there are no signs of that. 
Olins (1995) reports the redundancy 'axe' 
being wielded at Shell International as a 
desperate effort to change the culture as well 
as to reduce overhead costs. 
Solutions 
Rather than rearranging the deckchairs on the 
Titanic, or the pumps on the forecourt, the oil 
companies must face the inevitable con-
clusion that their strategic position in terms 
of barriers to entry (Porter, 1980, 1985) has 
now been eroded so &r that head-to-head 
competition on price is only self-destructive. 
Head-to-bead competition on 
price is only self-destructive 
Its current capital intensity is unnecessary 
and ultimately unsustainable. Lorenz (1997) 
reported the surprising announcement by 
Unilever, which decided to sell off its profit-
able speciality chemicals division. This was 
because it could not afford to be a leader in all 
of its markets: the need for capital spending 
would be too great. Refineries are also 
gobblers of cash, spending hundreds of 
millions of pounds on maintenance and 
improvements each year (ACTIVE, 1996), yet 
only three have closed in the UK post-1973. 
Companies in the UK apart from Burmah-
Castrol (and that was by accident) compete 
with each other on all forms of oil product. 
The solution is market specialization, and 
segmentation (Ansof'f, 1968) but this is 
happening only gradually. In 1996 two majors 
agreed to cut out this direct competition 
throughout Europe by asset-swapping. Mobil 
now does not compete on fuel and BP does not 
compete on lubricants. Each can then develop 
comparative competitive advantage in its own 
sphere. Already we have seen the rise of 
extensive advertising in Formula 1 for the 
'Mobil 1' synthetic lubricant, and as now all 
Mobil petrol stations are badged 1W, savings 
accrue across the board (450 million per year 
according to Noto, 1997). Mobil's Coryton 
Refinery has been allocated to ftP and ftP's 
Uandarcy Refinery to Mobil, which is closing it 
and rationalizing all of its lubricant production 
throughout Europe, and closing refineries in 
Germany. In 1997 Shell took over Gulf Oil GB 
and closed its refinery. Soon all Gulf stations 
will be badged as Shell. In 1998 BP announced 
a global merger with Amoco (Jackson, 1997; 
Jay, 1998), though this was not to avoid 
competition in product markets but to create 
scale economies, and has therefore been 
criticized by analysts who want to see a fall in 
over-capacity (Economist, 1998). On the 
chemicals side, similar events have taken 
place in response to economic and market 
pressures; Du Pont took over Conoco and sold 
part of it to XCI; ICI's Wilton plant cracking 
complex was sold to ftP and many other 
alliances and mergers have characterized the 
chemicals sector to create scale economies, 
reduce capacity and avoid direct competition 
in market niches which depress prices. 
Summary—Strategic position 
Oil companies do not need to retail their 
strategic product and cannot compete with 
hypermarkets which do not have to support 
the entire value-chain. The companies must 
re-position themselves as finders of energy 
products. Texaco's 1997 acquisition of Mon-
terey Resources aims to increase production 
(from 1.1 mbbl oil and gas/thy to 1.7 by 2001, 
increasing its spend to $23.4 billion over 
1997-2001), and to bring this to the market. 
No other companies except the integrated 
majors can play this 'finders and marketers' 
role, as it is often fraught with competing 
priorities and goals as well as international 
political problems. Despite the managers who 
are immersed in the oil business believing 
otherwise, refining and distribution are not 
complex activities, nor is producing oil from 
wells. It is not 'rocket science': though it may 
be challenging and dangerous, the technology 
is fairly simple. The operating activities 
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are anyway often subcontracted nowadays, 
(Cross, 1995; Lane, 1997), especially in the 
UK continental shelf, which is producing 30% 
savings (CRINE, 1993). 
As customers seem to prefer to buy petrol 
after their grocery purchases the hypermarkets 
have consumer preference as well as eco-
nomics on their side. When these two factors 
work together there can be no escape—Esso 
already is the major retailer of Mars Bars in the 
UK! These products are not separate, as Cohen 
argues, but what his analysis misses is the 
strategic dimension and the begged question of 
whether changes to service stations will bring 
about a change in consumer attitudes. Only 
direct, empirical research is going to shed any 
light in this area. 
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rllfwl 
by Neil Ritson, Newcastle Business School, University of Northumbria at Newcastle 
It sisay stun odd that so many of 
the 15 major ols'rthntng firms 
stirveryod for this article have been 
involved In detailed changes to 
Ihnr maisstrnance operations 
during the last ftw years. 
Mainienance of production, 
however, cars he seen to be the 
most Important function In a 
refinety or petrochertslcal plant 
whose profits ate based on product 
volume above all else. Indeed, 
nearly all the nsarsagestreni 
Functions are concerned with 
ssrailsle,iarice. Only jelly 
operations, lnsextTsedlate storage 
and tarsks's.filiissg arc iruly non. 
maIntenance activIties, The ten,, 
'pnscsns iriduttey' by definitIon 
means that even production 
operators are effecting conditional 
maintenance% liii, gcws for 
engIneering, store, and senior 
mattafensrrtt too. There is no 
marketing or product development 
in a prescest plant—maintenance 
of production Is the overriding 
consldetation. We would Therefore 
etpert that asnostg Ihese 
sophisticated consparsies, some of 
the largest in the world in terms of 
market capltaiIsation. there would 
he a hest'practice model. 
Change in a hostile 
envia'wament 
This meting it accentuated by the 
envtronrtsertt ctrrssarsdissg change. 
Over-capacity in oil refining in the 
UK and Europe has been estimated 
at around 20% sod recently in the 
UK we have seen the demise of 
Cciii Oil CE's Miiford Haven 
refinery with Shell 13K taking over 
the dowatsiresm and retail 
operations. El' taking over the 
stsssiagrsus'ns of the for.. Mobil 
refinery at Coryton and Mobil's 
lortisconting closure of the former 
Dl' refinery at Liandarcy. 
Worldwide, more joint ventures 
art on the cards, with the receni 
DP.Mnoco merger annotsncetnent 
its. lint, probably, of many. With 
the lnevttabie pressure on ttaasrglsti 
I. a time of over.capaclty these Is 
also the threat to retail peollit of 
the loss.Ieadlng status of petrol on 
the forecosarts of major UK 
supermarkets whose share has 
tape to 20% this yeas. 
Having IdentifIed the problem 
site dassir 01) forganlsatlonal 
development) approach is than to 
determine the etlects on the 
organlsatiot', and then to react, in 
seailiy, rather than theory, optiom 
are often lirrtited—both by 
management's users 'bounded 
rationatlsy of what might be 
possible and by ectsnunsic and 
financial constraints, in terms of 
immediate action, rusewed capital 
investment by these majors is not 
an option, as it I.t.t Y. to 
design and build. more efficient 
siant, and the eventual payback 
lies many years in the future. 
Effectively this leaves a 'recipe' of 
cost.tseutral Or cntl.saving 
measures as the only vIable 
options opt's. This may include 
closure ot plans, bsat efficiency 
cstnalaeions tuggesi that running 
at capacIty Is mandatory—hence 
the tiatsics' of nors'added'value 
activities as prime targets for 
management action—that which 
ones? 
Measurement and 
benchznoks 
It S almost an axiom of 
management that you can only 
manage what you can measure. 
Externally, the refinery efficiency 
survey provided by Solomons is. 
guide for companies to measure 
theIr performance against others 
ott a number of criteria, a luxury 
many other Irsdumies do riot 
have. However, the overall 
industry pattern Is somewhat 
disguised at quartile band, of 
perfornsarsrv are used in the 
reports, and auditing of refinery , 
data which is input into the survey 
does not happen. This rushes some 
managers suspicious of possible 
'sandbagging' b1' ttstiqxrtilori. far 
better comparisons are available 
Internally to major contpanles 
who have affiliates and 
subsidiaries in most countries, and 
these reveal that maIntenance In 
the UK is in more expensive than 
In other pasts of the world. The 
history of the way maintenance 
work has been organised, 
controlled and Implemented, and 
whIch an greatly affect its expense, 
is at the root of managements' 
inability to see alternatIves. In the 
first survey In the presrrst rr,nrtti 
(reported in Ritson, 1997) only 
one plant's rrsanagem.nt had 
grasped the fact that refining oil or 
making chemicals was just part of 
manufactssrinv there was nothing 
special about oil. lteieased from 
theIr historical Framework the 
managets thought the unthinleable 
and proceeded to derecognise 
maintenance trade unions (as early 
is 1990) and reorganlse 
maintedanee Internally and relate 
it to changes in external 
contracting. In subsequent years, 
other rnaor companies followed 
the recipe ttise final piece of the 
Jigsaw occurred In 19981 but with 
rather diFferent end results. One of 
the major reasons for the pressure 
on tfu'sr (inns to follow the leader 
was a new measure of 
nsalntenance efficiency. Not only 
was the coat of Itse mrsaisiteusance 
budget per capital employed used, 
but Also cite duration of the 
shutdowns of maJor production 
units for statutory maintenance, 
l'hese led, of course, to 
unrecoverable production losses 
but also to the additional costs of 
Inteunediate storage—ultimately 
lost revenue rats Into millions of 
pounds a day. Companies had 
always been aware of the duration 
of shutdowns varying between 
countries but now this was 
becomIng highlighted as a 
measure of management's 
capability. 
Op 11041$ 
The sample of plants all had 
differenl methods of solving the 
shutdown problem, albeit with a 
fairly common core recipe--the 
redssctlon of ilsr maintenance 
woekiocceand Increased use of 
contractors, and the transit of the 
retained skilled maintenance 
employees onto staff slabs This 
'sot only reduced artificial 
demarcatlotss, but also allowed for 
a change from the band of history 
to a more Involved, progressive 
cialture (El's slogan was 'all 
together better') more ilke the idea 
of 'human rvtourtr toanagesnent' 
than 'IndustrIal' or 'employee 
relations'. The subsequent ability 
of management to introduce 
changes became easier, though 
what to change, when to change It 
and who needed to be involved 
were still open queslions and there 
were no benchmarks—every plant 
management was learning from 
square one ast the new arena of 
Involvement of contractors on a 
large tale. 'Ibis was felt to be 
necessary horn efficiency and oust-
saving grounds. Jolsn Cross had 
outlined EP Exploration's decision 
to outsnorce its VT luncilon in a 
Hanwd asarinesr Rts'h'w articl, In 
1995. This decision was taken 
from a business viewpoint rather 
than cost'savinL on the basis that 
cxstsourtlatg left massage,o, time for 
a higher level of operating their 
business, releptisig IT to a support 
function, leasing managers to 
reconsider new systems without 
internal constraints such as stank 
costs or even Interdepartmental 
polities and conflicts. 
Interestingly, two companies 
had never followed the original 
recipe of an internal maintenance 
function. They had been built In 
the same area during the late 
1950s and early 1960, and had 
always relied on contractors for 
maintenance, while having a bare 
shift rsaaintensnce crew of two or 
three at technician level for 
ernergc'rscy cover. Those, however, 
were apparently too extreme an 
example an Fnlinw and all the 
other plants simply reduced 
Internal maintenance worklorces 
by around 50%. Very few 
managesnenti had a (ornsal 
rationale for this selectIon, and It 
was based on the 'criticalIty of the 
maintenance function affecting 
prodssctioes. For others It was more 
lnfosrrsal and even Involved 
maintenance ash employees In 
defining areas for saving, and 
inswer efficient roisilne% for others 
Instant, dlfftcsilt top'down 
decisions had to be made, 
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Table I Survey results 
Plant 7991 7997 
S eveuyyear eveey48 months 
I every 24 monthl every 360(48 months 
7 (fluid cat4'bc tracker) every 24 months every 36 months 
IS every 48 months 
There k also increasingbr. move to pee-plan in greater detail and 
prefabricate wort oft site. 
Management decision, 
llsese .levdopmentt were linked 
to internal Company style, plant 
location, peeceivrd cnnlracior 
competence and plant technology. 
Technnlngy is assIsting 
management in the quest for 
efficiency, but has required a 
gradual approach—shutdowns are 
beginning to be staged at longer 
intervals due 10 the ahilily at new 
materials to withstand producsion 
oust for longer tie. eights. 
Where contractors are part of 
the essential money-saving 
nperatinss, there are a wide 
number all options. 8P had gone 
(nra tflflnrliumottlsuppllers, 
F,anawi OaMfl, creSwwsl. I 
•wI,re.v.n.t& 11,75 
Zilch seller a,*as 14 IS 
but much Japanese naarsagetneist 
and TQM theory suggested 'single 
Source vendors'. 
At the other extreme was the 
new, possibility of using the market 
o a auprrsuerkrt of suppliers, 
playing one oil against the other 
for best process practirrs and, If  
posstble, loint  handing 
posslbtlttles. 
Huwrvvi, Michael Cross's 1989' 
90turvay concluded that, despite 
the rush to nutanuece activIties, 
there was no coherent way all 
managing contractors. 
The eventual decisions arrived  
at show. wide variety: from 
single-source vendors, through 
'key contractors numbering 
usually about five, to. preferred-
I hr grtsupiusg of around ten, to a 
more market-led approach or using 
from 25130 to 90 cnniracion. No 
benchmarks, no recipes to follow 
here: 
Even at the level or 'runc-tional' 
verDi, 'divisional' grouping of 
Lask there were diffrrr,lces 
between essentially very similar 
technologies iii dirfen-rur plants. 
Some managements had used a 
functional or trade based' 
grtsuping for contractors, even 
Where a 'divisional' or producs/ 
ascot-bawd urgartisatton ettsted 
within the plant Itself. 1151, gave 
economirs of scale. 
Others dirkied their plant up 
into areas and appointed a 
contractor for t-arh, and stirs 
included specific contractors for 
major units, giving t-nu,tiu natty of 
work oil technical aspecss of the 
plant. One ptassl used only taste 
tusitractor for all of its 
turnaround,. cnoshlni'sg the 
rtdvarttages of both the former 
approaches but leasing Itself open 
in crlriclsm by the Michael Porter 
school of strategic management in 
allowIng Itself to be In a position 
of tou r'ttsch supplier-power. 
Results 
More than one plant manager said 
the raliortailsaslon, whether 
efficient or not, had unblocked the 
mlndael, and by sthneqtienrty 
thinking afresh, often doing less in 
absolute terms, mililnns of jxajtuds 
1usd been shaved oft the annual 
maintenance budgets. Reputation 
effccss in a smaller slack market, 
and in some cases incentiviaed 
contracts hcslta Put brakes us, the 
opportunistic behaviour which 
was the scourge of the e.sgiiwerlrig 
cuotracttng industry in the post-
war years. Even today however 
herr i,avr been several malor 
strikes by contractOr workiorces, 
despite the presence of taew tuaton 
agreements. Time have been a 
cosnertronr of new working 
arrangements for integration of 
contractors and internal 
maintetiasice staffs and, with one 
or two exceptions, the 1996.97 
round of Cracker and oilier isiajor 
shutdowns had been of world-clan 
performance levels in trmsus of 
shortness of duration. 
Examples Include: 
Plant 2 HjsbssCwcker 	 I? days 
Plant 7 ThaIJ Carsltk 
Crocks 	 II days 
Again this represestis consIderable 
overhead and lost revenu, savings 
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Nothing changes ... or does it? 
for the bud-pressed refiners and in 
the process is re-establishing 
managerial pride. 
Summary 
Despite the most operating 
environment in the UK. with 
similar remote locattons and also 
despite being a part of a larger 
inteniatlonal group 5 UK oil and 
chemical companies have out ro-
ordinared their approach to the 
etnploytnrnt of outw,urcissg of 
what is a major functional 
influence on their bottom-tine 
performance. 
Even similar technologies do 
not apparently allow for 
benchmarktng of the process of 
coistrathng. Recipes ate followed 
only when the oseasons are 
tangible. Where that is no set 
formwa for costing functional 
venus divisional groupings them 
appear to I. ra'tdnm, at do single-
source vendors. 
This isesseollally down to 
management intuitIon, preference, 
perhaps even as 1.1 
reiatton,hlps. Kesearch by Aokt 
(1903) suggests that in Japan a 
formal relatiomlrip exists between 
major firms and subcontractors. 
but I. the UK Ilirre is no co-
ordination between pam of the 
Sante liens, let atone scantier of 
technology Internally from the 
trtl. Sea operations, which tue 
alliances, loins vesiturts and 
partnerships to explore and 
produce oil. 
Refiners will argue that their 
tetisnology is far more complex, 
and they ate right. But what they 
lack is the ability to see common 
connections across disoptiries; 
maybe that very technology 
compresses their Insight and 
hinders the development of a joint 
approach to snalnirnance 
Involving Contracton and clients 
on is equal looting. One wonders 
if Alit shortages and an expanding 
economy will damage the 
essentially pragmark 
arrangements these malor firms 
have made. 
At a higher level of abstraction, 
one lizt to wonder whether a big 
finn Is sophisticated, as Larry 
(rcinrr (1973) asserted In his 
theory of the stages orthegrowils 
of a firm, or whether they are after 
all just big. 
This wild. Is tsased eel a research 
rwwyfsandedby Use LlnlrersltyOf 
Noeffrunrtsrla and the Lconosssk and 
$odW Research Caorscl (2-00022-
1670) 
4$ 
The January TtN Video contains a 
Tltattareof quite radical changes 
and areas where, although laws 
have dwsg.d said more and 
rnorebessinessrnodelsabaond in 
the market place, the eesiM is no 
change...or chaos as usual. 
The eider of piayw the video 
starts off with the tistiat News 
Review which covey 
the woesy that UK Lid is still 
unprepared for the asaro. The 
governments Euro Awareness 
CampaIgn has found the 
greatest interest In the South 
East and tag MIdlands and the 
least Interest I. the-North last. 
North West-and Loson.-There 
was a good Oe*$agt writeup-
of the pails hf.EMU Is ignored 
in Mwwpenieest Aaounrhsg. 
December 198, page 18: 
• the guldancefrons tlaAsadklng-
Practices Oosrd t'dwe 
.o!Sanha&ttsaaátb flat the 
scope of a4lts 
a cororategemancermnthe 
form of a new publication from 
CMA (Corporate Governance 
and Cannel) end the.nevn that 
corporate governance in the 
USA Is about to itence that 
In the UK In the form elan 
alliance between Hermes end 
• acebing tasnilso and dbabled 
persons tax cledits, thek Inspect 
on employers asthe 
government seeks to anion 
them tivosagh the PAYt 
• brlefdatallso.stfitSMt 
researds database set tg, by the 
Dli and lindings of UwICAS 
Research Caimiltee on the 
disdoarge of pronts for 
-- during ubeovn 
The main programme consist, of 
• AnlndepthlookatPRSl2and 
a brief resumé of 11513 and 14; 
• Managing business within an 
economic— 
• Qianges In discrImInatIon law; 
• Hsthaiwuk. 
An In depthiooltat FRS12and a 
brief resume of 11313 and 14 
FRS12. This is where accounta nts 
will nto change radicals' some 
of their U*iidnq In relation to 
when is a xovàIon not a 
provision? As the finance director 
of litigate stated, accountants will 
have to thirst Ins of prudeetce and 
noel abuol disclosure. This 
standard was Introduced to stop 
the so-caled tlg bath provisions', 
where organtsadons provided vwy 
Ianje sums in the accounts for 
events that might happen and 
than In future year, released the 
provisions to give the appearance 
ofin,çvovernent In the results. 
Thesiind.dwii dsallersgath. 
viavpraioualytakenby 
.mW'ti 
 
in providing for 
future expenditure Sating to 
existing or antidp.lad legislation 
and the treatment of 'repairs and 
mainto'.ance' expenditure. Isobel 
Sharp from Arthur Andersen 
niakas.a good job as usual of 
the - and 
practical problems of 
implementIng (he standard. 
Manag!asgbtaslnesast4thln.ri 
economic dow,st.rn 
The strategies given by Alan 
Bainetand Raj SlthMotBDO Stay 
Heysvaid are not nawand ale, in 
fact, food and dUnk to the 
-nxanagerrsent accountant. 
• Watdxyourcash:cadi lilting. 
How many years ago was that 
pirase lInt cokied. 
• Have-effective management 
Inlomsu wisids products, 
ojstoenert or distribution 
channels are nt profitable, 
tilt your pe.forTtlaace CTISMU Its 
and bar.dsmnaet tomaasige 
how coenpetidve you are. 
• Doamartetlngaudt 
• Review costs and overheads, 
oA.otd,00-vabe added 
actMties. 
• Usecoesstitantwtseetheyare 
paid oi4 as a percentage of 
sanaigs In areas such as energy 
and ieltcosrwnunicatlons. 
• Moritor flocks and debtors. 
• Lcoforoppo.tailttn, 
partloatasly In acqulitig 
companies goi,g cheap in the 
downturn whIch have great 
potential but short1erm 
funding probleero. 
This is th,langsaaga of 
management accountants: has the 
eye been taken off the ball, has 
coeixptacny crept back Into as, 
organisatinna? Nothing new but 
peetlaps.atirTseb'rerrlinderto 
check that these strategies are 
changes In dlsaimlrsation law 
his progsarrurselooasat the 
• DisabIil' DisalrT,lnatloen Ac 
• Pregnancy and ruatemlty 
• Sexual orientation 
discrimbiadon; 
• Age dlsatrtioadon. 
A plethora of law cases, findings 
from tslbunah5 the European 
Court of justice (ECJ and Codes 
of Practice with rio teeth. 
CeorginalcaanafrornRlrisards 
Butler and lasnes Di ties from 
Lewis 551St review the findings 
from case law, tribunals, and the 
EQ. Have new laws made It.easler 
for employees and essployers to 
know theIr rights? Apparently not. 
There Is a great need for a srnal 
booklet to be consØSlb ex,iain 
eerty those tights. The-only 
winners attite moment-are the 
legal profnsio4.caaesn taiting 
longer and co,dag.rnor.—th. 
grOv4ng:tLseot apeit-wttnesies Is 
- addb'g.to -both tlmeand. 
ca*ttarexpeatarelhose. 
vritnesseaflp expert witness can 
- be ioaimdttsaa different 
beRets frornyourexpestwltiess's. 
An frstareittng but I warts you, 
frustrating progranusle. 
Health atwork 
Mossorgaiisaiknsh.vecarefuiy 
abided by the Safety part of 
Healthaaasafely.twodtAct but 
what. about the health 
This far9gransm.iooks at ways 
bdngptaeseuedbytheHsth 
Edtntlon Atstlsotity to reduce the 
£IObn cost to beaslnw.from had 
health: 8O-rnlillon days ax Ion 
arwsually from 
tses,sojfthicoddbe 
reduced profflahinty ehouW 
bxrease,. as (hould the motivation 
and nsaal.of the wortfoecaThe 
Woeleplaca Health Advisory Team 
v14AT) is there to help SME5 to 
tackle this issue. The programme 
and .cwatpanying nota cover a 
large nurnbeofcasestsadles and 
as we enter 1999 perhaps health 
of the woaldorca and 
consequently the balance sheet 
sho,Jd be a New Year's resofutlan. 
N year and mare ksfonr.ctfwe 
chose TEN (Television ids.catfoo 
- endure wayth. videos 
, be used S CPPD, please 
co.stoctang, )oarr roan. on -1-44 
(0)7453 757268 a,e-.ssuH 
Aleardodisely 
yet ca aefore TIN direct on 
freqshoae 0300 826764 - 
MlcbodAsagefo S TENon .44 
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Introduction 
This paper is based on documentary 
evidence and interviews with maintenance 
and engineering managers at a UK process 
manufacturing plant—called 'Riverside' to 
preserve anonymity. The managers co-
authored a paper presented to the main 
board describing the manufacturing strategy 
of the plant. This plant was the company's 
Manufacturing 
strategy in a UK 
process plant: 
the importance of 
human resource 
management 
• This artide provides a case history 
of strategic change in the 
manufacturing activities of a 
UK company. 
• The background and history of the 
plant are described in relation to the 
UK context. 
• Strategic actions taken in quality, 
safety, cost and HR are discussed, 
with the emphasis on 
implementation. 
• Some general conclusions are drawn 
about strategic change in the UK 
Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & 
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only UK fäcffity though the company owned a 
distribution and retailing system, parts of 
which were joint ventures with other similar 
companies. The UK had been singled-out for 
large-scale investment on a global strategic 
basis because of its proximity to European 
markets and the ability to supply these from 
almost anywhere in the UK by ship. The 
problem was the main board's perception that 
even in the 1990s, the UK's culture was below 
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par internationally while low productivity and 
questionable employee relations were still 
issues. The proposed investment programme 
was halted in the 1992 recession by the main 
board and the paper was later written to 
convince the board that the progress made at 
the plant meant that future investments could 
and should still be made in the UK, for the 
original strategic reasons. The board had sub-
optimized the performance of the plant by 
failure to invest over the previous ten years, 
and an analysis of the progress since 1992 was 
the basis of the argument for investment. 
The paper was noteworthy because of the 
concentration on people issues, despite this 
being a highly capital-intensive plant where 
only 10% of costs labour represented. Oliver 
and Wilkinson quote Soichiro Toyoda explain-
ing Toyota's view that 'the most critical area [of 
using Japanese production methods into the 
USA] is labour-management relations' (Toyoda, 
1992). However, this was in a mass-production 
industry and the perception is that automated 
process manufacture is somehow labour-free. 
Yet a key aspect according to the Riverside 
authors was their assessment of the perception 
by the employees that 'Management are only 
passing through on a career path and Riverside 
"belongs" to the blue collar and supervisors'. 
This paper describes and analyses the major 
elements of strategy taken over a period of four 
years by the plant management. It is divided 
into four parts. The first describes the structure 
and history of the plant and its UK context; the 
second deals with the major strategies such as 
quality safety, cost and manpower reduction 
and employee relations. Part three deals with 
the perceived outlook for the future and part 
four details some more general condusions 
about strategic change in the UK. 
Pan 1: history and context 
1.1. Structure 
Riverside is a complex consisting of over 
42 different process units, with utilities 
including partial power generation, a large 
tank farm, water treating facilities and five 
jetties. Total feedstock comes in entirely by 
sea. Products are shipped via sea, pipeline, rail 
and road. About 60% of total production is for 
inland consumption, the rest is exported in 
batches of up to 30,000 tons. The total 
number of products with different specifica-
tions is over 100 per year. 
The organization followed the conventional 
structure failing into production, technical and 
maintenance but with some variations. At 
superintendent (assistant manager) level the 
plant operated on a zone base, with four zones, 
a remnant from earlier reorganizations. Central 
groups handled plant-wide and longer-term 
issues. The Operations Support Group for 
instance handled all capital expense projects 
as well as major maintenance overhauls. 
There were five and six levels of supervision 
respectively between the Refinery Manager 
and the lowest levels in maintenance and 
production. In production, the shift line was 
historically the official line of responsibility. 
Day supervision was understaffed and only 
responsthle for unit performance, not for per-
sonnel issues. First line supervisors in both 
production and in maintenance were normally 
recruited from the blue collar pool with limited 
upwards promotion potential and therefore 
tended to have stronger relationships with the 
workforce than with management. 
Riverside was able to attract good people 
due to high salary and training expectations. 
The graduate recruitment and development 
system was first-class and Riverside was losing 
people into the corporate system or to smaller 
companies who paid a premium for the train-
ing they had obtained. Graduate entrants were 
seldom lost to big multi-nationals. 
The plant was built over 45 years ago and 
grew haphazardly, resulting in major infra-
structure and environmental compliance def-
iciencies. The managers' assessment was 
detailed in a development programme and 
identified 'all the skeletons in the closets' and 
through this initial 'scoping' process, all of the 
plant manages knew what engineering work 
had to be done to meet future legislative and 
market requirements. 
Like every other manufacturer, manpower 
numbers were a key target as they are an inter- 
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nal efficiency measure, and Riverside had made 
exceptional efforts to reduce numbers but 
retain the workload. Two areas may exemplify 
this. 
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actually earned. In time, it virtually became a 
given level of payment, but still the bureau-
cracy to support its administration was being 
maintained. 
1.2. Manufacturing manpower: a 
reduction strategy 
The production department reduced from 
63 positions to 56 by changing from an eight' 
hour shift system to a 'bare bones' five shift 
12 hour roster with no spare men. With a 
37.5 hour week, this shift roster had a basic 
4% overtime requirement. Sickness, training, 
special assignments etc. had to be covered on 
overtime, which avenged 16%. With this 
structure it was very difficult to have any 
continuity and to implement changes. 
Maintenance started with 360 people 
throughout the 1950s and 1970s but from 
1986 following rationalizations this was re-
duced to 92 craftsmen on daywork, supported 
by 'seconded personnel' (contracted via an 
agency) working to Riverside supervision and 
contractors working to the contract company's 
supervision. The maintenance flexibility was 
established in 1984 but contractors continued 
to work with strict demarcation. With very 
stringent manpower targets, overtime was the 
only safety valve. This generated a culture 
where time spent at the plant was rewarded by 
overtime payments with little encouragement 
for job efficiency during normal working 
hours. This emphasized rewards for ineffi-
ciency during normal work time in order to 
generate overtime. It also required overtime 
working by supervision and staff. 
With less and less Riverside employees and 
more and more contractors, the plant became 
increasingly dependent on contractor work 
and contractor efficiency. A site agreement 
'piggybacked' a national construction agree-
ment which determined terms and conditions 
of work, pay etc. and the contractor employees 
had an incentive to beat a specific established 
target in order to earn more money. It needed a 
tremendous amount of bureaucracy to make it 
work and eventually it depended on the 
honesty and commitment of the first line 
supervisors to determine that the bonus was  
1.3. Management-employee relations 
Riverside was virtually a 'dosed shop' with 
everybody up to a certain position joining a 
union. Production was represented by the 
T&GWU, (Transport & General Workers' 
Union), maintenance crafts by a joint agree-
ment with five separate mechanical and 
electrical unions. 'Union attitude' (as deter-
mined by the management) extended into 
staff areas especially in the laboratory and the 
secretarial section where a staff union, ACTS, 
(the white collar section of the T&G) was 
recognized by the company. 
Union power was very strong especially in 
the production area where the top operator 
was a T&G union member and as he was in 
charge of the unit: without him the units could 
not be kept in operation. Riverside did not have 
enough experience in white collar areas to 
operate the plant in the event of a strike 
(of which there had only been three in the 
plant's history, though these were very dama-
ging economically). T&G support to other 
unions was assumed to be high but as any strike 
could be very expensive and very damaging to 
the business, this assumption was never really 
tested. 
1.4. Change 
The natural tendency was for management to 
avoid any confrontation, and as a result, 
'The tendency was for 
man agement to avoid 
confrontation' 
concessions for change had to be bought 
dearly from the union and only after a long 
and hard battle. Moreover, first line super-
vision was normally selected from union ranks 
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and was neither trained nor committed to 
challenge the situation. The progressive 
reductions in managerial levels meant that 
adequate time to reflect was a rarity. Thus, job-
control strategies by the unions, often using 
the threat of restrictions on overtime, were 
enough to derive concessions. For manage-
ment, it was a difficult situation and they were 
never really in charge. However the company 
viewed the Thatcher era as legitimizing a 
change in the power balance in Britain 
between management and unions by making 
the unions potentially liable in law for any 
industrial action which did not follow the 
newly established legal framework (called 'the 
new industrial relations' by Bassett, 1989). 
Economic performance deteriorated in the UK 
and globally in Riverside's markets, incurring 
losses. These two factors—economics and 
legislation—created the environment and 
therefore the opportunity for management to 
make efficiency changes to ensure the survival 
of Riverside and in so doing to challenge the 
role of unions. 
Part 2: maJor strategies 
The overall policy was to make capital 
investments from the corporation as cheap 
as anywhere in the world. It was a long-term 
strategy and broadly there were three main 
constraints which had to be addressed: 
lack of leadership and vision [poor 
management] 
lack of fundamental processes for imple-
menting change [quality, reliability, 
technology] 
lack of teamwork at all levels [trade 
unionism] 
2.1. Leadership and vision 
The managers concluded that unless strong 
leadership was shown they had no chance to 
implement changes or improve things. A 
change in organization away from zone 
management back to conventional functional 
organization with new people in key positions 
had to be established. Luckily, opportunities 
for the new team were good: a major capital 
expense project was completed successfully 
on time and on budget, giving early success. 
At the same time, poor economic perform-
ance of the company in total forced Riverside 
to implement sweeping changes, and reduce 
manpower by 10%. This enabled people who 
were not committed to change to be coun-
selled or selected for redundancy. 
Crucially, major concessions were obtained 
from the unions: due to the deteriorating 
financial situation, there were no negotiations 
at all, just information on what management 
intended to do. The change worked by strong 
vision statements and a real commitment in a 
stated determination to manage, and save jobs, 
rather than by real power. The unions could 
not generate strong support and the workforce 
was more concerned with current earning 
power than future organizational power. How-
ever, the change away from negotiating was 
only structural. The new lean structure meant 
that the traditional productivity improvement 
methods had been exhausted. Teamwork and 
trust were worse than before, morale was 
down and management had not committed 
themselves to which processes should be used 
for continuing improvement. The process for 
identifying systematic improvement to plant 
reliability had died because the organization 
and team players had changed and it had not 
obtained enough commitment from manage-
ment to survive such a change. 
Management's new role was to generate a 
vision and some broad, long-term objectives 
describing where Riverside wanted to be in 
three to five years. It took the management 
team quite some time to generate the overall 
vision, and to create detailed goals in eight 
areas: safety environment, operational effi-
cienc)c reliability, quality improvement, 
public affairs, investment and human re-
sources. It took even longer to develop specific 
department targets for the year from these 
overall goals, and then to obtain the 'buy-in' 
from supervision and to explain, communicate 
and promote these goals so that everybody was 
aware of the overall programme. However, 
even setting out such a broad programme does 
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not mean success. Priorities had to be set and 
the commitment to such a programme had to 
be constantly and consistently shown. 
2.2. Fundamental processes for 
achieving change 
2.2.1. Safety, health and the environment 
Moss Kanter (1986) advocates using a 'vehicle' 
as an approach to managing a change process. 
The management team implicitly adopted this 
approach by selecting safety as top priority for 
a number of important reasons. Historically, 
safety at Riverside was quite often regarded as 
the unions' strongest prerogative: management 
was apparently only interested in profits and 
cared little about safety. It was felt therefore if 
management could take the lead on safety it 
would emphasize the new climate, and prove 
that respect for the plant and its people 
was management's underlying moral stance. 
Furthermore, safety benefits everybody in the 
organization and can only be accomplished 
by teamwork, including the contractors. It 
requires thinking, planning and organization 
before action is taken. It requires following 
established and agreed procedures. It needs 
training. It cannot be improved with a crisis 
management system. So all those chings which 
are identified as good management practice 
could be shown and used by everybody in 
order to improve the safety record. 
2.22. Operational reliability efficiency 
through quality 
One of the most difficult problems in operat-
ing a manufacturing entity is how to imple-
ment change but also how to have sufficient 
stability so that management is not constantly 
're-inventing the wheel'. How to ensure that 
the good established procedures are being 
kept alive but still create an environment 
where constant improvement is part of the 
culture? What kind of process do you use to 
be certain that changes are being worked on 
at the lowest organizational level but anticip-
ating the effect on other departments or the 
overall refinery? These are questions which 
cannot easily be answered, otherwise manage-
ment would not be necessary! But a process 
to make this change as efficient as possible is 
essential. Total quality management was 
decided on as the best process to make these 
changes: a structured approach was crucial, 
given previous experience of short-termism at 
the plant, and the Crosby approach was 
identified as ideal for the plant environment. 
2.3. Human resources—teamwork 
The following goal was established: 
To create an environment in which all 
individual employees can contribute to the 
success of the plant, develop themselves and 
receive appropriate recognitions (reward) 
A clear focus for all 'people initiatives' was to 
concentrate on the individual, whose contri-
bution could then be harnessed within team-
work. With this kind of focus, the plant could 
not improve unless there was a fundamental 
change in attitude by the unions and their 
members. In the unions' view, their team came 
first and they had to protect the individual. The 
individual historically had no personal respon-
sibility, only as a team member. The focus in 
a union environment was on the collective, 
not the individual, and the lowest level of 
performance became the norm against which 
the group defended change or negotiated 
improvement. 
23.1. Supervision 
With union power diminishing, a failure to 
maintain good supervision and management at 
all levels would have had disastrous con-
sequences and really could revert any future 
improvements back to failure. The biggest 
ongoing challenge was to fill the communi-
cations gap usually filled by the union and 
ensure that effort was input daily, not just for 
the specific areas targeted. Therefore, it was 
absolutely necessary to improve supervisory 
'It was absolutely necessary 
to improve supervisory 
management' 
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management before the union role was 
diminished as the union had a function to 
operate as a safety valve in case front line 
supervision did not properly take care of the 
individual's needs. Harris (1988) noted this in 
her study of two ammonia plants where super-
visors had a negative role and kept infor-
mation to themselves. In order to progress, 
the management had to establish supervision 
standards, train accordingly and monitor 
progress. 
Based on these principles a questionnaire for 
upward appraisal was established which was 
then taken into account in determining each 
supervisor's annual performance increment. 
Needs for improvement' were analysed to 
determine training requirements. Considerable 
training was carried out to train supervisors in 
appraising people and how to give honest 
feedback summarizing positive and negative 
accomplishments but also focusing on such 
items as commitment, dedication and taking 
responsibility. Front line leadership training 
modules were used together to revise and in 
many cases learn for the first time the basic 
principles of management. These involved all 
levels of management so that a quality-circle-
like approach enabled the giving and taking of 
advice and assistance. This made the experi-
ence more a problem-solving' activity: more 
open and less threatening to supervision. 
Similarly, there were informal methods: execu-
tive lunches with management, direct com-
munication during walkabouts and briefings. 
2,3,2. Teamwork and trade unions 
Before any changes were possible, a pay and 
career system had to be in place which would 
eventually absorb union members in a staff 
environment, so that there needed to be a 
progression in jobs from the lowest levels. 
This meant a completely new staff structure 
for unionized employees and junior white 
collar staff. Having a long-term interest and 
progression, at the gift of management, was 
seen to break the mould of dead-end pro-
duction jobs and align with the nenko-jurestsu 
or service-related pay prominent in Japanese 
companies (Oliver and Wilkinson, 1988). 
2.3.23 Crafts initiative. Craftwork, with its 
skill-based demarcations and traditions and its 
job-control strategy had always posed a pro-
blem for management-driven change, especi-
ally in large process plants requiring 
exceptional maintenance. Process manufäc-
ture can be regarded as 'just-in-time' with 
low stocks, a fragile stage-to-stage relationship 
and lack of internal flexibility. However, the 
craft union power to control jobs was spread 
between several unions and their sections and 
was less than in the production area. Flexibility 
to choose between using the internal work-
force or contractors had been achieved in 
earlier negotiations and this reduced the risk of 
industrial action. This led to a tactic of not 
hiring new craftsmen but rather working more 
with contractors. Although at a higher cost and 
with less quality, this move put pressure on the 
craft workforce. It was constantly kept alive 
with hints during discussions with individual 
employees that things had to change, the 
'status quo' was not an option and improve-
ments in individual work effort were import-
ant. Using contract workers was neutral to the 
union officials who represented both groups of 
workers. 
Simultaneously: groups were targeted who 
might relish a move to staff conditions, where 
demarcations were non-existent. In the main-
tenance stores area people were represented 
by the T&GWU, whose prime focus was 
production. Storekeepers were offered and 
took up staff status, were then treated well, 
like every other member of staff, and this 
showed that the tactic could work. The next 
step was to segregate a group which was 
closest to a staff environment—instrument 
mechanics. These highly skilled technicians 
were shown the potential to improve status, 
work interest and their pay on an individual 
basis and eventually they themselves came 
forward to ask for staff employment. Again, 
proper management of this group, attçntion to 
the individual, training and the recruitment of 
new staff showed to the other maintenance 
groups that the end of the world would not 
come by 'going on the staff', rather the 
opposite. The economic climate in Britain 
had resulted in pay increases at or below 
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inflation and so new money was only going to 
be available within a staff environment. 
The unions responded by strong words and 
threats but the management team communi-
cated with the total workforce and had the 
determination not to move away from the plan, 
its principles or its vision. A two-year deal with 
both crafts and T&G got away from the annual 
pay ritual and gave the space to concentrate on 
fundamental change to relations with the 
unions. Eventually, management presented a 
new employment contract to all maintenance 
craftsman. A feeling of fairness was helped by 
paying an increase of 4% to transfer the 
individual to full staff contracts. All craftsmen 
signed to fully agree to the changes, a real 
measure of the breakthrough. 
2.3.211 T&G initiative. There was little possi-
bility to put a wedge between the T&GWLJ 
and the production workforce. Firstly with the 
T&G, the local branch is the plant and 
therefore there was no way of splitting union 
and plant workforce. Secondly, the power to 
affect plant performance was much stronger 
with production people and there was no 
opportunity to refer to contractors. Thirdly, 
and most importantly, a stronger team 
approach was needed from them and con-
frontation would have left a legacy of resent-
ment. Three key targets for change were 
identified: 
1. The establishment of the top operator as a 
true supervisor (and therefore the 
reduction of shift supervision headcount). 
2. No collective pay bargaining but appraisal 
of all individuals and pay for performance 
as an incentive for the individual. 
3. Flexibility for increased safety and main-
tenance responsibilities. 
The union responded quite positively and 
requested involvement in the process of 
change rather than building towards a con-
frontation, gave advice and information on 
reorganization and work assignments and 
management slightly changed the original 
plan. Again, constant information about the 
poor financial situation in Riverside gave ample 
justification for these discussions. Eventually, 
the three aforementioned targets were pre-
sented to the total workforce, voted on and 
finally approved by the workforce without any 
pay increase. This was seen as a major win/win 
victory on both sides and therefore an ideal 
opportunity for real teamwork and progress. 
The union representatives, based on the 
changes in recent years, believed that the 
new management was prepared to manage in 
the interests of the total business. As a result, 
discussions with the unions began in a 
'co-operative approach' helped by the space 
created by the two-year pay deal. 
2.3.2.111 Contractor initiative. Improving con-
tractor efficiency is a key strategy for any 
process plant due to exceptional and infre-
quent major maintenance requirements and it 
focuses not just on expense reduction in the 
ongoing operation but also on minimizing the 
cost for future capital expense projects. This 
took a long time as the interests of the large 
and small contractors were different as were 
their levels of sophistication. It was necessary 
to renegotiate the local site agreement but this 
was met with union opposition which could 
not be challenged as the contractors were not 
Riverside employees. The unions were asked 
to revise the agreement themselves to create 
flexibility and productivity improvements and 
given three months' notice of termination of 
the old one. Management then devised a new 
model agreement, incorporating flexible 
working for the first time, by discussing with 
engineers what changes were needed and 
eventually this was implemented after gaining 
assurances from the national level officials of 
the union most sympathetic to change—the 
AEEU—who signed the agreement on behalf 
of all the contractor employees. 
Part 3: outlook 
There had been no backlash or resentment 
but an underlying respect that management 
was taking its responsibility seriously. The 
organizational changes and the initial training 
have been completed, starting with safety and 
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Respect that management 
was taking its responsibility 
seriously' 
maintenance work training so that the 
operators can start signing work permits and 
use maintenance tools. Ongoing training of 
the top operators will continue for the near 
future and their appraisal without pay pro-
gramme received positive feedback in general. 
The link to pay comes into effect shortly as 
does the first appraisal round of the operators. 
There is at all levels more open communi-
cation and teamwork than there was ever 
before. 
The principles of total quality management 
have been introduced but it is not yet strongly 
ingrained in the cultUre of Riverside and it can 
be easily reversed. It is a long-term strategy 
which needs total commitment, by everybody, 
especially the management, to prosper. Quality 
is the cheapest way to make improvements 
and the identified benefits will eventually hit 
the bottom line. However, the gap between 
expectation and reality has to be properly 
managed. They have started to develop and 
estimate PONC, the price of non conformance, 
to established requirements. Based on these, 
several departmental or inter-departmental 
corrective action teams have been established, 
to look at means to reduce those areas with the 
highest PONC. 
Teamwork improved at all levels. Again, it 
will only last with commitment by manage-
ment and the worlcforce to work together for 
the overall benefits of the company. This can 
only be achieved with clear objectives and 
improved communication. However, as in all 
other areas, communication hits the dilemma 
of diminished return for efforts which go above 
a certain level. Riverside has not reached this 
level, yet. Trust in management will have to 
balance any lack in communication. 
Improved communication can be achieved 
by having a central control room as many 
plants now have a central office location where  
face to face conununication could be im-
proved. Neither are available at Riverside and 
half the staff will move half a mile away into 
rented office accommodation to make space 
for new capital projects. With the current 
tightness of capital funds, to change the 
situation and bring people closer together 
physically can only be part of a longer term 
plan. However, new information technologies, 
specifically the local area network, and email, 
may enable improved communication at a 
distance. 
Safety achievement turned out to be a quality 
process: overall there are more established 
procedures than before and adherence has 
improved. This is supported by outside audits 
(achieving ISO 9000 accreditation). As a sign 
that quality really can work there are now 
established standards for meetings: prep-
aration, execution, follow up and action 
items. Everybody strongly supports this since 
it reduces time for meetings and its efficiency 
of getting things across or agreed. A major 
boost to efficiency was introducing a practice 
at the end of regular meetings whereby the 
efficiency of the meeting is discussed and 
rated. This closes the loop for constant feed-
back for improvement and it had marked 
results. This feedback requires honest% open-
ness and that managers are prepared to take 
feedback without 'shooting the messenger'. 
The managers ended by emphasizing just one 
quality process where they believe they had 
the most long lasting impact: human resources, 
the industrial relations area, with the establish-
ment of better teamwork. Organizational lit-
provements are a never-ending task. Everybody 
is now aware that management is in full control 
and union power is greatly diminished. Such 
power brings with it a substantial amount of 
responsibility. The power of management is 
only to be used for the overall long term benefit 
of the plant and has to be seen as being fair and 
honest. 
Pan 4: general conclusions 
The many initiatives which had already been 
started once before at Riverside had withered 
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on the vine and a flavour of the month 
syndrome was rampant. Interest motivated 
by managers' own personal career, cynicism 
within the blue collar area and 'retirement on 
the job' were all evident to some degree. 
Ahlstrand's (1990) study of Esso's Fawley 
refinery and chemicals complex also noted 
the degree to which managers' perception of 
what could be done rested on their own 
careers and historical 'recipes of success' (as 
described by Grinyer and Spender 1979). 
Riverside's experience is that manufactur-
ing strategy is doomed to failure if particular 
UK cultural factors in the process of managing 
are not taken into account. Short-termism, 
ifiustrated by the flavour-of-the-month ap-
proach to new managerial techniques, is a 
particular feature, and Riverside was only 
beginning to see the first bottom line impacts 
after two years of pretty dramatic changes. A 
key to its success was the realization that top-
down attempts at introducing fundamental 
change result in a considerable gap between 
expectation and reality which can strain 
management's commitment to the process. 
The democratic, legal and constitutional 
systems in Britain have been built up over 
centuries, and strongly support lengthy debate 
as a way of making decisions in order to get a 
solution which managers and supervisors are 
prepared to own and be 'bought into' except 
in a crisis situation. Gallie's (1978) contrasting 
of BP's UK and French plants also showed that 
the UK manufacturing plants generated better 
relationships but the downside was that this 
had the effect that procedures were normally 
regarded as optional. Even on environmental 
issues specific individual deals could be made 
with authorities and there were no firm or 
consistent standards. 
Riverside was fortunate in the appointment 
of a new director from another part of the 
group who was able to see the existing 'recipe' 
and break its grip by introducing a new, more 
successful one. This process of recipe adoption 
was illustrated by Grinyer and Spender's (1979) 
research, but is seldom realized in the UK, 
where few companies are truly multi-national  
and where recipes survive long past their sell-
by date. Employing consultants in the role of 
'recipe-busting' can never be as successful 
as a committed internal change agent, who is 
prepared to fail in the short term, because his 
reputation carries itself forward into a longer 
timescale. 
As the feature of short time horizons and 
limited vision aims seems stifi to be particularly 
strong in UK manufacturing, even in auto-
mated process plants owned by multinationals, 
it represents a part of management culture 
which threatens and constrains the develop-
ment of appropriate manufacturing strategy. 
This currently affects other industries in the 
UK which have not yet come to terms with the 
need for a strategic human resource audit to 
underpin manufacturing targets which River-
side exemplifies. 
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Abstract Human Resource Management in the literature has been considered a second- or 
third-order strategy largely related to implementation. Argues that the process of strategy 
formulation and evabsation has not been correctly conceptualised The evidence that HI? Sues 
are fundamental to business is compelling at the level of unit labour costs, but whether they are 
fundamental to the strategy process has remained highly questionable. The paper suggests that a 
favourable 111? environment has to be established before the various strategic chokes can be 
analysed Empirical research in two UK oil and chemical companies provides evidence that the 
effect of HR issues on corporate strategy is understated The assumption of a top -down, linear 
model of strategy formulation, whether positionally- or resource-based, is questioned and an 
alternative conception is discussed 
Corporate strategy and human resources 
Miller (1989, p.  49) defines strategy as "essentially market-related". This 
demands inter alia managerial control of the organisation's direction, especially 
its costs. These are important even if the organisation is pursuing a strategy of 
"differentiation" as opposed to "cost-leadership" (Porter, 1985). The importance 
of costs is highlighted by the threat to businesses such as automobiles and the 
question of labour costs looms large when labour is an important contributor to 
company productivity performance. Other authors (such as Chandler, 1962; 
Purcell, 1989) follow the line of argument that there is a separation of structure 
and strategy, and that this can be divided into three levels. The links of HR 
policies to strategy are, in this conception, essentially second- or third-order, or 
more "downstream", whereas corporate strategy is "upstream" (Purcell and 
Ahlstrand, 1994). This stratification approach puts HR issues into a "business 
strategy" level and a "functional" role. 
At this functional level, Blyton and Turnbull (1994) argue that changes in 
ownership have often led to downsizing, unbundling and increased 
subcontracting, and vertical de-integration. The HRM changes such as flexible 
forms of working which affect working practices, are only modest and most 
firms have pursued "numerical flexibility" - part-time and temporary labour - 
The many research visits were funded by an ESRC grant - number R-iO22-1670. I am also 
indebted to the managers, trade union officers and industry experts who were able to give so 
generously of their time to unravel the strategies. Thanks are also due to the editor and 
anonymous referees for their detailed comments on earlier drafts of this paper. Any remaining VoL 21 
errors are however mine alone. 	 0 Mcli Univesity PS 0142.5455 
Employee rather than extending the skills and versatility of the workforce. Thus, FIRM is 
Relations reactive rather than proactive. They cite Batstone et aL's (1986, p.  41) assertion 
21,2 that production problems - i.e. management deficiencies - lead to poor labour 
relations and low productivity not vice versa, thus reinforcing the claim of a 
downstream or second-order role. Even here, Nichols (1986) concluded that "it 
does seem that British managements have not been doing their jobs very well" 
160 and the role of FIRM has been categorised as "fragile, unstable and difficult to 
sustain" (Whipp, 1992), involved in acquisitions only in peripheral aspects like 
pension rights (Hunt and Lees, 1987), or asked to "play a very marginal role in 
the introduction of technical change, and then at the implementation stage, 
rather than the decision-making stage" (Legge, 1995, p.  119). Indeed the role is 
classified as one of "fringe lightweights, [with] infrequent involvement and 
infrequently influential" (F{ickson et aL, 1986, p.80). 
The definitions of the role, affecting the conception of HR, have often been set 
unrealistically severe tests. Sisson and Scollion (1985) complained that only (sic) 
55 percent of firms in the Warwick company level survey had "a written, formal 
policy on HR, [and only] '22 percent gave it to employees". This rigorous 
approach of course might well be the same figures for corporate strategy. Legge 
(1995) asks for "evidence . - .that senior managers ... have explicit, well- 
fonnulated and consistent HRM policies" (Legge, 1995, p.  96 emphasis added). 
These require a "deliberate" approach to strategy formulation rather than an 
"emergent" one (Mintzberg and Walters, 1985). 
There is further inconsistency in the literature over what constitutes human 
resource roles, outcomes and processes. The 1985 Warwick company level 
survey used "personnel issues" (Legge, 1995, p.  119), Hickson et aL (1986, p.  80) 
and Batstone et aL (1986) use "personnel managers" as distinct from "personnel 
directors" (Gennard and Kelly, 1994). Hunt and Lees (1987) use both "human 
assets" and "personnel managers". While Jenkins (1973) and Purcell (1989) use 
the "personnel department", Purcell and Ahlstrand (1994) refer to "personnel 
specialists". Clearly, these are not the same thing, and Marginson et aL (1993 
Table 4.148 pp.  36-7) showed that once the terms "personnel issues" and 
"personnel function", were separated, 70 percent of firms tdok "issues" into 
account, while the personnel function (ambiguous, but in fact, the personnel 
department) was not involved in 70-82 percent of cases. This illustrates the 
conflation of variables which previous authors had, probably wrongly, attested 
as measures of HR being taken into account in strategy formulation. This 
makes a considerable difference to the conceptualisation of FIR as a 
"downstream" post hoc event 
There are further complications: as mentioned above, "personnel function" 
should not be confused with "personnel department". If HRM exists in the 
integrated form suggested by Guest (1987, 1989) then personnel issues and 
functions will have been integrated into line management and only specialist 
issues like pension arrangements would be expected to remain in a personnel 
department In other words, we would expect a priori less involvement of 
personnel departments under FIRM, rather than more. Furthermore, in 
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divisionalised firms as against functionally-organised ones the role of the 
personnel department can be very different. Whether a personnel manager or 
department is involved on a particular issue depends on the company structure, 
which results from strategy (Chandler, 1962) and produces a certain 
management style (Purcell, 1987) which becomes the independent variable. 
Here, the argument seems to revolve around the post-Thatcher period where 
the hegemony of capital over labour resulted in a unitaristic and authoritarian 
management style, described by Purcell (1982) and Mackay (1986) as "macho 
management". The hypothesis is that within this increasingly common style of 
management, labour is treated as a commodity. 
There is substantial evidence that this kind of HR strategy, related to unit-
labour-costs, elevates FIR (issues, function and people) to a more strategic level. 
This is because labour can be one of the main constituents of both the "position 
audit" and the "environment" in the classic six-stage positioning school of 
strategy (CIMA, 1991, p. 38, cited in Marsden, 1998). For example, in the US, 
Caterpillar's labour had a "summer victory" which cost the company dearly 
(Economist, 1997). At a higher level Woodhead (1998, p. 10) asserts that 
"Germany's powerful unions [are] determined to resist Americanisation, and 
fusing the Daimler and Chrysler operations could be a struggle" indicating a 
clash of cultures where the works councils of Daimler will prevent changes that 
merger sought to introduce. Stelzer (1997, p. 7) went so far as to claim that, due 
to the UPS strike in the USA, "bolder unions [were] striking fear in 
boardrooms" and that there was a perception of a resurgence of union 
militancy in the US generally (corroborated by Rothstein, 1997; and the 
Economist, 1998). The impact of organised labour on the "bottom line" has 
been detailed by Kochan et at (1986) who demonstrated that firms moved 
plants to regions where union strength was low, in order specifically to avoid 
unions. It is worth noting that in the automotive industry, while non-union 
shops pay as little as $10 per hour, jobs covered by union agreements average 
$45 per hour, a 450 percent higher pay level (Economist, 1996). In a mass-
production industry where labour is a high content of total unit costs, then 
there is a strong incentive for "macho management" to use outsourcing to 
reduce costs - precisely as Blyton and Tumbull (1994) and others had noted. 
Clearly unit labour costs, in threatening their very existence, were strategic for 
these firms, but such a strategy was only couched in a defensive mode. 
Evidence for more positive, if macho, HR strategy comes from Smith (1995) 
who details the fragmentation of social relations at work by the impact of 
subcontract and call-centre cultures in the North, while Tuckman (1998) asserts 
that in BP "all together better" just means single status as a means for 
derecognition of unions. Critical studies (e.g. Kelly and Kelly, 1991; Kelly, 1996) 
also emphasise the apparent dominance of a managerialist power framework, 
which is often engaged in derecognising unions in an opportunistic fashion, 
rather than developing people and the business v1alloch, 1991; Claydon, 1996). 
Ursell (1991, p. 312) typifies what could be termed the strategic-cost-approach 
of macho management by stating "a major goal implicit in the idea of flexible 
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Employee labour is to render FIRM as a strategic, rather than a merely tactical activity 
Relations It is not however invariably the case that FIRM must figure centrally in such 
21,2 strategic behaviour ... only where labour's contribution to the production- 
"the valorisation process is crucial will it also be central" she continues (p. 326) 
status of FIRM may be more or less high contingent on such matters as capital: 
labour ratio, condition of labour markets, condition of product markets etc" 
162 (Ursell, 1991, pp. 312,326). 
Another way in which HEM issues (though possibly not the personnel 
department or its managers) may be seen as more proactive is the strategic issue 
not of labour costs per se but of productivity, and of production increases 
through control over working practices. Joint control was espoused by Flanders 
(1964) and formed part of "the new IR" in the EETPU single-union agreements 
(Basset( 1986). Several case studies reveal the continued and more positive 
importance of HR factors in strategic decisions related to controL For example, 
Starkey and McKinlay (1989) charted a number of initiatives related to the 
strategic choice policies of labour relations in Ford UK. Rover's pay deal in return 
for stability was widely regarded as a strategic move (People Management, 
1997). Wilkinson and Oliver (1990) discovered "obstacles to Japanisation" in 
analysing the decision by Ford not to invest in Scotland as a new-style single- 
union deal could not be brokered by the unions, and this was a critical factor in 
Ford's corporate strategy, related not to costs per se but to control via a "slimline 
bureaucracy" of a single-union agreement (see Grant, 1994, 1996 for a discussion 
of such deals). This strategy had emerged far earlier in UK car firms at Vauxhall, 
which had in the 1970s only three main unions and relative industrial peace 
(Lyddon, 1995). Bowley (1998) describes the differences between BMW and 
Rover in terms of factory output: whereas BMW were able to lift the plant 
capacity from 80 hours per week to 108 hours, Rover workers were still reluctant 
to accept even a change to flexible shifts. Hence, some strategic HR issues may 
become hidden within overall policy decisions promulgated not by FIR 
departments but by line managers intent on control of costs. 
In conclusion, most of the literature emphasises only the strategic role of 
labour as a cost-driver for businesses, especially in current competitive product 
markets, despite some evidence that a more proactive role may be taken. In 
capital-intensive industries which Malloch (1991) suggested had labour costs of 
15 percent or less, the opposite should be true. A swingeing 20 percent cut in 
these would therefore only have a negligible 3 percent impact overall. The 
present study aims to test this hypothesis. 
The research study 
The study uses the oil and chemical industry to test the hypothesis that 
management in general has in fact created an HR strategy based on cost-
cutting. This industry is a test case: it has a well-documented history of 
proactive strategic FIR interventions, and if these have been cast aside then the 
negative views of the strategic role of human resources only as a commodity 
should prevail. From individual plant bargaining in a collaborative fashion in 
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Esso and Mobil respectively (Flanders, 1964; Oldfleld, 1966) through to Hill's 
(1971) description of the company development of Shell UK, studies placed 
much emphasis on the role of FIR issues especially within the manufacturing 
plants. Indeed it was argued (Bladder and Brown, 1986) that Shell's Teesport 
refinery was organised on the basis of a new HR philosophy. The acid test of 
the "macho" managerial style theory is thus that these organisations may well 
be reverting to "macho" attitudes in their strategic choices as described by 
Kochan et aL (1986), and in this industry by Malloch (1992) and Tuckman 
(1998). The question is, why did Shell axe 3,000 jobs (Olins, 1995) if labour costs 
are not so important in capital-intensive industries? 
Gallie's (1978, p.  40) test of Blauner's (1964) general theory of alienation and 
automation used BP as a "critical case" and his findings could be generalised 
by dint of the generic hypothesis. BP was not a case study per se using an 
inductive method, but a hypothetico-deductive approach deriving a test case 
from theory. As a methodology it has been applied implicitly to empirical 
research into new approaches to employee relations. Flanders' (1964) use of 
Esso, Fawley, represented, for him, a sea-change in the strategic management 
of industrial relations, through joint regulation by the use of productivity 
bargaining. This change was complemented by Oldfield's (1966) study of 
Mobil's Coryton Agreements, which was significantly entitled "New-look 
industrial relations". This paper relies on justsuch an approach. Kelly (1996, 
p. 89) makes a similar point about the recent changes in the history of the oil 
and chemicals industry, reported by the TGWU (House of Commons, 1994), but 
for him, it is the alleged widespread derecognition which of itself represents a 
strategy. The literature on FIR roles within corporate strategy is on closer 
inspection seen to rely largely on necessarily superficial survey evidence, and 
so a semi-structured interview technique was used instead in the design for this 
research. The use of case studies often poses problems of generalisation (Yin, 
.1994), but as the hypotheses presented in the literature are generic, the test can 
also be designed to assess evidence at that level of abstraction. 
Nevertheless, the design not only used triangulation (Denzin, 1970) but also 
used case data from two entirely different companies (one oil and one chemical), 
with plants in different locations, in order to increase both the generalisabiity 
and validity of the results. The data collected was corroborated in the 
triangulation process, as second and third interviews were arranged with the 
interviewees to highlight and rectify any inconsistencies. Triangulation was 
designed with appropriate checks at local and national level both between 
documents and interviewees and between interviewees and other interviewees. 
Thus, in Hutching's, the recollections of the maintenance manager were 
triangulated against documents and against the recollections of the capital 
projects manager, the overhauls manager and the contracts manager; similar 
triangulation occurred at Wan-Co. Both cases were also simultaneously 
triangulated by interviews with National Trade Union officials responsible for oil 
and chemicals in three unions (GMB, MSF and AEEU), and against interviews 
and documents from representatives within industry bodies (ECIA, NJC for ECI) 
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Employee 	 and financial institutions (Dresdner Kleinwdrt Benson). The data were largely 
Relations 	 factual - dates, actioná, numbers, actors, (as opposed to opinions) and they 
21,2 	 proved to have a high level of consistency. The interviews, and documentary 
evidence where it was provided, were typed up, and then sent back to the 
respondents for checking. Any changes were incorporated and the final version 
• 	 of the interview was then sent back for their corroboration and reference 
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Case 1: "Warr-Co" 
The corporation's strategic analysis was undertaken continuously at a global 
level, and had to address the issue of how the corporation could manage its 
entire business world-wide, and how best manufacturing could be operated in 
future to deliver products to those businesses. Manufacturing has been the core 
competence of the business and manufacturing capability depends on how 
plant is operated and maintained as much as by the capital equipment. Harris 
(1988) for example showed that the differing performance of two ammonia 
plants under automated process control was ultimately due to HR factors. 
Analysis by Warr-Co of its position as a supplier into the commodity-market of 
bulk chemicals revealed that competition was so severe that differentiation 
(Porter's (1985), alternative generic strategy to cost-leadership) was essential. 
A move to speciality chemicals production required Wan-Co either to shift 
between priorities dictated by end-user customers rather than bulk supply to 
storage, or to enable a variety of subsequent marketing choices to be available 
to niche market of different customers. Both scenarios would entail fast 
response, require smaller-batch processes, and fast switching between them. 
Operating flexibility then demanded far more functional and numerical 
flexibility, and an ability to handle more complex tasks and so the skill level of 
employees would have to be raised. To enable the plant to achieve this, focus 
was necessary. The progressive transfer of lower-level work (and the semi-
skilled and unskilled employees who carried it out) to existing contractors was 
an essential element: Wan-Co was implicitly attempting to use the original 
flexible firm model (Atkinson, 1984; Acicroyd and Procter, 1998a) to reduce its 
"core" activities in order to be able to shift quickly into different product 
markets, and increase its core competence. The holding company in the UK 
planned an entire national strategy for all of its production units on this basis. 
The time taken - four years - and effort expended suggests that the reasons 
why Blyton and Tui-nbull (1994) had not seen much evidence of functional 
flexibility was because various British managements were not expert enough 
to enact the strategy ('4ichols, 1986) not because it was not needed. In 
evaluating the differentiation strategy, it became apparent that it would be 
limited by the existing managerial and craft/technical skills profile of the 
people employed (the overall competence of the corporation according to 
Prahalad and Hamel, 1990), and by the lack of availability of these skills in the 
external labour markets. The issue of the availability of appropriate skills and 
competences had to be addressed first in order to enable intended corporate 
strategy to be adequately formulated. It was, if not first-order, then of prime 
importance, and not as Legge (1995) viewed it as a follow-on from a previously 
determined, or "deliberate" strategy. Certain elements had to remain 
"emergent". If the HR analysis revealed that the differentiation could not be 
achieved with the present workiorce, the plants would have to be sold. If it were 
possible, new capital investment would be necessary on a massive scale. 
The UK strategy then moved towards objectives. A key aspect of 
differentiation was whether the plants could maintain the availability of 
production units, to improve the ability to react to customer emergencies. This 
meant reducing their "downtime" to keep them up and running and required 
better skills and managerial competence in maintenance, a medium-term 
objective, but required immediate changes in flexibility, shift and call-in 
arrangements. The concentration on high-skill work internally "won the minds 
of the Trade Unions" according to one manager, as the workforce would in 
future be required to be "high skill, high availability and low risk" which 
translated as high marketability, and long-term employment. 
Changes to contracts included annual reviews to reduce costs progressively 
and these became performance based, with targets on quality, and in fact safety 
improved immediately. Wan-Co agreed a flexibility package with the unions to 
use contractors in integrated teams, and to grow the contractors' skill-base. The 
number of contractors was reduced to assist in increasing focus and 
commitment, and this directly reduced the labour and contractor turnover. 
Also, because each contractor had to do more Wan-Co work, their employees 
were on-site more-or-less continually and effectiveness increased by the 
resulting "experience curves" (McKiernan, 1992, p.  3) of the contractors. 
To capitalise on flexibility and experience meant the giving up of trade 
ownership. This would allow an increase in the use of teams composed of 
different trades and increase problem-solving and preventative methodologies 
within maintenance. The c6mpany used the good offices of the NJC for the 
Engineering Construction Industry and its members to be able to negotiate an 
important national deal for all of its on-site contractors in the UK. The National 
Agreement for the Engineering Construction Industry '4AECI) was used as a 
basis for a new supplementary agreement For craft skills which Wan-Co 
estimated would become scarce, an apprenticeship scheme was created for the 
contractors by Wan-Co. The company had planned to pay for far more 
production operator/craft flexibility than it was able to achieve in national 
negotiations. One major problem was not anticipated: in transferring lower-
level work to contractors, it gradually became clear that with new levels of 
activity, two of the five contractors, which were selected as high-performing, 
needed management development more than they needed functional flexibility 
from the craftworkers. Wan-Co then initiated a kind of "placement" scheme to 
put its own engineers into the contractors' offices. They provided not only 
additional technical skills but also brought with them attitudes and concepts 
which were transferred to the recipient contractor staff. (This is not unlike 
Japanese practice reported by Sako (1993).) 
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Employee There is overall strong evidence that a strategy of cuffing labour costs was not 
Relations part of corporate strategy issue, neither was derecognition. Strategic evaluation 
212 depended on achieving more flexibility between employees and thus better productivity on the plants. Thus, although the use of peripheral workers, the 
contractors, may be a "limiting factor" or a resource constraint on strategy, it 
was not an objective of strategic cost-cuffing. To progress in strategic terms by 
166 moving its businesses up-market, the company invested millions of pounds in 
training, consulted and negotiated with its unions, was given the flexibility to use 
contractors alongside internal employees, and then and only then could it begin 
to address what might become the key success factors in its manufacturing 
plants. This could not have been achieved without the employee relations 
groundwork and inter-firm co-operation. Thus HR turns out to be not a second- 
or third-order factor, but a necessary underlying requirement which then enables 
the evaluation of corporate strategy. The role of personnel was not investigated 
per se but line managers interviewed had consulted senior legal sources (perhaps 
within personnel) early on the use of the transfer of undertakings legislation. 
Certainly the department was fully engaged in implementation, as would be 
expected from the literature. Without the employee relations groundwork, none 
of the higher-level strategies could be considered; as such, broad and significant 
HR issues were part of the original strategic evaluation process, rather than a 
technical add-on as had been suggested in the literature. 
Case 2 "Hutchings" 1260 
Product market competition provided a similar driver for change within this oil 
company whose main concern was a deteriorating oil price and the need for cost-
effectiveness. It could not move petrol or other products upmarket, in the way 
that chemicals could add value through further processing, and could only 
improve the output of higher-margin products such as its gases, or improve the 
marketing of products like road asphalt This is where the hypothesis of a cost-
cutting HR strategy can be tested. The company first needed, as did Wan-Co, the 
ability to assess how it could evaluate its performance, how to measure added-
value for each plant, how to decide whether to reinvest or to cease production. 
The organisation did not adequately attend to market demands, to efficiency of 
production, or to the margins on products, because of the structure of 
management responsibilities within the plants. Corporate strategy determined, 
as a first move, to increase managerial responsibility for profit, and so a product/ 
asset-based structure was proposed in order to subsequently evaluate each 
product and its market potential separately. This would enable positioning into 
cash cow, star, problem child or dog businesses as under the BGC matrix or a 
strategy of non-growth (see McKiernan (1992) for a discussion). Irrespective of 
the use of contractors, which was key to Wan-Co's strategy, Hutchings had to 
evaluate the possibility of achieving adequate measures of performance using 
the internal workforce. As with Warr-Co, however, manufacturing output and 
effectiveness required a major rationalisation of its maintenance support 
Changes to craftwork began in 1985 in a productivity agreement with the unions 
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for a reduction to four core trades. Trades with low utilisation, not necessarily 
low skill, such as plumbers, joiners, gas welders, and painters were outsourced to 
contractors. After this rationalisation Hutchings still experienced what its 
managers called "the usual restrictions" and the "usual pattern of events": 
constant disagreements with the craft trade unions about organising and 
manning up maintenance work This happened on a daily basis as maintenance 
priorities were changed by the production department's problems, which often 
emerged overnight As the managers of the production units were responsible 
only for normal, day-to-day operation and were not required to assess long-term 
development and maintenance needs, there was little pressure on them to solve 
the inherent FIR problems. 
However, this short-sightedness problem remains when organising on an 
assets basis: common problems are not seen as common and so not shared 
between units, thus leaving some gaps in information and a predilection for 
"reinventing the wheel". Additionally, the process often suboptimises because 
of lower scale economies. To circumvent this tendency, a broader strategy, 
encompassing FIR, required flexibility between units and a matrix approach to 
communication. To counter lower scale effects, labour had to become more 
available, to move flexibly between units on demand. This required a change of 
employee relations strategy to involve all levels of employees across the large 
site. Traditional productivity bargaining had worked thus far but still left the 
"us and them" attitude, and collective bargaining took up almost the whole 
year in repositioning tactics and manoeuvring for power. These were described 
above as "the usual" issues and so were taken for granted by production 
managers. In a flexible situation however it was felt more important to remove 
the stigma attached to the manual workers - who were called "the bears" on 
this site - and move, as had Warr-Co, to diagnostic, preventative and problem-
solving maintenance techniques. These required involvement and commitment 
and the company decided to negotiate an end to collective bargaining, moving 
to single-status to reduce inter-trade demarcations, but retaining union 
recognition for individuals and a collective system of site representatives In 
1991 a new agreement established a new grade of composite workers (fork-lift 
truck drivers with rigging and scaffolding skills added) and gave management 
the freedom to choose between contractors or in-house provision. Through 
simple efficiency measures across the site, 66 percent of the maintenance 
budget was saved, and service quality remained high because internal 
provision was topped-up by contracting-out or leasing. 
This could be described as "macho management" but not as a great saving 
on labour costs, as some of these were simply replaced by contractor costs, nor 
was it an intensification of labour, nor has the result disenfranchised the 
workforce, only the unions as a recognised collective force. Whatever the 
judgement, it is clear that the new asset-based policy could not have been 
implemented without the flexibility of labour to counteract loss of scale 
economies. Subsequently, the maintenance department has been able to 
circumvent some of the scale inefficiencies by processing all Hutchings 
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Employee contracts centrally instead of production units generating contracts mainly in 
Relations emergency situations. Given the wider scope allowed for by the changes to 
21,2 flexibility generally, a more strategic evaluation was taken by maintenance 
managers of what added-value they should create. They decided to out-source 
non-essential work and further discussions revealed that they felt their forte 
was in two areas: overhauls of rotating equipment (in essence, the pumps used 
168 to transfer all the products around the refinery) and relief valves (large metal 
"stoppers" which rise up under pressure and release gases which otherwise 
would form dangerous blockages)- These activities were not only strategic, or 
had 	 high-integrity 	 (high criticality) 	 in 	 that repairs entailed significant 
"downtime" but they also constituted a high cost if outsourced to contractors. 
The managers felt they had both the equipment and the skills to transform the 
processes in terms of quality assurance and quality control. Before the new 
agreement enabled this change, production management did not believe that 
internal maintenance personnel were capable of taking on more work, nor 
would the capital projects department use maintenance resources for new 
construction work. The maintenance workshops have subsequently been able 
to involve all levels of staff to document their competence and the first tender 
for internal work was successful on a competitive, objective basis. The effect on 
the employees has reportedly been highly motivating and this is an unintended 
outcome of a deliberate strategy- 
Contracting-out enabled the streamlining of work and both saved 
management time: this created time to investigate a strategic alliance for 
synergy with a neighbouring plant to actually bring-in additional work into 
Hutchings from other contractors operating locally. The manufacturers of the 
pumps which Hutchings uses to repair their equipment are now seen as direct 
competitors for work. Hutchings workshops are able to compete for this work, 
extend the skills of the workforce and expand the business. This will enable 
scale economies on capital purchases, with better rates of return. 
The framework of employS relations changes has also enabled the company 
to enact a further set of management changes. These have required re-framing 
of traditional attitudes and a new rationality based on outputs rather than 
inputs. In this case, the importance of maintenance to Hutchings' assets could 
hardly be clearer: Hutchings has been able to extend the period between major 
maintenance overhauls from 36 to 48 months and complete these in record time 
and so hundreds of millions of pounds of "downtime" losses have been avoided. 
According to the oil industry analyst at Kleinwort Benson, this enormous cash 
saving was a major factor in improving the company's share price. Recently, 
renewed corporate confidence in the site has resulted in a new major 
investment programme. Investment would have gone elsewhere had the HR 
atmosphere not been conductive to achieve world-class returns on investment, 
as was noted in the case of Norsk-Hydro (Blyton and Turnbull, 1992), and so, 
whether involving a specific HR function or not, HR issues have been vital in 
Hutchings' turnaround performance. 
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Discussion 
If employee flexibility creates a maintenance performance in process plants 
which can affect the share price of the companies it is hardly a "third-order 
affair" and represents the eventual aim of all corporate strategy, in that it adds 
shareholder value. Human resource management itself may have become a 
functional tenn, but this is more difficult to justify and to unbundle from non-
functional strategies. HR strategy may even be a separate entity within some 
firms, encompassing routines such as recruitment procedures, training plans 
etc. (as suggested by Devanna et aL, 1984). This paper however raises the issue 
of whether such a narrow formulation is advisable. 
Turning to the links with corporate strategy, the use of positioning models 
of strategy in particular tend to be externally-focussed (vIiller, 1989): these are 
therefore less able to evaluate the importance of internal factors. Much of the 
literature cited earlier seems to rely on this approach to assess the impact of 
HR. Johnson and Scholes (1997, p.  24, Figures 1.4) posit only three concepts: 
Strategic Analysis, Strategic Choice and Strategic Implementation, which are 
taken further (Johnson and Scholes, 1997, p.  139, Figure 4) in a linear, step-by-
step or causative model, yet there is evidence of the problems within the 
positioning approach where managers are using models from other industries 
as a starting-point (Ritson, 1997) and this gives credence to the idea of the 
importing of "recipes" noted by Grinyer and Spender (1979, 1989) whose 
serendipity does not readily fit the forced rationality of the positioning 
analysis. The evidence to support this contention lies within the major texts 
which do not consider HR factors to any degree (e.g. Mercer, 1992; Asch and 
Bowman, 1992; Johnson and Scholes, 1997; Porter, 1985). 
At various points this paper provides more evidence of the importance of an 
internal approach to the analysis and evaluation of strategy. The concern with 
costs, labour and a unit-based level strategic analysis based on efficiency and 
effective product delivery lends itself more to an analysis from a resource-
based perspective (Marsden, 1998). Yet if manufacturing is a core activity, 
efficiency savings though people in the reduction of production "outages' or 
losses of product are of vital importance. Effectiveness in manufacturing firms, 
independent of industry sector, depends on internal efficiencies, as Ackroyd 
and Procter (1998a) confirm. They suggest that UK manufacturing does not 
need highly-skilled functionally flexible labour within what they term the HSF 
(the high-surveillance firm) which adopts Japanese methods of control. Wan-Co 
and Hutchings are not HSFs, yet they too are looking more to "motivational 
flexibility", adaptability and team work than an attempt at fully-fledged 
functional flexibility, which Ackroyd and Procter limit to KIFs (knowledge-
intensive firms) which are typically hi-tech. 
Even though the resource-based theory of the firm seems better to fit these 
cases, again little space is specifically devoted to FIRM or employee relations 
within it Grant (1997, pp.  114, 116-7, 166-7, 377, 378, 409) provides only eight 
pages out of 443 in mentioning human assets, which he describes as 
"intangible", and subdivides into "training and expertise" (competence also 
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Employee appears on p. 117), "adaptability" and "commitment and loyalty" (Grant, 1997, 
Relations p. 114 Table 5.1). They are not derived from empirical data, suggesting scope 
21,2 for future 1-IR research, as Grant (1997 p.  118) notes that they represent "the productive services" of the firm, and its competitive advantage must have them 
interact and collaborate with other resources to produce the "organisational 
capability" of that firm. More work is needed to show how: he fuils to take the 
170 logical next step and suggest a more dynaniic model of strategy. The resource 
based approach still requires a linear step by step approach as first detailed by 
Grant (1991). Even recent HR texts do not take this route: Mabey et at (1998) do 
not refer to the link with the resource based approach except to mention 
Prahalad and Hamel and then to discuss competency. 
This research suggests a far more interactive approach to strategy than 
either the positioning school used by earlier writers on FIRM, or the more recent 
resource-based approach. Perhaps this problem is due to the separation, ad hoc, 
of HR within both schools as a set of functional strategies, where FIRM is still 
thought of as comprising a "fit" between key personnel systems such as 
selection, appraisal, rewards and development (Mabey et at, 1998, p.  61) which 
ignores the general non-functional and strategic nature of labour costs and the 
allocation of employees as productive resources. There have been attempts to 
categorise strategy and relate specific, functional HR strategies to each type of 
management strategy (Schuler and Jackson, 1987; Storey and Sisson, 1993). 
This rather compounds a set of two errors based on what Ryle (1953) termed a 
category mistake: the untested suggestion that HR issues can and should be 
separated from other resources available to the firm. 
This paper presents strong evidence that HR strategies can be integral to 
corporate strategy and not stand-alone aspects owned by the personnel 
department or its members. As such the role of the HR department was not 
mentioned by interviewees. This may be surprising to some who have expressed 
a desire for personnel departments to be seen as strategic (Purcell, 1985, 1994), 
but not perhaps to other more pragmatic authors (Ackroyd and Procter, 1998a). 
Quite explicitly, the need for industrial relations groundwork is clearly 
demonstrated. Yet this has happened at a time when there is much discussion of 
the loss of trade unions' power and influence (Smith and Morton, 1993) especially 
in this industry (Kelly, 1996; Tuckman, 1998). This debate however tends to 
confuse "trade unions" with the broader definition of "employee relations" which 
should be the relationship of the employer with all of its human resources - 
including staff on contracts of service rather than contracts of employmenL 
Thus, though the role of the unions has been rnarginalised, that of employees, 
and contractors' employees, has proved pivotal. 
The test of the hypothesis that HR was strategic only if related to cost-cutting 
must be rejected. In assessing whether this is specific to the industry, support for 
a wider interpretation and the generalisability of the dynamic approach to HR 
within strategy, comes from authors such as Acicroyd and Procter (1998a, b). 
While the cases provide evidence of increasing employer power to enact 
significant change from employees and their organisations, they do not indicate a 
"commodity" or cost-based approach to HR Though the outsourcing of tasks 
may save money in the short-term, such savings are trivial in terms of 
contribution to overall costs as Malloch (1991) observed. The concentration on 
core tasks, those most critical to the business, has been the internal mechanism 
by which the finns have adapted to changes in the external environment, and 
this is typical of manufacturing generally (Ingersoll Engineers, 1990,1994). 
The process is generic and not specific to the oil and chemical industry in the 
UK and many finns have created strategic management time and the ability to 
introduce and pilot changes. Outsourcing itself has been held to be strategic rather 
than (or even) cost-effective (Cross, 199. Because of industry-wide restructuring, 
most of the companies have leant towards more subcontracting (Cross, 1990 Cibin 
and Grant, 1996). Increased numerical flexibility by this means has necessitated 
further changes in ways of working the essential HR task 
Conclusions 
HR issues of flexibility and competence are critical to the evaluation of first-order 
strategies, of which some parts may be "deliberate" or have "strategic intent" while 
other aspects must remain "emergent" (Ivlintzberg and Walters, 1985). Much as a 
critical path analysis links a project series, so HR strategy informs and even 
precedes analysis of corporate goals. Some of the subsequent outcomes, such as the 
marketing of maintenance services, better safety, better morale, the assistance with 
human resource planning of contractors, could not have been anticipated at the 
outset and so the strategy is emergent However, even then the analysis of 
"emergence" does not go far enough. A more detailed view of strategic choice in 
industrial relations was expressed by Kochan et aL (1984) but the notion of a 
single, one-off, strategic choice decision also lacks the dynamism of strategic 
formulation in real thne. It would seem from the evidence presented in this paper 
that strategy depends on a dynamic and changing interaction between levels and 
functions, that it can be heuristic trial-and-en -or, and that FIR factors may be 
changed in order simply to allow for a reappraisal of the strategic choices open to 
business. This conception is opposed to the idea that they must, in a functional 
manner, operate directly in a linear pattern as a part of the "fit" to a certain 
predetermined corporate strategy in order to be considered "strategic". The 
evidence presented in other cases in the literature of supposed cost-led flexibility 
may not hold up to more detailed scrutiny. 
The strategic approach of firms is more accurately described as "crafting" 
strategy (Mintzberg, 1987) and formulation occurs where different strategies 
link together in a web or network. This is particularly true when the routines of 
the past have recently been disturbed and actual events cannot be neatly 
described under approaches with neat boxes and double-headed arrows. 
Rather, the paper then essentially argues that HR is at least a necessary 
precondition for action, and that in some cases unfavourable environments will 
be a sufficient reason for a change of strategy. Built into strategic management 
thinking is a need to get the preconditions right, to do the groundwork, and this 
is where employee relations remains vitally important This seemed a very 
Corporate 
strategy and the 
role of FIRM 
171 
Employee 	 clear first-order objective, because affiliates of any Multi-National Enterprise in 
Relations 	 the UK must compete with other affiliates in different global regions. Industrial 
21,2 	 relations strategy (a "strike-free" Britain) was even the main plank of the 
manifesto by which the first Thatcher government came to power in the UK in 
1979, and the success of Japanese transplants with their single-union deals 
., ,, became a focus for much research. This again cannot be regarded, especially at 
a national level, as a "second-order" affair. These cases thus have strong 
implications for how strategy is theorised about and where causation lies. 
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ABSTRACT 
This paper concerns the effects of the search for dynamic efficiency via flexibilisation 'by 
major oil and chemicalfirms under corporate strategy constraints, spec(fIcally in the area of 
the subcontracting ofplant maintenance, a high-risk, high-value activity in process 
manufacture. The study aimed to discover the effects of increased subcontracting of 
maintenance services on the viability of integrated manufacturing within the corporate 
strategy of the major oil and chemical companies. Data comprised interviews with 
maintenance managers in ten major oil refineries, five chemical plants, three maintenance 
contractors and with officials of three trade unions. It revealed a variety of weak governance 
structures to control contractors: such as employer panels, lead-contractor hierarchies, 
alliances and integrated teamworking, and processural structures such as labour contracts 
(site or national agreements), performance-related, fixed-price, fixed-term and contracts. 
The paper argues that strategic outsourcing has not been a success, and the data provides no 
direct evidence of the extensive use of competitive market forces in controlling contractor 
quality, price or delivery. 
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Introduction 
It is important to study the links between refineries and chemical plants and their 
maintenance contractors because this can illustrate how corporate strategies of multinational 
enterprises can adversely affect the operating of their affiliates. To produce dynamic 
efficiency gains resulting in increased profitability this means actually controlling overall 
activities by investment and manpower decisions which has the effect of creating flexible 
firms in the Atkinson (1985) sense. Penrose (1959) suggested that all administrative 
activities of a firm should be conceptualised as part of that firm, that is, a 'firm as 
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administrative system', but extensive use of subcontracting may make the market may require 
a different analysis such as Williamson's (1981) transaction cost approach. 
The risks which Williamson says are minimised by internalisation may not be simply avoided 
however. Perrow (1984: 84-88) assesses the nature of many manufacturing situations as both 
complex and close-coupled systems. Particularly where the transformation is greatest, in 
changing the inner form of materials rather than assembly work, the system, he argues, is 
more complex, and suggests that key roles in each do not often complement each other at a 
recognisable boundary. He notes the lack of interchangeability in a closely-coupled system 
between jobs, between systems and between materials. One could argue from this that oil and 
chemical production involves quite obvious transformations, and that the plants are very 
closely-coupled, and so one failure inevitably leads to another along the process. This may at 
first appear a linear process but Perrow shows that linear systems have spatial segregation, 
easy substitutions, single purpose controls, direct information and extensive understanding. 
Also this depends on governance of the systems (Reason et al 1995). Complex systems have 
proximity between production processes, feedback loops, multiple and interacting controls, 
indirect information and limited understanding. Perrow's description of the Three Mile Island 
accident in 1979 forecast another more serious one (Chernobyl) and raised doubts about the 
ability of operator in complex systems to see the whole picture; rather, accidents tended to be 
'system accidents' or as the term was changed, 'normal accidents'. 
Where the oil and chemicals production process comes into contact with a loosely-coupled 
system is in maintenance and especially in maintenance carried out by contractors. This is 
because the relevant managers, employees and managerial systems are not readily suited to 
connect with production work of a highly-coupled nature. For example, maintenance often 
has to be done in a limited time-period of a few weeks, at heights, often in foul weather 
(winter stocks and demand is lower, limiting downtime losses) and part of the time in the 
dark, while the employees are engaged on ten-hour-seven-day-shiftwork, rather than their 
normal daywork Monday to Friday routine. In refineries and chemical plants planned off-
stream projects are called 'major events', 'turnarounds', 'shutdowns' 'turnarounds and 
inspections' or 'overhauls' depending on the company. Cross (1989) reports one plant where 
'maintenance failures' in a single year cost £6.7 million, or 29 per cent of the total cost of 
non-conformance. This relates to issue of 'designism' (see Royal Society 1992, and Hood 
and Jones 1996) 
Despite the Cullen Report into Piper Alpha which identified gaps in knowledge and 
procedures by two sets of (contract) workers, (Wolfson, Foster and Beck 1996) and the long 
history of failure in the engineering construction industry (NEDO 1970), the companies 
concerned are all attempting more outsourcing of maintenance work in their 'downstream' 
operations.. This is despite the fact that in process manufacture, quality can be literally 
invisible 
The companies concerned are some of the biggest, indeed some are the biggest, in the world 
in terms of income andlor assets, (Mobil's annual sales turnover for example was bigger than 
Norway's annual GDP, according to Morgan, 1986) 
The external environment of the oil and chemical processors is becoming highly competitive as they are in 
a wholesale, commodity market where margins are made by continuous processing, and which is showing 
both signs of shifting priorities and of lower volumes while simultaneously safety, health and 
environmental issues are enforcing other changes (Yergin 1991). The capital employed in the vertical 
integration of these companies is similarly high, and with few exceptions all of the major companies 
compete head-to-head with each other and many of 'the independents' in nearly all of the markets which oil 
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and chemical products have created. The marketing and corporate strategy changes have been described by 
Cibin and Grant (1996) and by Michael Cross (Cross M., 1990) who presented data on maintenance 
outsourcing across a large number (238) of UK manufacturing sites, of which 12 sites were chemical and 
allied products and 4 sites coal and 
petroleum products. He concluded that strategic governance was absent, contrasting with the careful 
analysis and strategy employed by BP internationally (Cross J., 1995) 
The largest fixed but yet controllable cost in process manufacture is maintenance - on a typical site, sales 
would be £300 million, operating costs would approximate £80 million and a further £20 million would be 
due to maintenance activity. Flanders (1966) noted this aspect of Esso's operation at Fawley through the 
use of productivity bargaining. Although the costs were low in absolute terms, they were controllable by 
management and represented a kind of additional 'semiotic' or socio-psychological meaning, affecting 
subsequent managerial promotions (Ahlstrand 1990). This could also be a major source of risk since if 
managerial promotions are reliant on management maintenance cost this will introduce enormous negative 
bias into decision-making (Brazerman 1994) and might be prone to a danger of 'escalation' to a poor course 
of action. The other major costs of energy and crude oil supply are not amenable to reduction, and having 
over decades addressed the internal maintenance issues, the refineries and chemical plants researched by 
Cross were attempting cost-reduction through increased contractor usage. 
While the use of contractors was increasing, the risks were still apparent: not only for 
'conditional' or 'remedial' maintenance, but the 'planned maintenance' of production units 
called shutdowns or 'turnarounds'. These are critical to a plant's viability, as Cross M 
(1990) reports:- that a typical plant loses $50-60,000 per hour [at 1998 proces] in profit if 
shut down. In both 1986 and 1987 two oil refineries wrote-off their profits" (failed to 
satisfy their manufacturing margins) for the year as a direct result of poor planned 
maintenance performance (Whiston, 1988). 
Theoretical ConsideratioDs 
Williamson's (1981) 'new institutional economics' or 'transaction cost economics, TCE, is 
an extension of agency Theory (Alchian and Demsetz, 1992) which provides a theoretical 
framework for the institutional, micro-economic forces shaping individual firms' behaviour. 
It relies on a combination of economics and psychology to explain organisational structures. 
This is clearly relevant in the 1990s with more flexible labour markets. TCE is a contractual 
approach to the study of economic organisation, which regards firms as governance 
structures in opposition to control via the price mechanism in the market. An internal 
hierarchy, governance structure or firm, reduces risks. This is because internal contractual 
interfaces which are internalised via a governance structure, such as a firm, operate more 
effectively than interfaces between market partners or subcontractors because hierarchy has 
authority, enshrined in common law as the 'duty of obedience' whereas the civil law 
appertaining to contractors cannot provide for 'specific performance', though if nearly all of 
one's supply or income comes form one source - i.e. in small numbers exchange - then this is 
not feasible. 
To use contractors for maintenance will save costs in the short-term because contractors pay 
less employees than oil majors do, and they are not present all of the time thus seasonality 
can be built in to cost savings, making labour more of a variable than a fixed cost. While it 
saves costs, it is also possible to outsource the blame when things go wrong, and despite 
questionable quality, and knowledge passing out of the firm, it is an attractive solution for 
managers. Whereas before it was a function of the internal management team to take 
responsibility if a turnaround was late, if it is outsourced on a 'turnkey' basis then the 
contractor can be blamed. Indeed, Bower (1996) suggested one reason why oil majors 
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operating in the UK Continental Shelf wanted their contractors to acquire others and become 
bigger was to enable them to be sued for millions rather than thousands in the event of a 
disaster. Grant (personal communication, 1997) suggests that some outsourcing is strategic, 
allowing for world-class performance along the entire value-chain, by using whatever agency, 
internal or external, can do the best job (the best value-for-money). 
According to Phillips, (1988) uncertainty can be market-based or event-based. Market-based 
uncertainty arises as a consequence of dealing with other agents (for example, other 
contractors and subcontractors) who may not perform as they 'promise, contracts being a 
'promise' under neoclassical economics. Whereas, uncertainty which is event-based results 
from any instability inherent in a particular industry. Operations in petrochemical plant 
maintenance contracting are risky as it essential that the work is completed effectively and on 
time. A subcontractor, or a trade union, or group of workers, who controls an asset-specific 
input such as a particular welding technique could conceivably hold up the overall 
contractual delivery, because more specific assets require greater amounts of monitoring as 
they entail greater degrees of dependency. In these situations it is clearly preferable to 
internalise the acquisition of such services. However, infrequent use of the asset means that 
this is often not feasible for clients; the result is 'ownership' of the asset by the contractor. As 
this tends towards small-numbers or bilateral exchange, opportunism may result. 
Neoclassical economics relies on large numbers of exchange transactions in the market; TCE 
recognises that sometimes the small contractor has power over the large multinational client 
due to 'asset-specificity'. 
Governance: co-operation and hierarchy 
The types of contract vary between the types of maintenance and repair operations required 
by the Client. Mos5t important is Planned Maintenance or 'turnarounds' which require the 
shutting down of production units and loss of product, carried out by major contractors 
together with smaller Remedial maintenance contractors and client employees from 
maintenance and production. Some of the turnarounds are so large as to require co-operation 
of different clients, so that labour and product shortages in the UK are not a limiting factor on 
the speed and efficiency of the turnaround. For example, in 1996 the South East Clients 
Group negotiated the back-to-back turnaround of two Fluid Catalytic Crackers (FCCs) in 
refineries as far apart as Essex and Hampshire. Some refineries are so constructed (single-
train plants with only one Crude distillation unit) as to necessitate the shutdown of the entire 
set of units and their turnaround over an extended period of six to eight weeks. 
In engineering construction, the National agreement formed the basis of local Site 
Agreements or of in-company agreements. These have often incorporated a local Employers' 
Panel of contractors, to negotiate with a local Trade Union Committee as a partner to the 
agreement. The Panel was usually very closely linked to the client, sharing office 
accommodation, secretarial duties, and frequent informal communications and so derives 
some of the benefits of internalisation (defined as removing the management and some 
associated costs and risks from the market) which would normally accrue only to the Client. 
In some cases this quasi-integration is termed by the managers as an 'alliance' or 
'partnership' of client and contractors, but these terms are held for different situations than 
Employer Panels. An employers panel is a peer-group structure similar to a partnership of 
professionals but without any pecuniary rents. These are not intended to negotiate with the 
client, (as they are formed post-hoc, unlike the bidding consortia in construction projects),but 
with the trade unions and each other to monitor the performance of the work on site. They 
are thus ex-post costs of contracting. 
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The Study Results 
In two firms where there had always existed external sourcing of maintenance, and in one 
firm where there had been no maintenance trade unions, there was no governance structure 
for contractors whatever. There were no employers' panels, but a meeting was held chaired 
by the client, occasionally, to discuss work in progress. There was no site agreement but an 
imposed client rate of pay, based on NAECI, and any trade union arrangements were handled 
within the contractor firms without reference to the clients. Although one of these firms had 
previously engaged a single site service contractor, an SSC, because all of the SSC 
employees had gone on strike at once, and the refinery had had to shut down entirely, the 
current method was to use large-numbers exchange to obviate opportunism of this sort. 
However, the other firm in a similar position had at the time of interview reverted to an SSC 
arrangement. Key informants suggest that it considered a Supplementary Agreement to the 
NAECI in order to regulate its contractors in future. This suggests strongly that trade union 
agreements can assist in regulating contracts (not just contracts employment) and stabilising 
the contractors site, rather than just being about establishing wage rates. The fact that the 
non-union site which had internal maintenance workers and yet did not have an agreement 
seems to suggest that the agreement was a way of separating out the competing claims of two 
groups of employees - i.e. a rhetorical device, rather than having a simply substantive role 
There is more use of the market now in firms where there was previously extensive vertical 
integration. All of these have reduced their internal maintenance workforces on average by 
half or more, retaining asset-specific skills such as instrument mechanics and electricians and 
out-sourcing construction trades such as scaffoldcrs. In these firms, there were employers 
panels of some note, sometimes called Councils or Contractors Associations, but since the oil 
refinery clients had recendy derecognised their internal crafts trade unions - with One 
exception - there seemed less to discuss. Simultaneously the clients had reduced the numbers 
of contractors significantly - from hundreds down to tens or less - in most cases, so the panels 
became smaller, and because the contractors were on site more often - almost continually - 
the issues were able to be dealt with on an informal basis. 
To replace the panels, two related firms had specifically moved towards Alliances; two other 
refineries and one related chemical plant had moved to an integrated teams approach, a quasi-
alliance controlled by the client rather than jointly. Several had moved even fUrther, towards 
Partnership, in appointing SSCs. The plants where contracting-out of maintenance had been 
in situ for many years posted no changes to structures. These comprise two sites where there 
was no internal maintenance, one where there were no trade unions recognised, and a fourth 
site which recognised trade unions but had not changed its policy in recent times, though 
increased performance was of concern and ongoing changes to contracts the norm. 
Where there had been a changefrom hierarchy to market, however, a number of new 
contractual arrangements, structures and organisational changes externally and internally had 
occurred, but these were shown to be inadequate to counter opportunism. Two Fluid 
Catalytic Cracker turnarounds (in February/March 1966), and one full refinery shutdown 
involving several turnarounds on different units in 1997 were subjected to strikes of 
subcontractor workforces, and in two cases, the shutdown had to be extended. One refinery 
came back on stream for gasoiline production four weeks late, at a cost of hundreds of 
millions of pounds, the other refinery was three weeks late getting all of its production on 
stream, incurring a far larger cost 
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However, another plant completed its FCC turnaround sixteen days ahead of schedule, due in 
part to an 'alliancing' arrangement, which extended the organisational structure more towards 
the 'incorporation' end of the spectrum. Hence, the essential difference between panel-based 
or' allianced' contracting and simple prime and subcontracting is in the degree of 
commitment and incorporation which the various partners undertake. This is designed to 
economise on transaction costs by the sharing of competitive proprietary information and 
ideas, which reduce the bounded rationality. Similarly, by way of creating a commonality of 
goals, it will help to confine opportunism on the part of subcontractors. By concnetrating 
responsibility and sharing isdeas the involvement of the contractors mangers and empoloyees 
is a significant featrure in ensuring the earnings expaectations of the employees are managed 
by the contractors and the client. 
These findings suggest transaction cost theory, whilst espousing efficiency, whereas risk is 
the real issue 
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Derecognising Unions and Centralising 
Bargaining: analysing dualism in the oil and 
chemicals industries 
Marek Korczynski and Neil Ritson 
Loughborough Univorsit)i 	 University of Norihumbria 
at Newcastle 
ABSTRACT Therehas been arecent rise in employers derecognising unions.The oil and 
chemical industries have been identified as critical for the analysis and practice of 
derecognition. This paper presents data showing that major oil and chemical firms have, 
on the one hand, derecognised unions for key internal staff,but on the other hand, have 
enforced a centralised bargaining framework for their on-site contractors engaged in the 
out-sourced repair, maintenance and construction work. This centralised bargaining 
framework has strengthened the institutional position of trade unions. The paper analyses 
the key factors which have pushed the same employers to act in very different ways for the 
two sets of workers. It finds little evidence to support arguments thatastrong anti-union 
culture in the industries underlay employers' actions. Rather the evidence suggests that 
management have acted pragmaticallyin response to pressing short-term economic 
pressures. The different approaches to unions for the two sets of workers have been guided 
by the different economic objectives facing employers and by the different historical 
position of unions in helping or hindering to secure those objectives. The conclusion 
considers the implications of these findings for the future of derecognition in the UK. 
The last two decades have seen the birth of a trend of union derecognition by 
employers in the UK. This has contributed to what Towers (1997) has called the 
'representation gap' - the phenomenon in UK industrial relations where workers are 
increasingly left without an adequate independent collective voice mechanism. 
Studies suggest that while union derecognition has remained limited in its incidence 
and scope, there appears to be little doubt that it has become more widespread since 
the mid-198os. claydon (1989) was the first to note the rise of derecognition. His 
research suggested that derecognition was of relatively peripheral importance. Smith 
and Morton's (1990) study of the newspaper industry suggested the possibility that 
derecognition might be of more widespread importance but concluded that the 
newspaper industry was likely to be the exception rather than the rule for the UK 
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economy. Since then, however, a number of other studies by (e.g. Gregg and Yates 
1991; Millward 1994; Claydon 1996) have produced data to suggest that derecognition 
maybe becoming an important current of contemporary industrial relations. 
While there is a broad consensus on the extent of derecognition, interpretations 
of derecognition and analyses of its future have become key issues of debate. On the 
one hand the rise of derecognition and the fall in union density may suggest that the 
UK could be following the trajectory of USA industrial relations, albeit with a twenty 
to thirty year time lag. The argument here is that employers pursue derecognition 
because unions limit employers' discretion in determining the terms of the employ-
ment relationship. There is a central role here for management ideology and frames 
of reference (Fox 1974). Under a unitarist frame of reference, union interference in 
the employment relationship becomes something to be resisted, regardless of the 
effects of unions on economic objectives. Kochan a at (1986: 56) argue that for the 
USA strong anti-union values of management were a decisive factor in the growth of 
non-union industrial relations. 
For the UK, Kelly argues that the evidence on derecognition suggests employer 
antagonism to trade unions per se 'what employers object to is not a particular form 
of trade unionism but the very fact of its existence' (1996:89). Indeed, a number of 
individual case studies (Bacon 1999; Malloch 1992) suggest an important role for 
anti-union values. Woolfson a al. (1996) also relate the anti-union policies of multi-
national cofporations (MNC5) in the North Sea to the macho, anti-union philo-
sophy of management personnel, many of whom came from the USA (1996: 47). 
Higgs (House of Commons 1994), a national officer for the TGWU, also suggests that 
the union derecognition by oil and chemical MNCs is related to an imported anti-
union culture and a conspiracy in the industries. Proponents of this interpretation of 
derecognition can also point to the potential future impact of the growing 
managerial unitarism in the UK flowing from the rise in the (unitarist) rhetoric of 
human resource management. 
An alternative interpretation of derecognition is to see it as the latest example of 
the well-documented pragmatism of UK employers (Purcell and Sisson 1983). 
Within reactive, pragmatic derecognition (Claydon 1996) employers are likely to be 
motivated less by a strong unitarist ideology and more by a perception that unions 
are standing in the way of important short term economic objectives. The increased 
power of employers gives them the opportunity to act on this perception. Within this 
interpretation, there is a possibility that the limited derecognition that has taken 
place may have been highly context-specific to the conditions of the 198os and iggos, 
and so may wane overtime. Thus Smith and Morton (1990) highlight the key con-
textual factors that must be met before employers can confidently embark on cam' 
paigns of derecognition. They suggest that these contextual factors are unlikely to be 
commonplace in UK industry. Further, within this interpretation it is not assumed 
that managers will universally perceive unions as barriers to improved economic 
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performance. Rather where unions are seen as having a neutral effect on, or even 
supporting, employers' economic objectives then the institutional position of 
unions will not be challenged. 
From the above, at one end of a continuum there is a unitarist-driven, purposive 
derecognition, and at the other end is a pragmatist derecognition driven by per-
ceptions of unions as short-term barriers to better economic performance. However, 
it may also be that these motivations behind derecognition could be intertwined in 
practice. For instance, it may be that a growing prevalence of implicit unitarist 
assumptions among managers may in turn increase the likelihood that these same 
managers could see unions as barriers to better economic performance. Similarly, 
perceptions of unions as barriers to improved performance could underlay a growth 
in unitarism. For instance, in the USA it has been noted that a growth in the overt 
anti-union stance of many corporations coincided with the period when the union/ 
non-union wage differential was at its historical high-point (Kochan etal. 1986:70). 
Beyond the individual case studies discussed above, the evidence on why 
employers have derecognised unions in the UK is scarce. Gall and McKay (1994) have 
provided a breakdown of 'known reasons for derecognition' in 154 cases from union 
sources and the industrial press. Important listed reasons include 'low levels of union 
membership 'moves to performance related pay 'moves to single union/fewer 
unions and 'part of a wider dispute on pay, jobs and wnditions Unfortunately, it is 
hard to interpret these reasons in terms of the rival interpretative analyses of 
derecognition drawn out above. Some clear support for the pragmatist interpret-
ation, however, comes from Gall and McKay's statement that 'in a number of cases 
derecognition was threatened in response to what the employers saw as "union 
intransigence" (p. ui). However, in general the evidence is relatively weak, because 
as Gall and McKay admit, 'the employers have been quite reluctant to speak openly 
about their reasons for derecognition' (p. .i). 
in part to address this gap in the literature, this paper provides an analysis of a 
major restructuring of the status and role of unions within an important area of the 
economy - the oil and chemical industries. The industries are dominated by a small 
number of very large MNCs which act on a global scale. The industries often have 
been seen as emblematic of wider developments in UK industrial relations (Flanders 
1964; Purcell and Sisson 1983; Nichols and Beynon 1977). in addition, Ahlstrand 
(1989), Kelly (1996), Claydon (1996), and Tuckman (1998) have all identified the oil 
and chemical industries as critical ones for the analysis of union derecognition. 
This paper focuses on two employment groups in the oil and chemical industries 
whose job tasks overlap considerably and who occasionally work side-by-side. Both 
groups are involved in the planned and remedial maintenance of the oil and 
chemical plants. The first group, the internal craft workers, are directly employed by 
the MNCs. The second group, the external craft workers, are not directly employed 
by the MNCs. They are employees of mainly small, local contractor firms hired by 
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the MNCs. The MNC clients, however, centrally influence the nature of industrial 
relations of these workers. This point is elaborated below. These internal and 
external jobs typically include 'support' trades such as scaffolders, riggers, steel 
erectors, crane drivers, laggers, painters and joiners. They also include the 'black' 
trades of boiler-making, welding, fabrication and pipefitting, and the 'light' trades of 
calibration, rectification and repair of on-line instrumentation, and electrical and 
electronic equipment. Most external contractor staff are employed by single-skill 
contractors who use support trades from other specialist contractors. 
The following section of the paper details the research methods. The findings of 
widespread derecognition of unions for internal craft workers, and of widespread 
centralisation of bargaining for the contracted-out craft workers are presented in the 
third section. The fourth section provides an analysis of this dualism. The paper 
concludes by considering the implications of our analysis for the future of 
derecognition. 
Research Methods 
The research sample consisted of fifteen of the twenty plants belonging to the 
major oil and chemical companies in the UK. Given that research access was secured 
through a guarantee of confidentiality, the identity of the firms and plants cannot be 
revealed in this paper. Therefore, the identities of firms are hidden by a code. An 
upper case letter refers to the corporation, and the second, lower case, letter refers to 
differing plants owned by the same corporation. Ten oil refineries were included in 
the study, representing the major part of the oil industry. Only three refineries did 
not participate in the study. Five plants that were mainly associated parts of the oil 
majors represent the chemical industry. 
At the research sites interviews took place with maintenance managers. 
Documents, such as the contractors' trade unions agreements, were examined as well 
as more general documents describing the technology, site production units and 
facilities. In two cases, maintenance contracts were examined and in one case, 
extensive notes were made from several years of files relating to maintenance 
workers' industrial relations. Interviews were also undertaken with trade union 
officials - national and local level officers of trade unions that had experienced 
derecognition. The unions which participated were the TGWU, GMB, MSF and 
AEBU (Construction, Engineering and Electrical Sections separately). Two visits 
were made to a trade group representing all three unions. Finally, the Director of the 
National Joint Council for the Engineering Construction Industry and managers of 
three maintenance contracting firms were also interviewed. In all cases, typed inter-
view notes were returned to respondents as a check on validity. Any changes the 
respondents wished to make were incorporated into the final notes. In five cases out 
of forty, interviewees requested changes - minor in nature relating to small factual 
Derecognising Unions and Centralising Bargaining in the Oil and Chemicals Industries 	 423 
issues such as dates, periods of time and monetary amounts. Once the research data 
had been accumulated, the data was coded to allow an overall picture to emerge of 
the nature of changes undertaken by management, and the reasons for these 
changes. 
Findings on Derecognitlon and Centralisation 
Before presenting the findings some elaboration on the division between an 
internal and an external repair and maintenance workforce is required. It should be 
noted that the internal/external division of this workforce is not a new one. Oil and 
chemical firms have traditionally maintained an internal workforce which is 
engaged in ongoing remedial maintenance work (Gallie 1978).At the same time they 
have also relied on the workforces of specialist contractors to undertake large 
planned repair and maintenance events. In the 19805 and 19905 the absolute size of 
both workforces has shrunk, while the external workforce has grown in proportion 
to that of the internal workforce. l'ypically, rigging, lagging, scaffolding, and crane-
driving work have been out sourced. At Mobil Coryton this occurred as early as 1984 
(Young 1986). The final major outsourcing was undertaken in 1994 by firm G where 
management transferred several hundred workers to a single-site services con-
tractor. This shrinking of the core and increased use of outsourcing exactly mirrored 
the wider corporate restructuring by the MNCs in this period (Cibin and Grant 
1996). 
Derecognition of unions for internal craft workers 
A large majority of the oil and chemical MNCs have derecognised unions for 
their internal craft maintenance workers. Ahlstrand (1990) has shown that in 1970 
Esso Fawley managers were seeking a strategic shift in industrial relations towards a 
non-union basis. Central to this aim was the tactic of shifting occupational 
groupings into staff status gradually over time, beginning with store workers in 1974. 
Although this process was stalled for some years it was concluded in 1993 when the 
TGWU's bargaining rights on behalf of 700 process operators were withdrawn 
(Claydon 1996). Malloch (1991) has also detailed a long-term process of derecog-
nition in action at Tioxide which began in 1980. 
While Ahistrand and Malloch provide illuminating glimpses into derecognition 
by two major firms over a longer time period, Claydon (1996) has focused on 
developments in the early 1990S in a wider number of oil and chemical firms. He 
provides evidence that 'step-by-step dismantling of collective bargaining has been 
carried out by management at Esso, BP, Shell, and Mobil, and at Tioxide UK, Scottish 
Agricultural Industries, and Pfizer' (1996: 163). Claydon's convincing picture of a 
wider process of derecognition relies primarily upon secondary sources although he 
also makes use of primary evidence from the late 198os. We seek to build on Claydon's 
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Table I 
Status of unions with regard to Internal craft 
malntenanceworkers 
Site 	 Union role in collective bargaining 
A:a 	 Derecognised 1993 
A:b. Derecognised 1992/93 
B 	 Derecognised 'o 
C 	 Non-union site since inception 
D* 	 No Union recognition since 1993 
E 	 Non-union site since inception 
F 	 Non-union site since inception 
G 	 Craft unions nationally recognised 
i-La 	 Derecognised 1991 
H:b Derecognised 1991 
I: a 	 Derecognised 1993 
i:b 	 Derecognised 1993 
Derecognised 1993 
K 	 Derecognised 1997 
L 	 Craftunionsnationallyrecogniscd 
Note 
* In 1993 redundancies left in employment only staff 
technicians, forwhom there is no union recognition. 
work by using contemporary primary evidence to create a more complete and up-to-
date picture of derecognition in the oil and chemical industries. Table i portrays the 
cumulative picture by 1998 of the impact of derecognition for the MNCs' internal 
craft maintenance workers. The table gives data on the union role with regard to 
collective bargaining. 
The 'new wave' of derecognition of the remaining internal craft trade unions 
began with plant B's 1990 mass derecognition. The strategy of derecognition was, 
according to documents and interviews, only enacted after the failure of local 
negotiations with the three craft unions. Plant B managers by-passed the local 
officials and directed their staff-status suggestions to the craft workers. These 
workers eventually took up the offer, to the dismay of their officials. Another refinery 
in the same area derecognised the craft workforce at a single stroke, simultaneously 
transferring them to a joint venture partner. The transfer of the craft workers to staff 
status automatically meant that there was no role for unions because by 1990 no 
refinery recognised unions for workers in staff grades. Only two of the plants had 
ever recognised unions for staff workers - at plant A:a the MSF had had recognition, 
and at plant B, the staff section of the TGWU had had recognition. In both cases 
derecognition of the staff unions had occurred a number of years before the transfer 
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of craft workers to staff status. In sum, the findings in Table i augment Claydon's 
evidence to show that by the mid-199os unions' collective bargaining role had been 
all but swept away for internal craft workers. 
Centralisation of bargaining in external repair and maintenance work 
At the same time as many MNCs were derecognising unions for their internal 
craft workers, they were changing bargaining arrangements for the contracted-out 
repair and maintenance work. Where change occurred, the MNCs either moved 
towards centralised collective bargaining arrangements, or introduced single-union 
agreements. In no case did change lead to an attack on the collective bargaining role 
of trade unions perse. 
The changes are detailed in Table 2. The first thing to note is the extent of change. 
In ten of the fifteen plants studied there was a major change in collective bargaining 
in the period. The second thing to note is the nature of change. Managers in over half 
of the plants had placed their contractor work under the jurisdiction of the National 
Agreement for the Engineering Construction Industry (NAECI). The NAECI is 
Table 2 
CollectIve bargaining arrangements for contractor work 
Collective bargaining 	 Collective bargaining 
Site 	 arrangements 1991 	 arrangements 1998 
A:a Site agreement 
Site agreement 
B Site agreement 
C Non-union site 
D Client-wide agreement 
E Contractors' own agreements 
F Contractors own agreements 
C Work undertaken internally, 
under union agreement 
H:a Client-wide agreement 
H:b Client-wide agreement 
NAECI-SA 
Single union agreement 
Single union agreement 
Non-union site 
Client-wide agreement 
Contractors' own agreements 
Contractors' own agreements 
NAECI-SA 
(after contracting out) 
NAECI-SA 
NAECI-SA 
I:a NAECI NAECI-5A 
Lb Site agreement NAECI-SA 
Site agreement NAECI-SA 
K NAECI NAECI-SA 
L Site agreement NAECI-SA 
Notes 
* NAECI-SA stands for National Agreement for the Engineering Construction Industry - 
SupplementaryAgreement 
** In 1993 at thissite, a single union agreementwas signedwith theAEEU.The client moved to the 
NAECI-SA in March1997. 
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negotiated by the National Joint Council for the Engineering Construction Industry 
which comprises multiple unions and employer associations. It is a form of cen-
tralised collective bargaining (Korczynski 1997). The Supplementary Agreement to 
the NAECI allows for narrow site-specific deviations within the overall structure of 
the national agreement. The site deviations must first of all be approved by a 
committee of the NIC, which plays an active role in the policing and enforcing of the 
agreement. Authority, thus, rests at the national level. 
Within the NAECI there is a strong institutional position for the official unions. 
Not only are national union officials accorded a role in the NIC and its many 
committees, but there is also a legitimate role accorded to local officials and stewards 
to sit on site-based project joint councils. Further, the agreement has tended to 
militate against the use of labour-only sub-contractors. This is important for trade 
unionism because labour-only sub-contractors tend to be non-unionised (Ball 
1988). As Korczynski (1997) has shown, the NAECI is much more than the sort of 
'paper' procedural form of national agreement that used to characterise British 
industrial relations in the l96os and 1970S. As such, adoption of the NAECI should be 
interpreted as strengthening the institutional position of trade unions. 
The oil and chemical MNCs, as clients, played the decisive role in transforming 
these collective bargaining arrangements. Korczynski (1997) has shown that historic-
ally, these firms have been central in determining the collective bargaining arrange-
ments for external construction and maintenance work of their plants. In the 
research, interviewees uniformly stated that the clients were the instigators of the 
changes detailed in Table a. On sites, contractor firms come together in collective 
bargaining forums that rely on ratification by the client. Further, the contractor 
repair and maintenance industry is characterised by a large numbers of small 
contractors. The small and unorganised contractor firms have little option but to 
follow the dictates of the MNC clients in the determination of industrial relations 
arrangements. 
Accounting for Dualism 
Taken together, the findings constitute evidence of industrial relations 
policies in the oil and chemical industries pulling in apparently opposite directions. 
We would expect that if management's approach to the status of unions was guided 
by an anti-union culture then management should have derecognised and/or 
marginalised unions for both sets of workers. Given that this was not the case the 
evidence so far makes a prima facie case against interpreting management actions as 
primarily informed by an anti-union culture. To make a stronger case for this and to 
really understand the dualism of the MNCs, four further questions need to be 
addressed. First, why have the MNCs derecognised unions representing their 
internal workers? Second, why have they consolidated the institutional position of 
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unions organising workers in external maintenance work? Third, can the changes in 
industrial relations for the external work be interpreted as a staging post towards 
derecognition? Finally, why has there been such similarity in the approach of these 
MNCs? 
Why derecognise unions for internal craft workers? 
Here we find greater support for the idea that employers were primarily 
acting pragmatically in response to a perception that unions stood in the way of 
pressing economic objectives. The firms that led the way on derecognition were Esso 
at Fawley and firm B. Ahlstrand (iggo) has shown how Fawley management's desire 
for derecognition followed the failure of productivity agreements to deliver what 
management wanted in the 19605. Ahlstrand (p.170) argues that 'Fawley managers 
came ... to believe that productivity improvements could really only be made in a 
union-free environment.' This supports the pragmatist thesis that management was 
motivated not by the presence of trade unions per Se, but rather by their perceptions 
of the economic effects of trade unions. 
Plant B is a vital case for the new wave of derecognition in the 1990S because it was 
the first to act to derecognise unions for their craft workers. Plant B managers 
derecognised unions because they saw them as barriers to important economic 
objectives. In both 1965 and 1984 management had sought to increase efficiency by 
concluding flexibility agreements with the craft trade unions. These agreements 
sought to eradicate demarcations, but both failed to deliver their aims. Young (1986) 
shows how the 1965 agreement was eroded over time through active shop steward 
defence of traditional trade areas, with the aid of management pragmatism in the 
context of a buoyant product market. Similarly, while the 1984 agreement promised 
on paper that 'craftsmen will undertake refinery maintenance work in a fully flexible 
manner without any demarcations and restrictions' (Young 1986: 377), practice 
turned out to be very different. Young's follow-up research (1992) showed that 
management at the end of the ig8os perceived that strong demarcations still existed. 
At the same time, product market pressure began to be more keenly felt. 
At plant B, one manager said that pressure was being put on the UK's over-
capacity refineries to make money, and that it had been noted that maintenance costs 
were very high in the UK compared with the Pacific Rim refineries. He stated that the 
Pacific Rim refineries could apparently achieve ao per cent return on capital 
employed while UK affiliates struggled with i—io per cent. The pressures were such 
that at another plant a manager stated that it was imperative that management was 
seen to be attempting to take any kind of initiative, almost regardless of the content 
of that initiative. At plant B, management, having twice tried to increase efficiency by 
agreement with trade unions, and having twice failed, tried once again. Management 
called meetings with the officials of the craft unions and demanded that the 
fiexibilities of the 1984 agreement be honoured. According to management 
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interviewees, the union officials were obstructive. Some of these officials had been 
former militant construction stewards and trust on both sides was low. Both 
management and union officials reported that at this meeting the officials had called 
the (German) refinery manager, a 'Nazi' and a 'Fascist After this meeting the 
manager decided that 'these people are not good for my business After two failed 
agreements and clear difficulties in moving towards a third, it was perhaps not 
surprising that management saw unions as barriers to pressing economic objectives. 
Other plants followed a similar pattern to company H where a mid-198os agree-
ment on flexibility was concluded with the craft unions, and was perceived by 
management at the end of the decade to have been a failure. Unions were seen as key 
barriers to pressing economic objectives. At plant A:a, a manager stated that a key 
factor in this perception was the 'internecine squabbles' that took place between 
unions. These 'squabbles' had led him to think of unions on the site as 'antediluvian 
dinosaurs In addition, Tuckman (1998:142) has noted that BP Hull management's 
desire to derecognise unions stemmed from their perception of unions as barriers to 
better performance: 'they [managers] saw one of the principal objectives ... as 
"freeing up individuals to make the maximum contribution".., for which the main 
constraint was trade union demarcation The cases where there was no derecog-
nition were also consistent with the pragmatist thesis. At plants G and L management 
stated that sufficient flexibility had already been obtained in earlier agreements with 
the unions. Where unions were not perceived as barriers to immediate economic 
objectives they were not derecognised. - 
These points support the pragmatist thesis and, indeed, arguments of an anti-
union culture driving derecognition are hard to sustain in the light of Young's 
description of Mobil's management as recently as the mid-198os : 'the company fully 
accepted the legitimacy of the union role' (p.364). Crucially, also, evidence from firm 
B that management in the early 199os tried to work with trade unions to increase 
flexibility runs counter to the idea of a strong anti-union culture. Further, the chain 
reaction of other firms following firm B owed less to a latent anti-union culture than 
to a bandwagon process in which highly pressurised managers stumbled for 
initiatives which were informed by beiichmarking and a lack of alternatives. This 
point is elaborated below. In addition, the decision to derecognise unions was taken 
by local refinery management and was not dictated to them by corporate 
management as part of a company-wide anti-union approach. Files inspected at 
plant B showed that while corporate headquarters were kept in touch regarding 
developments, there was no decisive intervention from the corporate level to 
determine the substantive outcome of local management deliberations. This is in 
line with Cibin and Grant's (1996) characterisation of the MNCs restructuring 
towards decentralised decision-making. 
While the balance of the evidence lends greater support to the 'pragmatist' 
explanation of derecognition, this is not to deny any role for management and wider 
Derecognising Unions and Centralising Bargaining in the Oil and Chemicals Industries 429 
societal values as an important background factor. Indeed, at one plant a manager 
pointed to the influence of the Conservative governments as an important legiti-
mator of anti-union action. He noted that suddenly,'Thatcher made it airight to take 
on the unions In this way pragmatism and a shift in values became intertwined in 
informing management actions. Further local management actions must be placed 
in the context of wider corporate HRM/cultural initiatives within the firms which 
can be seen as congruent with union marginalisation and derecognition. As Cibin 
and Grant (1996) note, a corollary of these MNCs decentralising was the growth of 
'cultural change' programmes to provide the glue to maintain the wider corporation 
as a social as well as a financial unit. Such initiatives, while never explicitly anti-
union, were consistently informed by unitarist language and metaphors, variously 
centring on the 'empowerment' of individual staff members, 'flexibility', 'entre-
preneurship', 'teamwork', the firm as a 'family', and the shared commitment between 
workers and management to achieve standards of 'excellence' in meeting customer 
needs. 
In addition some corporate-wide HRM initiatives progressively marginalised 
unions through the establishment of forms of consultation and participation which 
did not involve a role for the unions. While all local management in the plants had 
had exposure of some level to these corporate-level initiatives, only at firm H did 
respondents state that such initiatives had informed their actions regarding the role 
of unions. When we asked our line-manager respondents why their firm had acted as 
it had, we were struck by the way in which managers consistently stressed their 
individual plant's pressing economic objectives and the way in which they did not 
allude to the wider corporate HR intitiatives. While such initiatives may have subtly 
affected the background assumptions, or 'lifeworld? (Giorgi 1970), of these 
managers, the managers did not perceive them as having directly informed their 
actions. Indeed, there was evidence of considerable cynicism regarding such 
initiatives, with one manager at plant B stating that 'there is nothing to distinguish 
one programme of cuts from another', except the title given to them by the corporate 
headquarters. The exception was at firm H where the Chief Executive Officer had 
outlined a number of areas of the business to be examined by local management to 
see if barriers to efficiency could be removed. One area involved the topic of trade 
union agreements. It was discussions on this topic within this corporate-wide 
intiative which led to renegotiations of the craft agreements and finally to 
derecognition. 
Our explanation of derecognition, taking a historical perspective, also intri-
guingly suggests that just as earlier flexibility agreements have failed, so it maybe that 
the current flexibility arrangements may not deliver all that management are aiming 
for. This would echo other research into the relative deficiencies of UK management 
(Nichols 1986). Additionally, it should not necessarily be assumed that derecognition 
has wiped away all forms of shopfloor organisation. Clearly, further research is 
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needed on this question, but fragmentary evidence from one plant suggests that 
there is still a quasi-union presence on the shopfloor. At this plant, management stifi 
used the previous shop-steward organisation as an important tool for communi-
cation and consultation. Before a recent re-organisation of work, management 
consulted with the craft workers and in doing so used the ex-shop stewards as the 
representatives of the workforce (Ritson 1999a). Further, Higgs, national officer of 
the TGWU, has stated that his union has maintained, and in some areas, increased, 
membership levels (quoted in The Independentl5 April 98). Tuckman (1998) also 
notes that at a number of BP sites shop stewards have maintained a presence around 
newly constructed consultation procedures, and around health and safety. As is 
discussed in the conclusion, the recent legislation on union recognition may also 
inspire management to actively reconstitute union representation in fear of it being 
imposed on them via the legislation. Indeed at firm H, having derecognised unions, 
management has begun preliminary discussions on establishing a 'partnership' 
arrangement with the same unions. 
Why consofldate the institutional position of unions in contracted-out 
work? 
Our analysis suggests that the centralisation of bargaining for the external 
workers has also been driven by management pragmatically responding to 
immediately pressing economic objectives. Crucially, however, there are different 
economic considerations at stake for the external group than for the internal 
workforce, and there is a different history regarding the role of unions in securing 
efficiencies. For the external workforce, management has aimed to cut hold-ups 
caused by unofficial strikes in critical maintenance/construction phases. In pursuing 
this aim, management has sought to work with official union structures, knowing 
that in the past, during construction of plants, these official structures have 
minimised hold-ups. 
The MNCs have begun to favour centralised bargaining because of a number of 
recent costly unofficial strikes. The strikes occurred at the critical time of unit 
'turnaround' when a unit is shut down for a period. The lack of production in this 
period represents lost revenue that cannot be recouped by the firms because at other 
times plants are run at full capacity. Cross (1989) has estimated that the lost profit can 
amount to $6o-9o,000 per hour of lost production. At three major plant turnarounds 
there have been unofficial strikes. Two of these strikes were very costly to the MNC 
clients. The minor strike involved 43  staff at plant B. Three thousand workers were 
involved in the strike at plant F that caused a stoppage of production in other units at 
the plant. The unofficial strike at plant J,  though lasting only one week, delayed the 
start-up of the production unit by four weeks. One of the key potential and actual 
causes of disputes at the time of turnarounds has been leapfrog bargaining, in which a 
contractor workforce demands more money on the basis of comparison with 
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contractors either on the same site, or on another site. The potential for leapfrog 
bargaining is minirnised through an effective national agreement such as the NAECJ. 
The NAECI has appeared doubly attractive to the MNC clients because it has a 
track record of helping to cut local unofficial leapfrog militancy. The NAECI 
originally was to cover the construction sites in the engineering construction 
industry which in the 1960$ and 1970$ had experienced very high levels of local 
unofficial militancy (NEDO 1970,1976). The 1981 NAECI contributed to a dramatic 
fall-away in militancy in the industry (Korczynski 1997) and this has ensured 
continued employer support for the national framework. When, in 1993, the NJC for 
the industry specifically devised the Supplementary Agreement to cater for repair 
and maintenance work, a large number of the major MNC clients seized the 
opportunity to centralise bargaining for their external maintenance work. 
For the external work, MNCs wanted to cut the threat of costly hold-ups and 
perceived that official union structures were a mechanism for delivering this. For the 
internal work, management perceived unions to be an obstruction to achieving 
increased flexibility. In these pragmatic terms there is little surprise that MNCs have 
acted so differently regarding the role of unions for the two sets of workers. 
Is centralisation of bargaining a staging post to derecognition? 
It maybe argued that the contrasting approaches to unions is the product of a 
time-lag - that the change in industrial relations for the contractor workforces is but 
a staging post in a longer term strategy of seeking non-unionised status for the 
external work. Thus it is necessary to consider the evidence on whether the changes 
in the 19905 can be seen as a precursor of derecognition to come. Ostensibly, the 
staging post argument may be supported by the emergence of single-union agree-
ments at two sites, because such agreements are congruent with an overall union 
exclusion approach (Smith and Morton 1993). It can also be argued that contracted-
out work has been spared from derecognition purely for tactical reasons in that it is 
inadvisable for the MNCs to fight on two fronts at once. Indeed, notably, the MNCs 
have used the option of contracting-out as a key tool of coercion in dealing with their 
internal staff. At plant B, the refinery manager stated that the threat of using more 
contracted-out work gave them greater power over the internal craft workers. It is no 
great surprise that workers voted 'freely' for staff status and the derecognition of 
unions on many sites, not only when a pay increase was dependent on the vote, but 
also when the threat of contracting-out was so apparent. 
Despite these points, overall our analysis suggests that, at present, the develop-
ments in the 19905 cannot be seen as a staging post to derecognition. First, the very 
factors that pushed the majority of MNCs towards a centralised bargaining system - 
the threat of unofficial action and the high costs of that - remain pressing issues. 
Second, from the interview and documentary research, it is clear that management 
have not acted with derecognition as the strategic goal. While it may be that in 
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interviews management would not seek to advertise derecognition as a strategic 
intention, the further documentary research and follow-up related interviews that 
were possible - at firm B - confirmed that there was no clearly formulated strategy 
aimed at ultimate derecognition. Documents which put forward the options for 
change presented a range of options - from NAECI, to single-union agreements, to 
partial derecognition, to complete derecognition. There was no suggestion in the 
documents or related interviews that derecognition should be the ultimate end goal. 
Eventually, the firm chose the option of a single-union agreement, having been 
persuaded by national officials of the AEEU of the benefits of the union's 
'commitment to change and its desire for 'prosperity for its members through 
embracing thEfuture - 
Other factors which militate against the option of derecognition are the generally 
low level of trust between MNC clients and their contractors (Korczynski 1994j 1996, 
1999), and the MNCs' perception of a lack of professionalism in contractor manage-
ment (Ritson 1999b). Where there is less than full confidence in the abilities of 
management to implement policies, this will weigh heavily against pursuing 
derecognition. Significantly, at plant G the refinery manager expressed concern 
regarding the HRM capability of contractor management. Young (1986) similarly 
notes that management at Mobil perceived a lack of professionalism in the managers 
of contracting firms. He also points out that among many contractor managers there 
is a latent union sympathy in that many had served their time in craft trades in union 
membership. Further, given the high levels of casualisation in the contractor sector it 
is extremely difficult to see how derecognition could be presented as part of an 
increase in organisational citizenship, as it was for the MNC internal staff. 
Finally, an analysis of the changes made to collective bargaining in the 199os 
shows that the single-union agreements that were adopted were concluded in the 
early 199os, while changes in the mid-199os (once the NAECI-SA became available) 
have been towards the NAECI. Indeed, plant l:a adopted a single-union agreement in 
1993, but switched to the NAECI-SA in 197.  In addition, changes were considered in 
1997 at Plant F that continue to work under contractors' own agreements. The only 
option seriously considered was not derecognition but adoption of the NAECI-SA. 
This is especially noteworthy because plant F had never recognised unions for its 
internal workforce, and had actively sought to maintain this status, but had been 
close to enforcing a strong position for unions with regard to external work. 
Analysing similarities in MNCs' approaches 
The wave of derecognition that occurred between 1990 and 1993 was detailed 
above. In this period, nine plants derecognised unions for craft workers, leaving a 
situation where only two of the plants had union recognition. The paper also 
detailed how between 1991 and 1997 ten of the fifteen plants underwent a major 
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change in the collective bargaining arrangements of the external work, leaving a 
situation where only six of the plants did not come under the NAECI jurisdiction. 
Why has there been so much similarity in the approach of the MNCs? 
A key factor to consider is that these oligopolistic firms act in a shared product 
market and hence are faced by the same pressures. Notwithstanding the oppor-
tunities for strategic choice, contingency theory (Donaldson 1985) would suggest 
that firms will tend to react in broadly similar ways when faced with similar environ-
mental changes. Indeed, given that the MNCs have acted very similarly on a global 
corporate scale (Cibin and Grant 1996), we might expect them to follow this pattern 
with regard to industrial relations arrangements domestically. In addition, research 
has shown that these MNCs frequently undertake informal information-sharing. 
For instance, Rainbird (1991:116) detailed managers from other plants being given 
informal information on developments at Shell Carrington. Ritson (1997) shows that 
in 1990 managers at one plant undertook a survey of industrial arrangements among 
contracted-out repair and maintenance work in the major UK oil and chemical 
plants. This survey gained a ioo per cent response rate and the findings were shared 
among participants. A number of the managers interviewed stated that they had on 
occasion contacted the managers of other firms in the industry to collect updated 
information on the latest industrial relations developments. Tuckman (1998) also 
notes that BP sites undertook benchmarking exercises in the early 199oS to compare 
their own forms of work organisation with other plants in and outside the industries. 
More formally, the MNCs are members of the Petroleum Employers Council which 
meets not for collective bargaining purposes, but for information-sharing. In 
additon, the MNCs are members of the Capital Projects Client Group, a relatively 
loose association of clients concerned with construction in which the primary 
purpose is information sharing. While there clearly has been significant information-
sharing among the MNCs' managers, there is no clear evidence to support Riggs 
assertion that the MNCs have bound together covertly and agreed to ad in similar 
ways (Higgs in House of Commons 1994). 
Finally and crucially, the similarity of MNC behaviour has arisen from the 
mimetic behaviour of managers (DiMaggio and Powell 1991) under pressure and 
driven by short term financial considerations (Ritson 1997). A manager at plant A:b 
stated that, 
we were in trouble. The plant looked like it was going to dose so we had to be seen to be 
doing something.Anythingwould have done butnert door [i.e. a nearby plant] had 
derecognised the crafts and gone for a single-union deal for contractors' crafts... It took 
them ages butwe hadn't the time and did it all at one fell swoop .... Wehad to showwe 
were in control of the plant orit would have shut. 
In sum, the similarity of MNC approaches appears to be the outcome of a 
'bandwagon' process (Labour Research Department 1992), rather than the product 
of a deliberate, conscious, co-operative strategy. 
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Conclusion 
The paper has provided evidence that the oil and chemical MNCs have 
created a segmented repair and maintenance workforce - one internally employed, 
and one externally. For the internal staff they have derecognised unions, and for the 
external staff they have enforced centralised bargaining arrangements. Management 
actions have been informed primarily by pragmatic concerns relating to 
immediately pressing economic objectives rather than by entrenched anti-union 
values. That their policies have flown in different directions for the two groups 
relates, first, to the qualitatively different economic objectives facing management 
and, second, to the different historical record of the unions in aiding the achievement 
of the respective economic objectives. For external workers, management perceived 
that unions were capable of aiding their objectives, while for internal workers, 
management had come to see unions as barriers to economic objectives. 
What implications does this analysis hold for the future of derecognition? We can 
say that if these industries are indicative of wider trends then derecognition in the 
UK appears not to parallel derecognition in the USA. In the USA a decisive factor 
underpinning derecognition and union avoidance has been the deeply held anti-
union values of management. Our data showed little evidence of such values. 
Moreover, it can be argued that if UK management were to hold strong anti-union 
values then the USA-owned MNCs featured in this study would be the place to find 
them. Indeed, in the USA many oil and chemical MNCs were the pioneers of union 
avoidance and derecognition (Kochan a al. 1986). Their absence makes the case 
against interpreting derecognition as primarily value-driven all the stronger. 
However, this does not mean that we can assume that because derecognition is not a 
value-driven phenomenon then it will fade away. Our data supports the pragmatist 
interpretation of derecognition such that managers have derecognised unions when 
they perceived them as barriers to pressing economic objectives, and when they had 
the ability to act on this perception. To consider the likely future of derecognition, 
therefore, we need to consider both management perception of unions as barriers to 
better performance, and management ability to act on this perception. 
On management perception, our analysis has some reassurance for unions. In 
our study, management, for the external work, actually perceived unions as helping 
economic objectives. For internal crafiwork, it was the strong and persistent craft 
demarcations that led to the perception of unions as barriers to better performance. 
Such craft demarcations are far from an economy-wide phenomenon at the end of 
the 199os. Indeed most research suggests that management's perèeption of unions as 
barriers to efficiency is generally the exception rather than the rule. This is true even 
in engineering and manufacturing establishments where the existence of multiple 
craft unions is not uncommon. For instance, Wiley's Engineering Employers' 
Federation study of union recognition and representation in engineering showed 
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that many managers (about two thirds) thought unions helped rather than hindered 
with changing work rules (Willey, 1986:36). Further, Dobson's (1997) study of the 
effects of multi-unionism in large manufacturing establishments showed that 
management generally did not perceive that multi-unionism harmed com-
petitiveness. 
On the issue of management's ability to act on their perceptions, current legis-
lation would generally preclude derecognition as a management option where 
unions have over 5o per cent of the workers in membership (Employment Relations 
Act 1999). If this legislation had been in place in the early 199os it is highly unlikely 
that management would have attempted derecognition because of the very high 
levels of union membership in the plants. A number of commentators have 
suggested that the legislation will curb derecognition in the UK for this very reason 
(Wood 1997). Indeed, the plants in our study are likely to be key arenas where unions 
will seek to use the new legislation to regain collective bargaining rights. As such, the 
industries will remain a key arena for examining the future of British industrial 
relations. 
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15 The quest for productivity 
revisited, or just 
'derecognition by the 
back door'? 
Neil Ritson 
Abstract 
While the oil and chemicals plants' productivity objectives are a distinct, 
well-documented feature in the various oil refinery studies, any mention of 
contractors is only in passing and without any coherent theme (Flanders, 1964; 
Oldfield 1966; Gallie, 1978; Young, 1986; Ahlstrand, 1990), the problems of 
management by the clients of the contracted work are seldom mentioned in the literature despite the 
prevalence of contracting out of maintenance in UK 
industry. This chapter uncovers the employee relations implications for contractors in the engineering 
construction industry engaged in the repair and maintenance operations of a large UK oil refinery. 
This process of contracting-out was controlled by means of a change in the 
industrial relations arrangements. The contracting firms benefited from their 
client's strategy of increasing productivity through 'numerical flexibility', which 
culminated in the transfer of more work and of many of the client's maintenance workers to the 
contractor firms. 
To increase managerial control of this work, a single union agreement' 
(SUA) was devised for the contractors' workforces, by which route the other 
unions were derecognised. This agreement was imported from other industries, 
re-written by the client management and then imposed on the contractors in an attempt to change the 
endemic culture on the refinery site. The National Agreement for Engineering Construction (NAECI) 
was considered and rejected, as it did not serve this purpose. The client refinery thus created a 
controversial industry 'first', which was copied by two other refiners, and which indirectly led to 
changes in the NAECI. 
This change is analysed under the frameworks of transaction cost economics 
(TCE), and institutional theory, with its notions of'isomorphism' or 'industry 
recipes' 
The critical discourse of efficiency, it will be argued, is based in the first 
instance on managerial ideology, followed by, where possible, measurable 
data. In its absence, under conditions of uncertainty and complexity, firms 
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seek to copy the strategies of others, creating 'isomorphism' or 'industry 
recipes' 
Implications for the wider construction industry are then discussed. 
Keywords: engineering, contracting, efficiency and ideology. 
15.1 Introduction 
The chapter is organised under seven sections. First, the engineering construction 
industry is introduced and explained in relation to the broader construction 
industry. The low-productivity culture of contracting is then discussed. The next 
section addresses the shortcomings of the literature on the industry by reference 
to two major theoretical approaches: transaction cost economics and institutional 
theory. The following section combines the earlier discussions to discuss the 
nature of ideology and its role in creating isomorphism or recipes for productivity. 
The research study is then described, followed by discussion and analysis 
of the contribution of economic and institutional factors to its results. The chapter 
concludes with some general issues for construction. 
15.2 The Engineering Construction Industry 
The construction industry contains a wide spread of task and skills, and in its 
wider definition it incorporates the engineering construction industry sector 
(Ed). Work in this sector is based on the use and manipulation of metal, usually 
on the sites of large clients. The ECI is different from the wider construction 
industry in this important respect: it is based on narrow, capital-intensive 
industry markets, where specialist clients buy from specialist contractors. There 
is no wholesale or retail segment as there is in house building, for example. The 
ECI's clients are very large enterprises: owners of power stations, offshore platforms 
and rigs and, of particular importance for our discussion, oil and chemical 
installations. 
The Engineering Construction Industry Training Board's sector development 
plan states: 
The engineering construction industry has a big impact on the UK economy, 
directly contributing around 1.5 per cent of GDP. The importance goes 
beyond direct GDP contribution, because engineering construction underpins 
the UK production of crucial products such as oil, gas, chemicals and 
power generation. Around 50,000 people are employed in the industry in 
both site and offsite (design and procurement) work. The type of site work 
has changed in the last decade as fewer new build projects have been undertaken. 
Repair and maintenance work now makes up the majority of work in 
the sector. 
(ECITB, 2005:1) 
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The ECI itself is therefore split into two distinct spheres: construction of plant - 
'new builds' ,clearly forming part of the construction sector - and the repair and 
maintenance (R&M) of existing plant. In R&M, the work relates to construction 
in two ways. First, and most importantly, the short-term nature of contracting 
work and its 'atmosphere' or culture is identical. Indeed, large maintenance 
projects - 'shutdowns' or 'tumarounds' - closely resemble construction projects. 
Secondly, the ECI finns involved in repair and maintenance also operate in wider 
construction activity. Hence this chapter has implications beyond its initial 
context, as will become apparent. 
The industry originated in construction works undertaken by a number of 
separate firms from widely differing backgrounds. These firms had different 
employer associations, and each had its own set of relationships and its particular 
employee relations policies and agreements. Tasks involved relatively simple 
sheet steelwork (using the 'Outside Steelwork Erection Agreement', for 
example) and more complex projects involving boiler-making (using the 'Water 
Tube Agreement'). These and other agreements, though detailed in terms of 
'works rules' (as Salamon, 2000 describes them), were not necessarily about 
efficiency. They were more about systematically separating out spheres of 
influence, predominantly not only between client and contractor workforces, but 
also between the different groups within the ECI firms, which were usually 
single trade (e.g. scaffolding, lagging, and welding). This separation related to a 
discourse about the various employer power-bases and their ability to get work 
and, given the insecurity of the contracting environment, this in turn gave rise to 
multi-unionism. 
This diversity was problematic as it led to huge delays in the UK's major 
construction projects, particularly power stations. Accordingly, the government 
commissioned the National Economic Development Office to investigate and 
make recommendations. Its report 'Large Industrial Sites' was finally published 
in 1970 (NEDO, 1970). The separation of the flullIScompetences and singletrade 
working was not highlighted; instead, the labour issues were considered 
significant. 
The report suggested that 50 per cent of hours in the ECI were unproductive. 
Three quarters of the labour force was composed of a temporary, drifting 
mass, often paid 'on the lump' By this means - popular with employees- income 
tax and National Insurance was not paid and employees often used aliases to 
avoid detection by the authorities (Austrin, 1980). Such arrangements contributed 
to a low-quality/low-pay culture which featured inter-craft 'demarcation disputes' 
and 'leapfrogging claims'. This latter occurred where unions on one site copied 
the negotiated agreement of another- and this then in turn was copied by others. 
The Report recommended a National Agreement (NAECI) and a National 
Joint Council (NJC) to oversee it. This Agreement was not finally signed-off 
until 1981, ten years later, when its importance was politically recognised: the 
Labour government actively pushed for its establishment (Korczynski, 1996). 
According to Garfit (1989), with this new structure and its processes the ECI 
then became an entity. The NAECI, he suggested, initiated a new era and led to 
a more coherent industry. Negotiated by disparate and competing employers and 
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unions, the NAECI formed some kind of normative consensus, though very long 
and complex with 120 pages (National Joint Council, 1994).Williams(1989) the 
NJC chair at the time, wrote an article for Personnel Management magazine in 
which he described the subsequent increase in engineering construction industry 
productivity over the period 1980-89 as 'Construction's in miracle'. 
However, the ECI's clients, who all had their own parochial site agreements, 
rejected the NAECI for Repair and Maintenance work. There is little in the 
literature concerning these agreements despite the fact that maintenance costs 
have a considerable indirect effect on overall costs: Whiston (1988) presented 
evidence that even minor maintenance failures, consolidated over the year, 
ensured that no profits for the year were declared by two plants. 
There is a widespread use of contracting to lower costs in the UK generally 
(Atkinson, 1984), particularly in the oil and chemicals sector (Cross, 1989). 
Keenoy (1979) in his 'Lagger's Tale', describes how contracted-in employees in 
the repair and maintenance area are paid considerably less than client employees, 
creating conflict. 
The general lack of capital investment in the UK has also featured in the 
literature (Blyton and Turnbull, 1998), and the use of contractors avoids 
extensive capital costs by their clients. This avoidance reinforces the strategy of 
using contractors, with their low labour costs. Cibin and Grant (1996) argue that 
in the oil and chemicals sector, over a considerable period of time, there had 
developed a focus on internal 'static' efficiency, which was in the process of 
being replaced by its 'dynamic' cousin. But there is a relative dearth of information 
in the literature on 'dynamic efficiency' - on the crucial link between contractors, 
craft industrial relations and maintenance on the one hand, and plant productivity 
on the other. Contracting and supply-chain issues are generally ignored, and 
vertical-integration is taken as a given (e.g. Sampson, 1975; Yergin, 1991). Yet 
the key issue in maintenance is not budget (unlike the wider construction 
activities in the ECI) but schedule. Plants are run at capacity and 'downtime' 
catmot be made up later through overtime. 
Ahlstrand's intensive study (1990) demonstrated how at Esso's Fawley refinery, 
as early as 1975, 'static' efficiency needs resulted in a change to the structure of 
the internal craft workforce by the removal of craft demarcations through 
derecognition of the relevant unions. This strategy has extended across the client 
firms. Table 15.1 shows the results of more widespread craft derecognitions 
within the internal labour forces of the client firms in recent times. 
Table 15.1 arguably shows the effect of the strategy of increasing 'static 
efficiency' by removing craft demarcations of the intemal maintenance workforce 
through derecognitions. With a new concem for 'dynamic efficiency' the 
question is, how were the client's plants to increase the efficiency of contractors 
in R&M? The clients already used construction firms because they were cheaper 
than in-house provision, but these ECI firms were apparently only 50 per cent 
efficient according to NEDO. Was further action necessary? Were the craft 
unions to be derecognised as they had been in the client firms? What were the 
altematives? Could the NAECI act as a coordinating device? 
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Table 15.1 	 Trade Union derecognition in major UK oil 
companies 
BP Chemicals (Raglan Bay) 
BP Oil (Liandarcy) 
Esso (Fawley) 
Mobil (Coryton) 
Mobil (Birkenhead) 
Shell UK (Shellhaven) 
Shell UK (Stanlow) 
Craft and process operators, 
Craft and process operators 
Craft and process operators 
Craft and administrative 
Craft and administrative 
Craft and process operators 
Craft and administrative 
Source: Adapted from the House of Commons' Select Committee report 
•The future of Trade Unions' evidence from the TGWU (House of 
Commons, 1994). 
15.3 Contracting and its low-productivity culture 
There is an employer discourse around the idea, if not the exact nature, of 
productivity and efficiency, which is often based (wrongly, according to Goldratt 
and Cox, 1993) on input (labour) and output ratios. This is a key concept in 
unravelling the culture of the work of contractors. The survey evidence of Cross 
(1989) showed increasing subcontracting and decreasing direct labour, caused by 
the economics of the 'production function' where, in the shod run, only labour 
can be cut and where efficiency equates to productivity. 'Where this is set as 
'output per employee', the internal loss ofjobs does not have to mean loss of 
tasks or expertise, as these can be made up for by using contractors. Though such 
a crude, neo-classical idea of efficiency has been extensively criticised (e.g. by 
Marginson, 1993), it may still be a driving force for managements. 
The ECI needed to address this problem, and it was a large one. It required a 
change in the culture of the construction industry as it affected the clients - from 
under-utilisation of labour to the short-term goals of the ECI firms themselves as 
well as their employees. This culture had resulted in the infamous inter-trade 
'demarcation disputes' mentioned above. There was no NAECI in R&M, the 
predominant branch of the industry: no coordination mechanism except the local 
site agreements. Thus, the sites had none of the advantages ascribed to the ECI in 
construction of'new build' projects. In contrast to Williams' assertion that the 
NAECI played an important role, Korczynski (1993) argued that only the emergence 
of the coordinating managing contractor solved the inherent weaknesses of 
the employment situation. Of course, it could be a joint achievement. 
Nevertheless, this culture of low pay, insecurity and low productivity had led 
to a situation where Lloyd (1990) in his History of The EETPU described the 
contracting culture or atmosphere as follows: 
Like much of the rest of the construction industry, contracting was a rough 
tough young man's game, with more than its fair share of sharks and tearaways 
among both employers and workpeople. With the opening and closing 
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guile'. This happens because, with less redundancy and with smaller numbers of 
agents, the contractor and his employees now have more power (porter, 1985). 
Thus, any change to small-numbers exchange should be managed carefully within 
constraints - in the case of single-union deals, this has often been accompanied 
by a no-strike clause' (Beaumont, 1990). 
Hence, TCE can provide a framework for analysis as it can encompass the 
process of management of contracts via industrial relations agreements. 
15.6 Institutional theory and isomorphism 
As an alternative to TCE, and given 'bounded rationality', an institutional 
theory framework might suggest (as did Grinyer and Spender (1979a, b, 1985) 
in their research into 'business recipes') that institutions might simply copy 
each other. Spender (1989) extended the idea of the business recipe (such as 
efficiency and productivity, as mentioned above) to a wider discussion of 
'industry recipes'. These might result, for example, from adopting concepts 
such as 'world class manufacturing' or 'strategic management' resulting in the 
so-called 'benchniarking' surveys among a group of firms. This 'industry 
recipe' would need to be shown to have originated as a method of avoiding 
blame and uncertainty, according to the literature, and not by some back-to-basics 
analysis of the economics of contracting to ECI firms, as suggested 
under ICE. 
This notion of recipes has been usefully analysed as 'isomorphism'. The latter 
word replaces the more mundane idea of a recipe' and derives from the Greek 
meaning 'similarity in unrelated forms' (Macdonald, 1977). Coined by 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983, 1991)within the framework of institutional theory, 
it extends the idea of recipes to identify three types of similarity based on causative 
factors - coercive, normative and mimetic isomorphism - which allude to the 
origin of the existing 'industry recipe'. 
Coercive isomorphism is exercised formally or informally by other organisations 
or by society via rules, laws or sanctions, including the use of 
contract and power within buyer-supplier and other inter-institutional 
relationships. 
Normative isomorphism is a process by which organisations adopt certain procedures, 
policies and structures advocated by professional bodies such as trade associations, 
universities or consultancies, and as such is more deeply hidden. 
Mimetic isomorphism takes place at a cognitive level through the adoption of 
similar practices by organisations within the same field. These may be deliberate 
and objective - by use of benchmarking exercises, for example - or they may be 
intuitive and taken for granted. More often than not they need to be culturally 
supported norms of behaviour. 
Table 15.1 showed an industry recipe of internal craft derecognition, but the 
evidence of causative factor(s) is not there: the similarity between the actions of 
the different firms may be a result of economic factors or of ideology. This is 
discussed below. 
266 Neil Ritson 
15.7 Ideology and recipes for productivity 
Origins of ideology 
Ideology can be defined as a set of inter-related belief systems which 
underpin behaviour. Salamon (2000) describes three paradigms which 
represent points of managerial and employee ideology within the employee 
relations cognate area: unitarism, pluralism and Marxism or conflict theory. 
Unitarism relates to the original paternalism of the capitalist employer, 
whether nurturing or not. Pluralism accounted for the rise to power of 
different interest groups where conflict was inevitable and reduced by a 
system of rules, such as those within Trade Union Agreements. Marxism or 
critical theory only accepts the idea of class conflict on a larger scale, and 
thereby rejects the conflict of pluralism within the rules established by capitalism. 
Pluralism is accused of dividing the general power of workers into 
separate interest groups (i.e. the trade unions). 
It has been suggested that the current managerial ideology across most sectors 
in the UK should be seen as a move from pluralism back to unitarism. This move 
is heralded by the arrival of the ideaof a 'new industrial relations' (Grant D, 
1993, 1994, 1996) and of human resource management (HRM), a set of supposedly 
new policies and process (Keenoy, 1979; Guest, 1987, 1989; Legge, 1996; 
Storey, 1992). HRM has also been termed 'macho management' (Purcell, 1982; 
Mackay, 1986).Thus, ideology may underlie the attempt by firms to provide an 
'appropriate' recipe - managements may only look in certain favourable 
directions when seeking corroboration of their position by other firms. 
Whereas the client firms formerly recognised unions at a level of almost 100 
per cent, and so had a pluralistic ideology, the derecognitions seen in Table 15.1 
suggest a dramatic change to unitarism. However, as all of the firms are subject 
to similar environmental pressures, a degree of similarity is to be expected. As 
the change has been dramatic - set as it is against almost 100 per cent unionisation 
of manual workers in the petrochemicals industries (Kelly, 1998)- and 
recent, this change would point to an economic motive. 
On the other hand, the clients are different from the UK industry norms. Many 
are American and have been through what Kochan et aL (1989) call 'the transformation 
of American industrial relations'. These authors point to the relocation of 
factories in non-union areas as part of a union-avoidance strategy. Mobil was 
singled out among such firms for its new, explicitly non-union Joliet refinery in 
Chicago. Furthermore, in the UK, Wolfson et al (1996) demonstrate the resistance 
of all these major firms to collectivisation in their 'upstream' functions, 
perhaps also deriving from a transatlantic influence. 
Thus, the question which must be addressed by TCE and institutional theory 
is whether the cause of the isomorphism seen in the craft derecognitions in 
Table 15.1 is indeed a recipe, perhaps based on a managerial ideology or, as 
identified by Cibin and Grant, an economic rationality in support of the focus 
on efficiency. 
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This evidence provided by the House of Commons' Select Committee in Table 
15.1 illustrates that the derecognition of the clients craft unions is a unifying 
feature. However, neither in the Select Conmiittee's separate reports nor 
elsewhere is there evidence given of the industrial relations issues of the large 
contractors workforces on oil and chemical plants, nor are the arrangements for 
their collective bargaining described. 
There is an important link here between the internal and the external workforces. 
Gallie (1978) noted the fear of BPs internal maintenance employees 
that contractors might take their jobs in the future. This concern turned out to 
be welt-founded: the crucial mechanism for the preponderance of internal craft 
derecognition was the substitution of available contractor labour, which 
provided leverage and subsequent exploitation of the weakness of the internal 
crafts trade unions (Claydon, 1989, 1996). Thus, the ECI firms substituted 
labour rather than adding to it when demand arose, as they had in the past. The 
question is why? This question was addressed in the research study on which 
this chapter is based. 
15.8 The research study 
The research set out to explore the basic propositions identified above regarding 
management motivations in the organisation of construction work at various 
plants. The evidence of a move to unitarism was hypothesised as the cause of the 
derecognitions in Table 15.1, but equally these might have been economically 
based due to the similar environment of the firms and the need for static efficiency 
by way of removal of craft demarcations. In this study, the client firm 
attempted to improve its dynamic efficiency - that is, the contractors' performance 
- and in so doing it had to manage the economic exchanges as described 
under TCE. 
The study began with a survey of the R&M function in the oil and chemical 
industry in the UK. This study revealed that one refinery had rejected the NAECI 
in favour of a single union agreement (SUA). This agreement was taken up by a 
neighbouring plant and subsequently by one some hundreds of miles away. The 
question raised by this isomorphism is whether the spread of the SUA idea would 
endanger the role of the NAECI in other plants by its substitution by this much 
simpler arrangement. Should the trend of SUAs continue, the Joint Council 
would lose both status and the money charged for the NAECI administration 
when it is adopted on sites. 
As discussed earlier, a deeper analysis of possible causative factors should 
give a better picture of the way in which ECI firms might be managed in other 
locations - would a 'recipe' be adopted, or would an economic calculus be 
rigorously applied instead? Data is needed at the level of the plant to assess the 
relative merits of these two alternatives: in particular is there evidence of 
extensive calculations of the costs and benefits of alternative strategies? Or, 
alternatively, is there evidence of'benchmarking' against the end results of 
others 
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The following case study is based on interviews with line managers and HR 
specialists, triangulated with the officers of the relevant trade unions and the 
industry bodies within the construction industry. 
15.9 The refinery's internal maintenance craftwork 
Productivity deals were continually introduced in the refinery during the 1960s 
(Oldfield, 1966) and 1970sand into the 19808(Young, 1986, 1992).Management 
negotiated hundreds of inter-craft flexibilities for maintenance tasks (and some 
operator-craft flexibilities). It was difficult, however, for both managers and trade 
unions to manage all these transactions effectively via 78 pages of individual 'tasksheets' 
and gradually demarcations began to reappear in the late 1970s through 
different interpretations of the wording and context (Young, 1992). 
This development led to a new craft agreement in 1984 which swept away all 
the detailed inter-craft flexibilities described in the task-sheets, and rationalised 
the craft workforce by outsourcing the lower level trades to contractors (Young, 
1986). This did not work: demarcations began to reappear and the refinery 
managers felt able to ask the unions to honour the agreement or to devise a new 
'flexible' approach. The local craft union's full-time officers (FTOs) were rigidly 
opposed to this proposition. As a result, management put more and more work 
out to contract, and advertisements for 'filly flexible craft technicians' appeared 
anonymously in the local press. This action led to the derecognition of the craft 
unions on the instigation of the craft workforce. 
However, given the success of the various tactical moves to outsource work to 
contractors, management deemed that the days of static efficiency gains were over, 
and that continual wars of attrition with the craft maintenance workforce, as in the 
recent past, were no longer an option. Economic performance problems, and 
government initiatives (Mclnnes, 1987)illustrated by BP's substantial de-layering 
and downsizing (Cibin and Grant, 1996),led them to consider dynamic efficiency. 
Subcontractors 
Previously, the refinery's own site agreement, like most others in the sector, predated 
the NAECI and followed the general principles of the existing National 
Agreement (the 'Black Book') between the Engineering Employers Federation 
and the 16 Confederation of Shipbuilding and Engineering Unions. However, its 
detail was written and controlled locally by the refinery. This agreement was not 
subject to the transforming productivity agreements in the refinery. While 
production operators were already flexible, as they all performed a broadly 
similar function, maintenance craftwork was managed under inter-trade demarcation 
arrangements (described as 'professionalism' by Stinchcombe, 1959)This 
arrangement was due partly to the difficulty of coordinating many contractors 
and the 16 trade union signatories, and the lack of economic incentive given the 
lower cost of contractor craftwork. 
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those inter-group relativities that unions usually manage (Walton and 
McKersie, 1965). In construction, an SUA solves this problem. It exists in Germany, 
for example, with Industry Group unions, and in Japanese enterprises in the UK. 
It is effectively a management device, which gives some legitimacy to change 
and yet reduces transaction costs. 
15.11 Conclusions 
Given the fact that in this case the refiner created an industryfirst, there are 
implications for other oil and chemical sites. The case could be used as a basis for 
'mimetic isomorphism. It is important to remember that the starting point for the 
refinery management was a search for an agreement that it could emulate, as seen 
in Tables Island 15.2.We might therefore see further SUAs and derecognitions 
on other sites; after the concluion of the research study, two new SUAs were 
reported to the NJC. Thus, isomorphism is a present and continuing rationale for 
management. 
If the role of economic necessity is paramount, instead of legitimacy through 
isomorphism, it may have implications for the wider engineering construction 
industry. The aims of the new agreement were basic and related to efficiency. 
The alignment with refinery working times, and the various tactical changes 
made for working in teams - a more efficient method than single-trade working and 
the loss of the washing-up and tea-break times were an example of this 
approach despite the risk of upsetting previous established practices like the 
afternoon tea-break. This latter item was highlighted in the docunients as it 
'carried an IR warning'. 
We already know from Garfit (1989) that the NAECI contained inefficient 
practices and its procedure was long and complex. Subsequent to the research 
study, according to the NJC, the economism of the SUAs led to a move to change 
the NAECI by using a local site Addendum to make the conditions and practices 
more efficient. The savings on transaction costs would then match those of the 
SUAs. This is 'stage I' of the change, based on economics. 
This new 'product' is now available to R&M operations which had previously 
rejected the full NAECI terms; using it to progress economic change is not as 
risky as an SUA as it is part of a set of legitimate National negotiations. On this 
basis, a new survey would reveal that, according to the NJC, this NAECI-SA 
(Supplementary Agreement) has been adopted in a mimetic fashion in a number 
of client firms - that is, without extensive internal economic calculations or 
justification. This is 'stage 2' of the change process. 
These analyses indicate a complex inter-relationship between economic needs 
and ideology, resulting in isomorphism, or common practices. In terms of its 
isomorphic extension to the wider construction induTstry, which has a similar 
atmosphere' and efficiency problems, there are significant barriers. There is an 
important difference between the ECI's clients and those of the wider industry, as 
discussed earlier: contractors in R&M have a relatively stable existence on the 
site, and a single local solution to local issues is therefore possible. The same is 
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not the case for construction in the wider sense, as sites are temporary and 
geographically dispersed, making the contractors and their labour force far more 
mobile. Accordingly, in coordinating these differences, a National Agreement is 
more efficient than a series of single site agreements. 
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